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ABSTRACT
The competitive dialogue procedure is a new public procurement award proce-
dure first introduced by the Directive 2004118 for the tender of particularly com-
plex contracts, when contracting authorities consider that the use of the open or
restricted procedures do not allow for the contract to be tendered. It is not in-
tended to be adopted freely as the open or restricted procedures, but contracting
authorities may use it only when the need arises and specific grounds for its use
are fulfilled. The procedure was introduced with the stated objective of increasing
the flexibility of procurement, which had been already identified as a shortcoming
of previous existing EU procurement framework.
This thesis studies how the competitive dialogue has been implemented in Portu-
gal and Spain. It covers both the legal transposition and aspects of its practice in
these countries., through the use of empirical research methods.
Through his research, the author has found that the procedure was implemented
very differently in Portugal and Spain with consequences on its use. This study
has tried to highlight similarities and differences in the transposition, illustrate
how the competitive dialogue is being used in Spain and explain why it is being
used only sparingly in Portugal.
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Chapter I - Introduction
I. Introduction
The aim of this research project is to study how competitive dialogue has been
implemented in Portugal and Spain. It covers both the legal transposition and as-
pects of its practice in these countries. The competitive dialogue procedure is a
new public procurement award procedure first introduced by the Directive
2004h8 for the tender of particularly complex contracts, when contracting au-
thorities consider that the use of the open or restricted procedures do not allow
for the contract to be tendered. It is not intended to be adopted freely as the
open or restricted procedures, but contracting authorities may use it only when
the need arises and specific grounds for its use are fulfilled.The procedure was in-
troduced with the stated objective of increasing the flexibility of procurement,
which had been already identified as a shortcoming of previous existing EU pro-
curement framework. Academics researching the procedure at EU-level have
found a number of potential issues that may affect its usefulness regarding the
stated aims. It can be argued that those issues may be relevant in any Member
State that transposed the competitive dialogue.
.1. Research questionts)
The main question the author wants to address is the phenomenon of competi-
tive dialogue's implementation in Portugal and Spain. This can be defined as the
analysis of the legal concept of competitive dialogue as introduced by the Direc-
tive 2004118, the extent that it is used and the way it is used in Portugal and
Spain.
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The author did not start his research wanting to validate a theory developed be-
forehand but with the desire of studying the implementation of competitive dia-
logue in these countries. As no previous study has been carried on this field in
these countries, the current research has an exploratory nature. This has had an
impact in the choice of methods employed in this research (doctrinal legal analy-
sis, empirical research, comparative legal analysis and interviews with law makers
in Portugal), which will be explained in detail in the next chapter.
By researching the implementation, the author intends to assess firstly, the way
the procedure was transposed into national legislation. Secondly, the author wants
to study the practice relating to, and perceptions of, legal rules. By practice, the
author means the way participants in the procedure interpret, apply and perceive
competitive dialogue legal rules in Portugal and Spain. I t does not mean the
entire practice relating to competitive dialogue, although where potential non-le-
gal issues (such as the monetary cost or the duration of the procedure) were refer-
enced in literature, they were studied.
It can be thus said that the primary aim of this research project is to examine the
"law in books" and the "living" procurement law in the area of competitive dia-
logue in Portugal and Spain, so as to increase the understanding of the procedure.
As will be explained in further detail in Chapter 4, competitive dialogue is a new
public procurement award procedure, regarding which academics have raised a
number of questions at EU level. It was introduced by the Directive 2oo41I8 as a
novelty and allegedly important innovation for public procurement. Since thor-
ough research at the national level regarding competitive dialogue's implementa-
tion is yet to be conducted, one can argue that a need exists for studies to be car-
ried out, with a particular focus on exploratory research.
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To achieve the stated aim, one should understand firstly why competitive dia-
logue procedure has been introduced by the Directive 2004118. What were the
motivations behind its creation? What needs was it supposed to address? What
were its objectives? In what circumstances was it supposed to be used? The an-
swers provided to these questions in Chapter 4, create a framework that provides
a backdrop for the study of the phenomenon in Portugal and Spain. More so, the
category of "particularly complex contracts" defined as the scope of application of
competitive dialogue in Directive 2004h8, and the examples set forth by the Eu-
ropean Commission in its various documents, allows for an anchor to be devised
which will then render possible the comparison between the target countries.
With that blueprint in mind it is thus possible to conduct research in the target
countries identifying the common ground and any differences between them and
the original idea.
This research will analyse the cases where the procedure has indeed been used in
practice and situations where the procedure might have been used - in face of the
aims set forth in Directive 2004118 and by the European Commission for it - but
other options may have been adopted. This approach covers, firstly the anticipat-
ed use of the procedure in the target countries, secondly its use outside those sit-
uations and finally, its non-use in anticipated projects.
There are three compelling reasons for selecting Portugal and Spain for this re-
search, with a fourth subjective reason playing part also. Firstly, their legal
regimes are usually not researched abroad or published in other languages, in par-
ticular in English. Therefore, national experience or solutions locally developed
are not known externally and arguably deserve to be studied so as to inform deci-
sion makers elsewhere. In procurement in general, both countries have a rich his-
tory and practice of procurement rules dating well before their accession to the
European Union. Since both countries have awarded "particularly complex con-
tracts" before 2004, and arguably been faced the same issues that led to the cre-
ation of competitive dialogue, then it may be relevant to assess if a tool that has
been developed at EU level is of use in them.
Secondly, due to the novel nature of competitive dialogue procedure, as we have
mentioned above in this section, at this stage no research involving mixed meth-
ods (doctrinal legal analysis and empirical research) had been undertaken.
The third reason is connected with the close relationship between both coun-
tries. They are geographically close, sharing a border and semi-isolated from the
rest of continental Europe through the Pyrenees. Both have transitioned to
democracy in the 1970S after fourty years of authoritarian rule. As we will see in
Chapters 5 and 8 Portugal and Spain share a common heritage regarding public
procurement. One could arguably expect some differences but not huge discrep-
ancies in their transpositions of competitive dialogue. However, they have trans-
posed the procedure in markedly different ways. Portugal opted for a very de-
tailed transposition with law makers tuning the procedure to fit it in the national
framework, whereas Spain has followed a more straightforward path. In addition
to these differences at legislative level, it is appropriate to assess if common
ground and differences can be found at the practice level when competitive dia-
logue is being used for awarding contracts.
These have sparked a number of academic questions for the author. Is there legal
uncertainty on each transposition? Is competitive dialogue useful or used at all in
either country? How does it fit in the existing national frameworks or procure-
ment culture? Have any strategies been developed to conduct the procedure with-
in possible limitations? Do stakeholders perceive this procedure as a positive in-
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novation or a lost opportunity to tackle procurement problems? Is it being used
as anticipated at the time of its creation?
Fourthly, and arguably a minor reason to shape the research undertaken albeit
still relevant, the author has a keen interest in public procurement issues in both
countries. Such interest is due to his experience as a lawyer in Portugal and Spain.
Furthermore, the contacts and knowledge provided by the professional experi-
ence of the author proved useful in subsequent stages of the research.
In consequence of the above the research questions the author will address in this
research are the following:
I. How was competitive dialogue implemented in each target country?
2. Why is it not being used more in Portugal?
3. What are the legal issues surrounding the procedure?
4· What other issues, if any, can be found in practice?
5. What best practices, if any, can be found in practice?
3. Research objectives
Having exposed the research questions of this project in the previous section, it is
necessary to provide a further explanation of its objectives. As no previous study
has been carried on this field in these countries, it is expected that the informa-
tion produced in the course of the research will help understand the value and
problems of the procedure in Portugal and Spain and how it fits alongside alterna-
tives available to contracting authorities in these countries.
From a lege data perspective, the information gathered can help develop case law
in the target countries and guide the interpretation of the procedure in its real
world use. In Spain, it may inform the guidelines that procurement advisory bod-
ies may issue. Furthermore, it may be helpful for practitioners, contracting au-
thorities and private companies participating in competitive dialogue procedures
in these countries. In fact, the author's research was met with a degree of interest
by respondents in Portugal and Spain that have requested him to submit them
the findings.
From a legeferenda point of view, the findings of this research may be of use for in-
forming future legislation in the target countries, giving the law makers access to
data that they would otherwise not have. Outside the target countries, this re-
search may have a similar usefulness for other member States in the process of
transposing competitive dialogue or intending to review it in future legislation.
At EU level the product of this research may be of use by providing information
about the value and problems of the procedure. Upcoming reviews of the Direc-
tive 2004118 can also benefit from the data collected in this research.
4·Structure
This thesis is comprised of II chapters, including the present introductory
chapter.
Chapter 2 will present the methodology adopted in this thesis. It will explain and
discuss the methods (doctrinal legal analysis, empirical research, interviews with
the Portuguese law makers and comparative law) used during this research. It is
divided into different sections, one for each method used (doctrinal legal analysis,
interviews with the law makers, empirical research and comparative law).
Chapter 3 is focused on providing an overview of the public procurement frame-
work in Europe. It is divided into five main sections. I t covers the public procure-
ment evolution in the Europe Union, the principles, treaty provisions and Direc-
tives applicable to public procurement.
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Chapter 4 deals with the competitive dialogue as it is included in Directive
20041I8. It is divided into four main sections. Itwill detail the characteristics of
the procedure in the EU framework and the main issues with the procedure
raised by academics.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the current procurement in Portugal and its
procurement history. It is divided into three sections. It will explain the public
procurement framework in the country and its main characteristics. The main fo-
cus is on the current Public Contracts Code (Law 1812008).
Chapter 6 details how the competitive dialogue has been transposed in the Por-
tuguese legislation. It is divided into six main sections. It presents the procedure,
its main features and also the most relevant issues. Furthermore, the results of the
interviews with the persons involved in the draft of the Public Contracts Code
are included in this chapter, since they were taken into account when drafting it.
Chapter 7will present the findings of the empirical research stage on Portugal. It
is divided into 15 sections by type of issue detected by the author.
Chapter 8 covers the procurement framework in Spain and its characteristics. It
is divided into four main sections. The principal focus is on the current Law on
Public Sector Contracts (Law3°12007).
Chapter 9 explains how the competitive dialogue has been transposed to the
Spanish national legal framework. It is divided into four main sections. As with
Chapter 6, it presents the procedure, its main features and most relevant issues.
In Chapter IQ the findings of the empirical research on Spain will be discussed. It
is divided into 21 sections. As with Chapter 7 it is also divided by type of issue de-
tected by the author.
Finally, in Chapter II we will recap and compare the findings in both countries, as
well as answer the five research question presented above.
50 Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced the research questionts) the author wants to
answer. We have briefly seen what is the competitive dialogue procedure and why
it is relevant to research it in Portugal and Spain. In the next chapter we will see
the methodology and methods employed by the author in this research.
Chapter 2 -Methodology
I. Introduction
This chapter explains the methodology adopted for this research project. Section
2 exposes the methods adopted and methodology followed. This section is subdi-
vided by each of the methods used, doctrinal legal analysis, interviews with the
law makers, empirical research and comparative law.
z.Afetbodse~ployed
The research undertaken by the author has an exploratory nature. It was set to
investigate a specific phenomenon in depth, which is the implementation of com-
petitive dialogue in Portugal and Spain. No previous research had been conducted
in these two countries on the procedure. As such, issues, answers or theories were
yet to be identified or developed.
To achieve the stated aim of analysing the implementation of competitive dia-
logue in the target countries, the research could not be focused only on a legal
analysis of the "law in the books". This is still a very much needed method in the
research conducted due to the data it provides.' However, further methods are
necessary to provide a more complete picture of the procedure. As such, a mixed
method approach was adopted. Adopting more than one method allows for an
holistic assessment of the procedure. In particular it makes possible to check how
it was transposed and used in practice.
The fact that the nature of the research is exploratory frames the choice of the
methods to use. The author has adopted both qualitative and comparative meth-
I. In Portugal, in particular, where the law makers opted to elaborate further than the regulation included
in Directive 1004/18. In this country the legal analysis conduct was extremely important.
ods as the most appropriate ones to undertake the current research, for the rea-
sons that will now be explained.
On an exploratory study, research is concerned with the depth of the investiga-
tion' and not its breadth. It is more relevant to investigate in more detail a spe-
cific phenomenon than to find patterns across multiple phenomena. This balance
between depth and breadth of research is a critical trade-off between what meth-
ods to adopt in research.' With the focus clearly in the depth of investigation, the
methods to use could only be the ones more likely to provide purposeful answers
to the research questions proposed.
Quantitative methods were also considered by the author at the development
stage.' However, for the goals of this research - to examine a phenomenon in de-
pth for the first time - quantitative research would not be adequate as it is primar-
ily concerned with the measurement of a wide range of phenomena and noting
frequencies or pattern distribution across data.' It is more interested with num-
bers and averages rather than meaning or content," aiming to generate statistical
data, discovering patterns and formulating rules allowing future behaviour to be
predicted through statistical tests of significance.' These are not the aims of the
present research. It was anticipated that the priorities of this research and its ex-
ploratory nature would be better served by means of a qualitative research.
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is more geared to such inquiry as it al-
lows for individual experiences to be harvested and processed." Since this is an ex-
ploratory study, it is more important to understand correctly the issues raised
2. Patton, ~/itative evaluation and researchmethods (Sage Publications, "NO), p. 16~-166.
3. Ibid., p. ,62-,63·
4· On quantitative research please sec, Denscombe, The good research/l;Uide(jrd cd, ()pcn University Press,
2007), Bryman, Socia! researchmethoddOxford V niversity Press, 2004).
5· Black, 'The boundaries of legal sociology' (,972) 8. Yale 1411.1Journal, p.1086.
6. Bryman, Social researcbmethods (Oxford U niversity Press, 1004), p. 166.
7. Denscombe, The good researcb/l;Uldt(jrd ed, Open University Press, 1007), p. Il}H-IOO.
8. On qualitative research please see, for all, Mason, ~/itat;vt rtstarchinfl, (Sage Publicarions, 2001),
Bryman, Social researtb methods (Oxford L niversity Press, 1004).
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than to find its patterns. True, numbers are still relevant in a qualitative research
such as this one. It is important to know the total number of competitive dia-
logue procedures on each country, for instance. But that is not the focus of the
research. Its focus is to find how competitive dialogue was implemented and
used, thus revealing potential problems and practices developed by the direct par-
ticipants in the target countries.
It should be stated that after exploratory research has been conducted, quantita-
tive analysis is relevant for a subsequent development study to provide further in-
formation on the topic. After this initial stage where competitive dialogue has
just been transposed, quantitative methods could be used, for instance to provide
statistics on the number of procedures initiated and concluded or economic
benchmarks to assess the savings obtained by contracting authorities who have
adopted it.
Further to its exploratory nature, the author started his research with no prior
theory he wanted to test during the empirical phase. It was expected that from
data analysis emerging categories could be found and the data collection phase re-
fined as permitting such theories to gradually develop grounded in the data."
To close the circle of analysis, as two countries are being researched and there is
an EU model of the procedure involved aswell, it was necessary to include a com-
parative perspective. Comparative law research is undertaken to improve knowl-
edge of the law and also to understand the law in context. to This perspective al-
9. This means the approach adopted by the author is close to some of the key ten nets of grounded theory,
such as the theory to be developed through empirical data analysis (and not purely doctrinal legal research),
the key issues of research being allowed to evolve during the research phase according to the data collected,
and the data collection process to be concluded only when data saturation is achieved, that is, the new data
recently collected is not yielding new information. As such, it is impossible to foretell the exact number of
interviews that will be conducted. On grounded theory please see, for all,Charmaz, Constructing grounded
theory (Sage Publications, 2006), Strauss and Corbin, Basics of qualitative research.' techniques and procedures for
developing grounded theory (Sage Publications, 1998) and Glaser and Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory
(Aldine Publishing Company, 1967)' ..
10. Orucu, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law: a handhook (Hart,
2007), p. 53.
lows for the demonstration of the similarities and differences between each
country and the EL"and between the countries themselves."
Finally, and although it was not anticipated at the outset of the development of
this project, it was decided to conduct interviews with Portuguese law makers to
explain the numerous differences between the national transposition and the EU
version of the procedure. Having carried these interviews before the start of the
qualitative research dispelled some of the author's uncertainties and focused the
subsequent research on more pressing issues.
b)Doctrinal legal analysis
Research started by conducting a legal analysis of available sources. Doctrinal
studies of law use interpretive methods to examine different sources of law, with
the aim of discovering its rules and principles to then systematise and employ
them on a descriptive analysis and normative evaluation." Through this process,
both primary and secondary sources were examined at EU and national levels.
Regarding primary sources, research was conducted firstly by analysing EU Direc-
tive 2oo41I8, the relevant articles of the EU Treaty, as well as the Commission's
Green Papers and Explanatory Note on competitive dialogue, to frame regulation
at European level.
Subsequently, the laws of the countries were also analysed where relevant for the
purposes of this study. It led to the identification of competitive dialogue charac-
teristics in each country and a preliminary listing of potential issues related with
the transposition of the procedure.
II. On comparative law, for all, please see Zweigert and Kotz, Introduction to com/NIrat"'t ItIW (Oxford
L'niversity Press, 19<)8) and Bogdan, Comparative liIW (Kluwer Norstedrs Juridik Tano, 11)94)' .
11. Banakar and Travers, 'Law, Sociology and Method' in Banakar and Travers (eds), Theory tmd mlthod '"
Jocio-Ie!{alrmtlf'ch (} Iart, 100~),P.7.
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In addition to primary sources, available literature in the form of books and jour-
nals was also reviewed" (secondary sources). Once more, this was carried at both
EU and national levels, by accessing both electronic resources and printed materi-
als. Documents were researched in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan and
French.
Since competitive dialogue was originally established at EU level in 2004, before
transposition to the national legislations in 2007 and 2008, it was anticipated
more literature would be available at EU level. This insight was proved correct.
However, the few secondary national sources found were analysed as well.
Doctrinal legal analysiswas particular important in the Portugal. As we will see in
Chapter 6, the transposition of competitive dialogue was very detailed and the
law makers introduced a number of differences in relation to the Directive's
version.
Most of the issues brought to the qualitative or empirical research phase were
found in this process of legal analysis. Some of the potential issues previously
identified were then dropped in the subsequent empirical research when not
grounded in the collected data.
(2) Interviews with law makers
At the beginning of 2009, after the bulk of the doctrinal legal analysis had been
concluded, it appeared that the very detailed transposition adopted by Portugal
raised a number of questions such as why to forbid the phased elimination of can-
didates or mandating the drafting of a common set of specifications at the end of
dialogue stage. From this process, it appeared that further explanations were
13. Such as Public Procurement Law Review (PPLR), European Law Review (ELR), European Public-
Private Partnerships Law (EPPL) or Common Market Law Review (CML).
needed to better frame and maxrrruse the outcome of the empirical research
phase. In addition, as gaining access to the persons involved in the drafting
process was possible, it was decided to interview these respondents.
A gatekeeper" in the drafting team was approached and this person was key to
identifying further respondents who might be available to speak on the record
about the implementation of competitive dialogue in the Public Contracts Code.
In total, four relevant persons were identified and invited for interviews.
These four persons can be divided into two groups. Two persons were members
of the legal consultant team who actually drafted the law. The other two intervie-
wees were members of different Government departments and participated in
the drafting process from the political side, offering suggestions, amendments or
criticisms to the successive working drafts. Both of these respondents have law
degrees and occupy legal advisory posts. Although the formal law maker of the
Public Contracts Code is the Portuguese National Government, as the body that
approved the law, these individuals are the ones who most significantly shaped
competitive dialogue in the legislative process. One can say they are the material
authors of competitive dialogue in Portugal.
Of the four persons, one declined to speak on the record. To preserve anonymity,
it was then decided not to identify any of the respondents in the text. Further-
more, all data gathered by the conversation off the record were used only as input
for the remaining interviews.
These interviews were conducted in late March 2009 and tape recorded, with
notes taken. The notes were subsequently expanded as quickly as possible after
'4. By gatekeeper the author means in this thesis any person he personally knows that could inrroduce or
put him in touch with prospective respondents.
the interview had ended. The guide for conducting the interviews can be found at
the end of this thesis as Annex III.
The interviews undertaken at this stage were not part of the empirical research
phase per se, but were needed to inform the author of the best path to follow in
his research. The insights gathered from them much improved the author's inter-
pretation of the Portuguese law and provided useful information for the subse-
quent phase of empirical research. Furthermore, they allowed for the develop-
ment of an important network in Portugal, which facilitated the process of
identifying research participants for the empirical research.
There are two reasons for the same type of interviews not to have been conduct-
ed in Spain. First and foremost, Spain has not further elaborated on the Directive
regarding competitive dialogue, thus reducing the anticipated value of potential
insight to be gathered from a similar process. The scope for information to be
harvested was much smaller in comparison with Portugal. There was also less
need of searching for explanations from the lawmakers.
Secondly, the author contacted a small number of academic experts in public pro-
curement in Spain who were unanimous in stating that the Law on Public Con-
tracts was drafted exclusively by civil servants within the National Government
without recourse to external experts. This reduced the potential number of peo-
ple available to interview. Furthermore, the said academics informed the author it
would be difficult to pinpoint the exact civil servants who might have information
to impart. Based in their own negative experience, they advised against reaching
such key personnel. In face of the difficulties and the anticipated lack of relevant
information that could be accessed, it was decided not to conduct a similar
process in Spain.
(3) Empirical research
In order to conduct the qualitative research a technique for the collection of data
had to be chosen. The choice of technique is dependent on the type of informa-
tion best suited to achieve the aims of the study and potential constraints that
may limit the availability of techniques.
In face of the aims of the research, the process that was deemed that could pro-
vide more relevant data to be analysed would he the interview of people with di-
rect experience in the use of procedure. It was expected that conducting semi-
structured interviews" with experts involved in the use of competitive dialogue in
the target countries would yield thick data for the subsequent analysis.
This approach has been adopted successfully in the past years in research projects
developed within the Public Procurement Research Group." The current project
benefited from the accumulated experience from those pathfinding projects.
Since this research was conducted as part of a Ph.D. two major constraints were
present. Firstly, time was of the essence and of the total of three years. roughly
half was reserved for the collection and analysis of empirical data. Secondly. costs
had to be taken into account and it was set an approximate budget of 1000
pounds for the interviews. These costs were covered by the School of Law of the
University of Nottingham.
IS· The differences between structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews is explained 10 detail
in the section (c) hereunder.
16. The projects were undertaken by Braun, Tbe prtlrtictll impart of E. fJ I~blir /'rorurtmtnt iJU,' on PH
procurtment prectic« in the United Kinfl"dom (ZOO I) and Pachnou, Tbe tff,ctivtlfm of biddtr remtditl/or ,,,}om,,,, tht
EC publir procurement rules: iI case ltudy of the puhlir wo,'" sector in tht (Inittd Kin"dom ilnd (;"trt (sooa). The- "nt
project was focused in assessing the impact of EU law on PFI procurement pracrirc in the lK durilllt the
1990'S, obtaining a complete picture of PFI eractiee in the light of the arparrnt divergence between the law
and commercial procurement requirements. Ihe second project analysl"l side hy side hiddcr rrmedl(,s 10 the
L'K and Greece to ..ssess the extent that a system of bidder remedies is an effertiv(, mechanism to enforre'
procurement rules.
Therefore, it was decided to adopt interviews as the method for gathering data
from the field. At the start of the research, a tentative goal of 30 interviewees per
country was considered appropriate to prepare the empirical research phase.
(a) Choice of participants
To conduct empirical research through interviews, one needs firstly to identify
within the wider population the research participants targeted by it. As we have
mentioned in the previous section, the population of research participants of this
project in general would be competitive dialogue participants in the target
countries.
Three categories of potential respondents" were identified: contracting authori-
ties, lawyers and public procurement advisory bodies." Itwas anticipated mem-
bers of these categories could provide answers relevant to the research. Another
category - private companies - was initially considered, but was excluded due to
the need to carry out the research within the time and cost constraints. In addi-
tion, it was felt respondents from the other categories would provide more an-
swers related to legal issues surrounding the implementation of competitive dia-
logue. Furthermore, contracting authorities have a more important role in those
legal issues since they not only apply the legal rules but also determine how the
procedure will develop. Having said this, the author believes that knowing the
opinion of companies that have participated in competitive dialogue is relevant
since they could provide information on why they did or did not apply for judicial
review. However, such research will have to be carried out in another project.
17. All respondents are mentioned in the male form irrespective of gender.
18. Public procurement advisory bodies were only interviewed in Spain as we will see in detail in Chapter 8.
From the categories of potential respondents selected - contracting authorities,
lawyers and public procurement advisory bodies - it is necessary to check who are
the key persons who can provide useful information about the implementation in
practice of the procedure. This is, however, an iterative process."
(b) Sampling
In a broad sense, sampling of participants is a principle and a set of procedures to
identify, choose and gain access to relevant data sources." Samples in qualitative
research tend not to be chosen randomly" or be representative" of the wider pop-
ulation as with quantitative studies."
In face of the stated aims of this research of identifying in depth a phenomenon
which has not been researched previously, the most suitable method for sampling
is purposeful or theoretical sampling." Theoretical sampling is concerned with
constructing a sample which is meaningful at theoretical and empirical levels," as
this type of sampling builds in certain characteristics with the aim of developing
and testing the theory.
By this process, the researcher collects, codes and analyses his data to decide
where to gather data next." Theoretical sampling involves starting with data, de-
19· Cassell and Symon, 'Stakeholder analysis' in Cassell and Symon (eds), ~l/4lit.Jtive melhodJ in o,.".,ni:JliOlWI
researcb: a practical guide (Sage Publications, 1(94), p. 196.
20. Mason, ~/itativtrtstarch;"fl. (Sage Publications, aooz), p. 121.
21. Ibid., P .IZO.
22. Ibid., p. 125.
Z3· Ibid., p. 123 and Strauss and Corbin, Basics of qwlitalive rtJtarch : Itfhniqrm "nd proctdurt1 for dtwlopi"R
groufllkd thtory (Sage Publications, 1(98) p. ZI;1'
24. On this kind of sampling in general, Charmaz, Constructing flTOundtd theory (Sagc Pu"Iil'3llOn~. 1006)
96-113, Mason, ~/il4tiw reuarchinll. (Sage Publications, 1002) p.1l0-1l~, Strauss and emllin, /Wsi(J of
qwlitativt researtb : techniques and proctdures for dtvtlopin!l. groundtd theory (Sagc Puhlil'atiuns, 1()98) p. 201-ll~.
Patton, How to UStqwlitatiw methods in tvaluation (Sage Publications, 1,)117) p. W6,) and (ilascr and Strauss,
Thediscovery~grOUndtdtheOry <Aldine Publishing Company, 1(67) p.4n8
25. Mason, itativt rmarchill!l. (Sage Publications, 2001), p. 124.
26. Glaser an Strauss, TINdiscoveryof flTOulldtdtheory (Aldine Publishing Company, 1.,67), p. 4~.
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veloping tentative ideas about such data and checking them through further
research."
This is a mainly inductive process. I t allows the theory to be gradually developed
according to the data collected from the field, which analysis is conducted while
collection is still taking place." These characteristics make for an iterative
process of theory development. As such, the findings and potential emerging the-
ories are tested against the data that is still being collected."
The theory is considered conceptually adequate when data saturation has been
achieved, that is, when the data collection process is no longer providing new in-
formation and is simply reinforcing the theory developed."
To carry out the present research, a theoretically meaningful sample had to be de-
fined. To do so, the author had first to identify the experts or key people in each
part of the wider population of research participants. The use of experts within
the wider population ensures that available means for the research are focused on
the participants who can provide the most useful data.
(i) Sampling in Portugal
As mentioned above, the original research plan was to interview experts with ex-
perience in applying competitive dialogue procedure. However, as Moltke would
say, "no campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy. " In Portugal, the lack of
use of the procedure led to a necessary adaptation of the research project to the
reality in the field. The sampling was thus focused on experts with and without
experience in the use of the procedure.
27. Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory (Sage Publications, 2006), p. 102.
28. It can be said that theoretical sampling is in this sense, emergent, Ibid., p. 104.
29· Ibid., p. !O3 and Strauss and Corbin, Basics of qualitative research: techniques and procedures for developing
grounded theory (Sage Publications, (998), p. 203-
30. Glaser and Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory (Aldine Publishing Company, (967) p.6.
Firstly, it was deemed relevant to approach the few contracting authorities which
have used competitive dialogue procedure as to identify the key decision makers
who were responsible for the choice of the procedure and the persons within the
structure in charge of the procedure itself. Depending on the responses. the au-
thor then proceeded to interview these persons, all internal legal advisers. The au-
thor interviewed three contracting authorities that had experience using competi-
tive dialogue. Out of the remaining two, one declined to take part and the other
was too far from concluding the procedure to provide useful information.
Secondly, as we have mentioned before, the number of competitive dialogue pro-
cedures held in Portugal during the course of this research was extremely limited.
Therefore, to have a more complete picture of the reality it was necessary to
broaden the scope of experts to interview. Since we are now standing on hypo-
thetical premises - situations where competitive dialogue might have been used
but was not - a more purposeful sampling is needed and this is where theoretical
sampling comes into play. It was then decided to include the leading lawyers in
procurement - the ones expected to know about competitive dialogue and to have
a legal opinion on most of its issues - and contracting authorities that although
they had not used the procedure, could have been expected to. This would allow
the author to come close to the tentative target of 30 interviews in Portugal.
As such it is important to define what are those hypothetical situations and who
to contact. Since the procedure is potentially available to all contracting authori-
ties, entities from each type of contracting authorities had to be considered. Na-
tional Government, autonomous regions governments (two), local authorities
(317) and bodies governed by public law (whose number is impossible to quantify)
were thus considered.
In face of the numbers involved, theoretical sampling was used to define the par-
ticipants of the population that would probably yield more useful information.
Since competitive dialogue is a procedure which is geared for the award of com-
plex contracts, the National Government, which awards a number of complex
projects, was considered a safe place to start. Furthermore, during the law mak-
ers' interview phase at the beginning of 2009, one of the respondents informed
the author that it was envisaged that some complex projects - mainly public-pri-
vate partnerships - where competitive dialogue might have been used in theory
would be awarded by other procedures. This respondent acted as a gatekeeper
and pointed out the key decision makers in the relevant departments or min-
istries inside the Government. The author interviewed the head of procurement
of one Ministry that is known to award contracts that one could theoretically
consider as complex.
Autonomous Regional Governments (from the Madeira and Azores islands) were
also considered as probable to award complex contracts. As the author was ac-
quainted with a legal advisor in one of those, such advisor was approached and
acted as a gatekeeper to identify the complex contracts awarded by the Regional
Government and the key decision makers responsible for the non-use of competi-
tive dialogue when it could have been used. However, with the passing of time it
became clear it would be impossible to secure an interview.
The large number of local authorities made it impossible to establish contact with
all of them. Therefore a balance had to be struck between the ones with the
biggest budgets and a higher probability of awarding complex contracts and
smaller local authorities. The author identified gatekeepers in eight different local
contracting authorities and also cold called a few more. I t was not possible to se-
cure any interview either through the gatekeepers {whowere not even able to in-
troduce the author} or through the author's own efforts. However. since some of
the lawyers interviewed advise local authorities. the answers they have provided
are relevant also for practice in these authorities due to their importance in the
conduct of procurement in such entities.
Since the number of bodies governed by public law is impossible to quantify in
advance, the research had to be focused on a selected few, again following the
same line of thought developed for the local authorities. The author was able to
conduct seven interviews in such contracting authorities. These operated in vari-
ous sectors and included three authorities in the utilities sector." one major hos-
pital, one university and a regulatory body, P Five of the respondents were internal
legal advisers, one was the director and the other the head of procurement. In
one of the entities the director and the internal legal adviser were interviewed
since they had different outlooks on the procedure.
Finally, the expertise of lawyers in general was needed to complement the dataset.
Theoretical sampling had also to be employed to select the research participants,
To achieve this, making use of the author's own experience as a lawyer in the field
of public procurement and the Legalsoo guide (http://www.legalsoo.l"om/c/portu-
gal) in 2009 it was possible to identify the law firms which tend to participate in
procurement. This guide recommended 12 law firms as experts in the field of pub-
lic law in Portugal." The author contacted all of them with two declining to take
part, citing their lack of experience with the procedure. Through these inter-
views, it became apparent that there were other lawyers (four) with a strong repu-
31. The actual sectors are nor Identified since they are the ~ole entity lind it would amount tu vlolale the
confidentiality agreement signed with the respondents. BOlh entities lire known tu (,(,"dun prr)(-urcmcnt
procedures following not only the utilities rules hut also the puhhc sector rules n Wt' wtll IItMU\\ In further
detail in Chapter 5 hereunder.
}2- As with the sectors in the utilities authorities. identifying the sector of this t'nlilY would makt' II very
easy to pinpoint the exact contracting auhtority and. eventually. the respondcn iuelf.
33. As we will discuss in Chapter 5. in Portugal public procurement ref'Ulalinn dt'fivt'~ (rum puhllt' ~.
Departments in law firms in Portuaal tend to be divided hy areas of law except smallt'f "boutique firms. for
instance. from the 12 firms Identified. 10 have specific departments of puhh(' law and only two have not, as
they arc smaller and cater specifically to puhlic law.
tation in public procurement that did not appear in the Legalyoo guide and were
highly regarded by their peers. In two law firms it was deemed appropriate to in-
terview two lawyers since they had extensive non-overlapping expertise and po-
tentially differing views on the procedure. In total, the author has interviewed 16
lawyers in Portugal. The lawyers had between 7 and 25 years of practice experi-
ence. All of them were either partners or senior associates in their respective law
firms.
In total the author conducted 27 interviews in Portugal: 16 with lawyers, eight
with contracting authorities without experience using competitive dialogue pro-
cedure and three with contracting authorities who have used it. It became appar-
ent after the first round of interviews that the ones with lawyers were yielding
more relevant data for the purposes of this investigation. This was due to the fact
that most questions were focused on legal issues," the lack of use of the proce-
dure and the fact lawyers have a more holistic view of national law as they provide
services to both private and public entities. It was thus decided to saturate this
category of respondents firstly and as the number of contracting authorities that
had used competitive dialogue was small, complement the research with a sample
of entities that had not used the procedure. The interviews were carried in Octo-
ber 2009, December 2009, March 2010, May 2010 and June 2010.
(ii) Sampling in Spain
Since the total number of competitive dialogue procedures initiated in the coun-
try was 30 at the end of 2009, it was decided to keep the sampling focused on the
experts with actual experience in using competitive dialogue." The sampling was
34. As can be seen by the interview guide attached as Annex IV.
35· As in the previous sub-section on Portugal, the detailed overview of the respondents will be given in
Chapter 7 when the findings are presented.
aimed at identifying the key decision makers who were responsible for the choice
of the procedure and the persons in charge of the procedure within the structure
itself. This identification process yielded interviews with respondents in manager-
ial positions (two), head of procurement and internal technicians (ten), in-house
legal counsel (eight), external lawyers (four) and one consultant.
The author contacted all 28 contracting authorities that had started competitive
dialogue procedures in Spain up to March 2010. 19 agreed to take part in the
study, four stated the procedure was still in a too early stage for an interview, two
agreed to participate by email without ever replying and the remaining two de-
clined. In one of the entities, since it had used the competitive dialogue multiple
times, both the former head of procurement and the current one were
interviewed.
The author has also interviewed four lawyers that are not employees of contract-
ing authorities. Three of the lawyers belong to reputed law firms in the Spanish
market and had been identified by previous respondents. The final lawyer is the
head in legal counsel of a Spanish trade association.
Two of the lawyers had not had experience of using the competitive dialogue pro-
cedure and their interviews served mainly as pilots of the interview guide to pre-
pare the following rounds of interviews with contracting authorities. The first of
these lawyers is a partner in one of the most renowned legal firms in the country.
The author was directed to him through a gatekeeper who considered him as a
leading expert in Spanish public law. The second lawyer was interviewed by sug-
gestion of the first, as he is the head of legal counsel of a trade association and the
author was told he had strong (negative) views about competitive dialogue and
that those were based on the opinion of his industry. I" The other two lawyers had
36. Identifying the industry would make it easy to identil)- the actual resJ10nllent and. rbuv, the author
would he in breach of his duty of confidentiality.
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participated in at least one competitive dialogue procedure and had hands on ex-
perience advising clients in the use of competitive dialogue. All the lawyers had
over IQ years of experience.
Further to the above, in Spain there are public procurement advisory bodies, at
national and regional levels, that are entitled to issue guidance in the field of pro-
curement. In total, there are 16 procurement advisory bodies in Spain, one natio-
nal and 15 regional." Although these bodies do not have a procurement practice
and could not be expected to have hands on experience, they have an important
influence in shaping procurement through their powers." Collecting data from
them was paramount to having a more complete picture of the competitive dia-
logue procedure in the country. Of the 16 bodies, 6 were contacted with a prefer-
ence for the regions where the competitive dialogue procedure was in use. Two
accepted to be interviewed, two others have declined stating that they had no in-
formation to impart (although a gatekeeper had provided their contacts and as-
sured the author the persons were interested in participating) and the last two did
not reply neither to emails nor telephone calls.
The author has also interviewed a consultant who, although without a legal back-
ground, took part in five procedures and helped design the way those were to be
carried out, including administrative clauses. The author feels that if this respon-
dent was singled out in the data it would amount to a breach of the confidentiali-
ty agreement included in the authorisation form." Due to this fact, the author
has decided to include the consultant's data in the lawyers' subset.
37. Not all of the regions have an advisory body. On those 3 without regional advisory body, the national
body acts as sole advisory body.
38. Detailed in Chapter 8 hereunder.
39. Especially bearing in mind the author is only aware of two companies providing technical assistance in
the development of competitive dialogue procedures that are not law firms.
In total, the author has interviewed 27 respondents: 20 from contracting authori-
ties, four lawyers, two public procurement advisory bodies and one consultant. Of
this total 23 had a direct experience in participating in competitive dialogue
procedures.
(c) Type of interview adopted
There are three major types of interviews, available for qualitative research: struc-
tured, unstructured and semi-structured." The distinction between them de-
pends on the degree of structuring and standardisation. The option for either
type depends on the aims of the research. As mentioned before, the aim of this
research is to investigate in depth a phenomenon, that is, the implementation of
competitive dialogue in Portugal and Spain and its use (or non-use) in practice.
Structured interviews have a standardised set of questions to be asked to all inter-
viewees in the same order. Having the exact same questions asked to all partici-
pants facilitates the work of finding variations and differences among the answers.
However, this type of interviews stifles the interviewees' liberty of response, as all
answers have to fit into the pre-determined mould.
Unstructured interviews, as the name implies, are the opposite of structured in-
terviews. No pre-determined questions are asked and the flow of thoughts, expe-
riences and ideas of the interviewee is encouraged. This type of interviews is usu-
ally used in psychotherapy, where the therapist is most interested in the thick
description of the patient's perspective. Such personalised experience makes it
difficult to analyse a phenomena across different subjects.
40. For an overview of the different types of interviews, please see Bailey, Methods of social research (Free
Press, 2007), Chapter 8, Bryman, Social research methods (Oxford University Press, 2oo4J, Chapter 15or May,
Social research: issues, methods and process (Open University Press, 2001), Chapter 6.
Semi-structured interviews offer a middle ground for the researcher. On the one
hand, they are more flexible than structured interviews, as the researcher has a set
of points or issues to query the respondent, but no need to do so in a particular
order. On the other hand, the existence of a guide with points to cover assures
that a minimum common ground is covered, thus permitting comparisons across
the different subjects. The defining trait, however, is that it allows the researcher
to adapt the interview to the interviewee and, more importantly, to leave room
for him to express his thoughts or give insight in topics or trains of thought not
originally forecast by the researcher. On the minus side, this more adaptable in-
terview makes the data analysis process more cumbersome and difficult as the an-
swers' order and content are prone to variability.
Qualitative research is typically associated with the last type of interviews." The
reasons for this are straightforward, as it offers an appropriate set of characteris-
tics to achieve the aims of empirical research, particularly when it has a explorato-
ry nature. As this is the case of the present research, semi-structured interviews
were deemed the most appropriate type for the harvesting of data from the field
and to produce the more relevant input for subsequent analysis. Furthermore,
since the interviewees would be experts in the area being researched one can de-
fine the subset of interview type to be expert interviews, which in turn influences
the way the questions to pose are defined and the way the interviews are
conducted.
(i) Definition of interview questions
The definition of interview questions started with the potential issues flagged
during the doctrinal legal analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources avail-
41. Bryman, Social research methods (Oxford University Press, 200.v p. 319-324 and Mason, ~/itati'Ve
researching (Sage Publications, 2002) p. 62-67.
able. Especially regarding Portugal, a number of questions arising from the way
competitive dialogue was transposed were raised. However, since data collection,
analysis and theory development is an iterative process in this research, the feed-
back from interviews was used as input for the creation of new issues to present
to subsequent interviewees.
The need to accommodate the experience of two countries with markedly dis-
tinct ways of transposing the procedure has led to different interview guides. The
fact is that not all the issues are replicable in both Portugal and Spain. It is, for
example, useless to ask a Spanish interviewee what he thinks about the two meth-
ods of assessing the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates as in
Spain only a single method is available. For the same reasons, it makes no sense to
ask a Portuguese about the logic of competitive dialogue being the default proce-
dure for the award of public-private cooperation contracts as it is relevant only in
Spain.
However, even with the differences, the comparative angle to the study is still as-
sured as its objective is to analyse the implementation of the competitive dialogue
procedure in both countries. The fact that reality in the field is different is the
sole reason questions and respondents had to be different as well. Even so a com-
mon set of issues was indeed identified and common questions could be asked to
all participants. This ensures that the reality being compared is the same, thus
permitting similarities and differences to be pinpointed. Having said this, the fact
that the implementations are so distinct, means that interviews ended up being
more focused in the differences between the systems than the similarities.
Since the interview guide was drafted based on the findings of the doctrinal legal
analysis - itself focused on the legal issues at national and ED levels - most of the
issues discussed in the interviews were focused on legal topics. That is not to say
all topics were legal and non-legal issues such as time, monetary cost or impact in
human resources were also discussed. A full breakdown of the issues that were
covered in the interviews can be seen in the interview guide (Annexes IV and V).
(ii) Conduct of interviews
As mentioned above, semi-structured interviews were adopted. The author did
not follow a questionnaire during the interviews, but had a more fluid set of issues
which he wanted to see addressed reflected in an interview guide."
During the interviews the aforementioned guide was followed, not to make sure
answers were given in order, but only the major issues were raised during the con-
versation. The guide was revised through the data collected in interviews and the
input gathered applied on subsequent interviews. Therefore, the guide evolved
during the course of the research.
It was decided to adopt face-to-face interviews rather than telephone interviews
whenever possible, as a means of ensuring maximum reliability in the data collect-
ed. Face-to-face interviews allow for more interaction between the parties and
make it easier for the interviewer to conduct the interview by looking at the sig-
nals of the respondent in contrast with a simple audio feedback through a tele-
phone. Therefore, the author interviewed 25 respondents face to face in Portugal
and 14 in Spain. The remaining had to be interviewed by telephone due to agenda
issues and the costs involved, especially in Spain where the respondents were scat-
tered all over the country. 14 interviews were conducted over Skype to keep the
costs low and one by regular landline due to the impossibility of establishing a
good Skype connection on that day.
42. Bryman, Social research methods (Oxford University Press, 2004>, p. 321.
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Before the start of each interview the informed consent form was signed by both
parties, each keeping a copy. Some details changed from respondent to respon-
dent, to assuage their fears (like the use or not of the audio recorder) and to en-
sure they were as comfortable as possible when being interviewed. The draft form
on which all changes were then based can be found as Annex 1. For the interviews
conducted by telephone, a signed informed consent form was sent by email by
both parties before the start of the interview.
As a means of maximising data collection reliability, a digital audio recorder was
brought to all face-to-face interviews and the interviewee asked at the beginning
if he minded talking with the recorder on. The use of an audio recorder ensured
that not only all the information got recorded, but also that the interviewer kept
focused in the topics at hand. Having said this, as a precautionary measure against
any sort of equipment malfunction, abbreviated notes were taken. When the in-
terviewee declined the use of the audio recorder, more extensive notes were kept
and were complemented as soon as possible after the interview had ended. In
Portugal, 22 respondents agreed to be interviewed with the audio recorder on. In
Spain, only seven, all in face-to-face interviews, agreed with the interview being
recorded.
Interviews were held in the native language of the respondent. That is, Por-
tuguese interviewees were interviewed in Portuguese and Spanish interviewees in
Spanish. Although some of the Spanish interviewees had a second native language
(Catalan, Euskera or Galician are all official languages in Spain) all of them kindly
accepted to be interviewed in Spanish. The fact that the interviews were only
held in the author's native language and another in which he is fluent, reduced the
probability of errors during translations or misunderstandings.
The interviews began with general questions about the respondents' work in the
field of procurement and their background in general, so as to avoid jumping di-
rectly into the core issues. This "introductory context" was particularly important
when respondents were not acquainted with the author.
The questions posed to the interviewees were phrased clearly and straightfor-
wardly, being as specific as possible. Care was taken in ensuring they were posed
in neither a tone nor using words which could be deemed as threatening or lead-
ing by the interviewee.
Although the interviews follow a pre-existing guide, respondents were encouraged
to produce additional insight and to go further on more specific topics. This was
done through the use of various means available to the interviewer. Open-ended
questions were used extensively, as can be seen in Annexes IV and V. The flexi-
bility offered by open-ended questions made them a prime tool in this research,
as they encourage the exploration of unknown or uncertain phenomena. The in-
terviewer also offered direct encouragement to the subjects to develop thoughts.
Second questions were posed when the interviewer felt appropriate and silence
was used as a cue for the interviewee to keep going.
Reliability of answers was tested by reframing questions already posed and by
means of summarising what the respondent had already said, thereby asking for
confirmation if the interviewer's understanding was correct. This added the bene-
fit of making sure notes were taken correctly and no mistakes in the data were
caused by the interviewer misspelling or misinterpreting the interviewee.
The interview duration was not set in advanced, although a rough ballpark figure
of one hour was given to interviewees as an indication of the time they would
need to set aside in their agendas. The actual duration varied between 45 to 130
minutes.
(iii) Interview analysis
As mentioned above in section (3)(b), when theoretical sampling is used in quali-
tative research, the different stages of the research project tend to be iterative.
Data collection, analysis and theory development moment overlap in time and in-
fluence one another.
The analytical process began after each interview was concluded. Where the
recorder had not been available, notes were expanded and where it was available,
conversations were listened to again to complete the notes taken.
Handwritten notes were anonymised and then moved to a secure drawer in the
Ph.D. students' office within the School of Law. Digital audio files from the
recorder were extracted to an encrypted sparse image and backed up on an on-
line service through Secure-Socket Layer (SSL)transmission. This ensured the se-
curity and reliability of the data collected. The recorder was erased after each in-
terview had been extracted.
To make possible the use of a mind-mapping programme to assist in the data
analysis, the expanded notes were copied to a computer and translated to English
by the author, when the notes were moved to the mind-map application. The au-
thor preferred to use a mind-mapping software in alternative to other pro-
grammes commonly used for qualitative analysis such as nVivo as he considered
the visualisation and the liberty to rearrange ideas easily in clusters would make it
easier to find links in the data.
Afterwards, coding began and data harvested were broken down for analysis.
Concepts, themes and ideas sprang and were identified, leading to the formation
of categories. These categories grouped similar issues, points of interest or re-
spondents' perspectives. Emerging connections between categories were identi-
fied and the core concepts flagged.
(d) Presentation offindings
The findings are presented separately by country. Although the aim of this re-
search is to compare the potentially different experience of the competitive dia-
logue procedure in two similar countries, and to explore identified differences, to
keep the research focused and the findings clearer it was opted to shown them as
such. The conclusions chapter has, however, a comparative tone to tie up the
findings of each country, where disparities are highlighted.
As such, the findings for Portugal are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 and the
findings for Spain in Chapter 10. Respondents are not identified directly in the
text. They are grouped by categories according to their type. In Portugal, the cat-
egories are divided into contracting authorities with or without experience and
lawyers. In Spain, they are divided into contracting authorities, lawyers and public
procurement advisory bodies. Furthermore, one consultant interviewed in Spain
was moved to the lawyer category as to avoid any potential violation of the confi-
dentiality agreement signed.
(e) Trustworthiness offindings
Empirical research needs to be designed and carried out as to ensure the trust-
worthiness of its findings. It is not totally clear in the field of qualitative research
what are the appropriate criteria to be applied to undertake such assessment,"
43. Mason, ~/itative researching(Sage Publications, 2002), P.38.
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and it has been argued that this kind of research should not be evaluated accord-
ing to the patterns defined for quantitative research."
From the point of view of qualitative researchers, the worthiness of an empirical
study has been measured according to its reliability, validity and generalisability
of findings."
(i) Reliability
Reliability involves the accuracy of the methods used in the research and the rela-
tionship with the data produced by them." It can also be defined as the possibili-
ty of reusing the data gathering procedures without achieving different results."
In this sense its goal is to minimise errors and biases during the study which may
affect the outcome. To do so, the procedures followed by the researcher need be
clear, systematic and well documented, so as to allow a potential replication to be
carried.
In the present study the first facet of reliability <reliability of information gath-
ered during the interviews) was ensured firstly through the use of an interview
guide, a digital recorder and the taking of notes by the author, which were subse-
quently expanded. During the interviews themselves, reliability checks were car-
ried out, such as summarising points interviewees had presented to make sure no
information was misunderstood, reframing questions using a different terminolo-
gy or approach, asking for clarifications, inviting corrections to the notes taken,
44. For a discussion on this topic, flease see Denzin and Lincoln, 'The choreography of qualitative research
design' in Denzin and Lincoln (eds , Strategies of qualitative inquiry (md, Sage, 2003) and Seale, The quality of
qualitative research(Sage Publications, 1999).
45. Murphy and Dingwall, ~litative metbods and health policy research Social problems and social issues (Aldine
de Gruyter, 2003), defending the application of the principles of construct validity, internal validity, external
validity and reliability to all types of qualitative research, Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methoth (Sage
Publications, 2003), p.3n9.
46. Mason, ~l;tat;ve researchin$ (Sage Publications, 2002), p. 39.
47. Yin, CaseStudy Research: Design and Methoth (Sage Publications, 2003), P.37.
asking interviewees to confirm a certain statement or to reconcile apparently con-
tradictory ones.
On the second facet, reliability was ensured by means keeping an "audit trail" of
the data collection phase, to ensure the possibility of the evidence to be evaluat-
ed. Informed consent forms, correspondence with interviewees, interview guide,
recordings, transcriptions and notes taken in the process were kept in safe
storage.
(ii) Validity
The aim of validity is to ensure the correspondence or accuracy between what is
allegedly observed or identified and the actual data collected." To achieve this
aim, the data source chosen was interviews with stakeholders in the target coun-
tries. This was deemed as the most appropriate way of producing information rel-
evant for the aims of this research with the maximum of insight and accuracy by
the respondents.
Having chosen interviews as the medium to access data sources, validity was then
ensured by means of informing interviewees in advance of the content of the
project. During the interviews themselves, bearing in mind that the particular
type of interviews adopted was semi-structured, a flexible approach was followed
by having an interview guide with topics to evaluate but without a need of going
through them in a pre-determined sequence. In the same spirit, interviewees were
prompted to take the initiative to add more information. In addition, questions
were posed in a way that they were not suggestive of answers and non-threatening
to respondents, as to avoid influencing their responses by means of suggesting an
48. Mason, ~/it4tive researching(Sage Publications, 2002), P·39·
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answer caused by any sort of bias of the researcher or to make respondents adopt
a defensive attitude towards the interview.
Furthermore, when appropriate in face of contradictory statements, cross check-
ing of responses was carried between interviewees.
Sampling strategy is also of relevance to ensure the validity of a research," as de-
fined above. Sampling in this research was carried out to maximise the amount of
useful data that could be harvested through the interviews. To achieve the stated
aim of the research, a variety of respondents, from contracting authorities (natio-
nal, regional and local), private parties, lawyers and when appropriate public pro-
curement advisory bodies, were interviewed in order to have a picture of the phe-
nomenon as broad as possible, allowing for the testing of rival explanations or
negative cases to be carried."
Finally, whether interviewees may have reasons to falsify their answers needs to
be taken into account. In the research undertaken there is no reason to believe
that may have happened since participation was voluntary and by invitation with
the topic of the interview disclosed in advance. Furthermore, confidentiality was
also ensured to all participants.
(iii) Generalisability
The concept of generalis ability involves the extent to which it is possible to apply
the findings of the research outside the data investigated."
Generalisability of the findings of the present project was sought by the sampling
strategy, intended to give the researcher access to the stakeholders with the most
49. Murphy and Dingwall, ~/itative methods and health policy research Social prohkms and social issues (AMine
de Gruyter, 200y.
50. As a means to ensure further validity of the findings, Patton, ~litative evaluation and researchmethods
(Sage Publications, 1990), P.462-464·
51. Mason, ~/itative researching(Sage Publications, 2002), P·39·
experience in the topic being researched, therefore increasing the probability that
the findings from this research would be extendable to the wider population of
contracting authorities, lawyers, private firms and advisory bodies which were not
probed. However, one should exercise caution when extending the findings out-
side the actual classes of participants. The author is confident that findings on
contracting authorities or lawyers that have not used competitive dialogue in Por-
tugal can be extended to respondents that have not been interviewed in the same
classes. What should not be inferred is that, in Spain, for instance, answers from
respondents with experience in using competitive dialogue are extendable to oth-
ers that have not used it. In other words, one should not read the findings in
Spain as illustrative of all contracting authorities but only of those contracting au-
thorities that have used the procedure.
(4) Comparative law
The final method used in the current research project is comparative law. Com-
parative law research is undertaken to improve knowledge of the law and also to
understand the law in context. 52 Comparative law has been described as the
comparison between different legal systems" as to ascertain similarities and
differences between them." Since societies face frequently the same problems or
issues," comparative law may function as a tool to assess how different legal sys-
tems deal with a certain issue.
Comparative law may be focused at two different levels, macro and micro-com-
parative, deemed as complementary between themselves." A researcher is con-
52.. Oriicii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law : a handhook (Hart,
2007), p. 53· .. . . . .
53. Zweigert and Kotz, Introduction to comparatIve law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p.z.
54. Bogdan, Comparative law (KJuwer Norstedts juridik Tano, 1994), p. 18.
55. Oriicii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law : a handbook (Hart,
2007), P·5I. d D 'C . LSd f si '1' .. diff ". Z56. Ibid., P.56 an annemann, omparanve aw: tu y 0 simi Ian ties or I erencesr ID immermann
ducting macro-comparison if he is assessing the spirit of different legal systems,
techniques of legislation or the methods of thought and procedures used in the
target legal systems." Comparative law may be used to investigate a specific prob-
lem, legal institute or conflict of interests, and in this case the researcher is be
conducting micro-comparison." For the purposes of the current research project,
the author strived to research the implementation of the competitive dialogue
procedure in two different countries. This option means the focus is on the mi-
cro-comparison level, albeit without forgetting its position within the legal con-
text or framework where it is being applied. 59
To carry out a comparative work one must find identify clearly what is being
compared, as to ensure that the subjects under research are indeed, comparable.
It has been argued that comparative law may only be done when comparing insti-
tutes with the same functions in the different legal systems." That is, one should
identify what institution performs and equivalent function" in both systems and
avoid resorting to the use legal concepts developed in his national system as a tool
of comparison." In the present research the author is not exactly comparing the
functional equivalent in the two different countries. As this research is grounded
in a legal concept originally developed at EU level, which member States were
free to transpose and had some leeway on how to do so, the comparative element
is the implementation of the procedure and not a certain function to be per-
formed in both target countries, as they mayor not perform the same function.
and Reimann (eds), The Oxford handbook of comparative law (Oxford University Press, 2006), P.387.
57· Zweigert and Katz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 5 and Bogdan,
Comparative law (Kluwer Norstedts juridik lano, 1994), p.18. Macro-comparison has also be defined as the
comparison at the level of legal systems, Orucii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds),
Comparative law.' a handbook (Hart, 2007), p. 57.
58. Zweigert and Katz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p.6, Bogdan,
Compqrative law (Kluwer Norstedts Juridik TaI1!>,1994>,p.18.
59. Oriicii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law.' a handbook (Hart,
2007), p. 58.
60. Zweigert and Katz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford University Press, 1998), P' 34-36.
61. On the functional method, Michaels, 'The Functional method of comparative law in Zimmermann and
Reimann (eds), The Oxford handbook of comparative law (Oxford University Press" 2006).
62. Zweigert and Katz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 34.
The fact that the aim of the research is to find out how it has been actually imple-
mented, makes it difficult to be otherwise. On the other hand, it may be argued
that the procedure as envisioned in Directive 2004h8 constitutes a tertium compa:
rationis." or a common denominator between the two legal systems."
Comparison should be done at the level of both similarities and differences be-
tween the different legal systems." However, during the course of research it is
natural to have the focus on either the similarities or the differences. In the
present research, since the study is focused on two countries from the same fami-
ly of law, similar system of government, similar tradition in public procurement
and geographically close, where a new award procedure is being implemented at
the same time, the emphasis is on the differences. However, the similarities to be
found between them are also important when looking at member States of the
EU level, for instance.
Furthermore, it has also been mentioned in literature that comparative law stud-
ies may go further than simply identifying and exposing similarities and differ-
ences." That is, that the research may have as a aim to suggest or point the way
to ideal systems. This is not, however, the purpose of the present research, which
is to know in depth a specific phenomenon, the implementation of competitive
dialogue in Portugal and Spain. That is not to say that the identification of pitfalls
or practices perceived by stakeholders as positive are not of relevance for the de-
velopment of better implementations of the procedure, but the author is not tIy-
ing to answer such questions.
6). Jansen, 'Comparative law and comparative knowledge' in Zimmermann and Reimann (eds), The Oxford
hlmdbook of comparative IIl'W(Oxford University Press, 2006), P·)14·
64. Oriicii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law : a handhook (Hart,
2007) p. 48, Bogdan, Comparative law (Kluwer Norstedts juridik Tano, 1994), P.58.
65. Oriicii, 'Developing coml?arative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law : a handbook (Hart,
2007) P.50 and Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of sirniliarities or differences?' in Zimmermann and
Reim~n (eds), The Oxford handhook of comparative law (Oxford University Press, 2006), P.)96-401.
66. Oriicii, 'Developing comparative law' in Oriicii and Nelken (eds), Comparative law : a handbook (Hart,
2007), P·49·
Many potential purposes for comparative legal work have been identified, such as
to improve and consolidate knowledge and understanding of the law in context,
providing an aid to the law makers (de legeferenda), as a tool for the interpretation
of national laws (de lege data), as a mean to improve the education of students, as
means for the contribution for the unification of law or the development of a sys-
tem of private law common in Europe."
From the identified possible objectives of comparative law, for the purpose of the
present research only the first three are relevant. Regarding the first, by research-
ing the implementation of competitive dialogue the author is concerned with ex-
panding the body of knowledge not only by researching the law in the books, but
also to understand the law in context, that is, how competitive dialogue proce-
dure was implemented and how it is being applied in practice.
Regarding the second objective, it is anticipated that this research may be useful
for forthcoming reviews of legislation both at EU and national levels, as to in-
crease the awareness and recognition of the perceived pluses and problems identi-
fied at both the legal and actual use levels."
The third objective is also relevant to the research herewith carried as the find-
ings of either country may be of use for the interpretation of the procedure in the
other by interested parties.
67. Zweigert and Katz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 16-31. An
alternative ro this functional approach, based on problem-solving originated from sociology has also been
suggested, Onicu, 'Developing comparative law' in Orucu and Nelken (eds), Comparative law " a handbook
(Hart, 2007), p. 52.
68. It was noted by two of the law makers interviewed that in the Portuguese case, a problem faced during
the drafting of the procedure in the Public Contracts Code was the lack of information available at the time
of the procedure implementation and use in other member States. They also considered the procedure as too
different of the normal in Portugal, thus furthering the need for information from other countries.
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3. Conclusion
In this chapter we have the methodology adopted by the for this research project.
Regarding methods, we have seen that this research includes doctrinal analysis,
interviews with the law makers in Portugal, empirical research and comparative
law. On the empirical research, the explanations were focused in the sampling
strategy, type of interviews adopted, how the findings were presented and how to
ensure the findings are trustworthy.
After discussing the methods and methodology it is time to introduce public pro-
curement in the EU, before analysing the competitive dialogue itself. Therefore,
the following chapter will cover the current EU legal public procurement
framework.
Chapter 3 - Public procurement inthe Eu-
ropean Union
I. Introduction
The current chapter will analyse the current EU legal public procurement frame-
work. Public procurement defines the ways the State, through a contracting au-
thority or entity, chooses a contractor to provide works, goods or services. Pri-
vate enterprises and companies are basically free to contract with whomever they
deem adequate, being liable only to their shareholders. The autonomy of States
when contracting, on the contrary, is limited by a series of factors. A number of
binding principles restrict the States' liberty in this area. These are, for instance,
the fulfillment of public interest, transparency, equality or value for money. Some
of these principles are set forth in each State's own constitution and laws, while
others come from EU law and jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU).
Outlining the ED public procurement framework is relevant for this thesis since
it is the basis of the rules for competitive dialogue and because it influences the
national laws in the countries in this study. In this chapter, we will present an
outline of general principles and EU freedoms relevant to public procurement
(sections 2 and 3), the Treaty provisions (section 4)69 and Directives which consti-
tute the secondary legislation framework applicable to public procurement (sec-
tion 5).
69. All Treaty article numbers refer to new Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European Community, except where expressly noted.
2. Public procurement evolution in the European Union
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome there is no single article dealing directly with public
procurement." Some scholars argued that at the time, there was no idea of the
impact of public procurement in the economy, while others sustained a complete-
ly opposite view, stating the importance of contracts awarded by States was all to
clear and it was an obstacle during the Treaty negotiations." It has also been ar-
gued that the Treaty was simply a framework defining major principles necessary
to establish the common market, leaving for secondary instruments the more spe-
cific regulation. At the economic level, the concept of trade liberalisation in the
1950S was limited to the reduction of trade barriers."
Nonetheless, since the common market was the major objective of the then Eu-
ropean Economic Community," public procurement was seen as an instrument to
achieve such an objective. Itwas bound by a number of principles set forth in the
mentioned Treaty. Principles such as equality and non-discrimination in the basis
of nationality (article 18), or the Community liberties: free movement of goods
{article 31),74 freedom of establishment (article 20) and freedom of services {article
49)/5 are all applicable to public procurement" and have shaped its development
since 1957. These principles bound not only Community institutions, like the
Commission, but also the member States.
While the principles stated in the Treaty were not enough to make for the devel-
opment of a policy by the Community," they have influenced public procurement
70. Except for an indirect mention i!'l art!c.le 1,30,f, (2) of the ~.U. Treaty, about the co-operation between
undertakings, research centres and umversmes In the field of national public contracts.
71. See Flamme, Traite thiorique et pratique des11IIlrchiJpuh/iques (Bruylant, 1969), p. 272.
72. Fernandez Martin, The EC Public Procurement Rules (Clarendon Press, 1996) p.6 ss.
73. Treaty of Rome articles 2 and 3, setting the means necessary to attain it.
74. On the free movement of goods, Oliver and Jarvis, Free Movement of Goods in the European Community
4th, 20m).
75. Mota de Campos, ManUl1~~e ,?ireito Comuniftiri? (~ulbe~ldan, 20~0) p. 54r572•
76. Viana, OsprinciptOS comumtdnos nil contrataiao pUb/tea (Coimbra Editora, 2007) p. 137.
77- Fernandez Martin, The EC Public Procurement Rules (Clarendon Press, 1996) p.lO.
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at multiple levels. They also constitute the groundwork for subsequent develop-
ment done by the Directives covering public procurement, such as defining the
framework for interpretation of such Directives. Furthermore, since the Teiaus:
tria" case, principles like transparency are recognized to be directly applicable to
contracts outside the Directives' scope."
3. Community principles applicable topublic procurement
A number of European general principles" are relevant to public procurement,
particularly non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and equal treatment,
transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition."
(I) Non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and equal
treatment
One of the fundamental general principles stated in the Treaty on the function-
ing of the European Union is the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
nationality, as stated in article 18. It embodies the EU's very nature of establish-
ing a standard of equal treatment for nationals of any member State. This princi-
ple can be considered as one of the most important examples of the equality
principle."
This rule aims to reduce not only overt discrimination but all types of indirect
discrimination that lead to an unequal treatment. In the realm of public procure-
ment, this principle ensures that tenderers and goods from any member State are
78. C-3Z4/98, Telaustria v. Telekom Austria [zooo] ECR 1-10745.
79. Estorninho, Diretto europeu dos contratos pUblico! - Um olhar portugues (Almedina, zooo) p. z7.
80. On the EU law principles in general, Tridimas, The General Principles ofEU Law (znd, Oxford University
Press.zooj)
81. Mutual recognition will be referred further down, in connection with the free movement of goods
freedom.
82. Trepte, Puhlic procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, Z007) p. 7.
given an equal treatment in public tenders carried out by contracting authorities
in another member State." The importance of this principle cannot be understat-
ed since it acted as the stepping stone for subsequent developments in public pro-
curement." Without this principle, the discriminatory logic of buying national
and the protectionism given to national companies, would have rendered the
common market objective unattainable, particularly in the field of public
procurement."
Since 1963 the CJEU has consistently held that material discrimination under the
Treaty consists in both equality before the law and different treatment of equal
situations {or its opposite, equal treatment of unequal situationst." In other
words, both formal (the first) and substantive (the second) elements of equal
treatment are covered by non-discrimination. Across the years the Court has also
refined the concept and applied it to other topics of the Treaty such as the four
freedoms."
A number of other landmark decisions by the CJEU related to non-discrimina-
tion in public procurement also deserve a mention. In the Beentjes case," the
Court ruled that this principle could not be put in jeopardy by the desire of the
contracting authority to include social considerations in the award procedure. In
the Walloon Bus case'? the CJEU affirmed the need for the non-discrimination
principle to be applied in award procedures ruled by Directive 90/531 (utilities
sector). In Unitron Scantiinavia90 non-discrimination was extended to entities pur-
suing public interest activities not considered as contracting authorities by 93/36
83. As it is applicable only to nationals of member States, tenderers from third countries cannot seek
redress under its scope.
84. Moreno Molina, ContrlltospUblicos:derechocomunitario y derecbo espaflol (Macgraw-Hill, 1996) p. 76.
85. It has been applied to the field of public procurement by the CJEU in case C-41O/04, ANA V v Comune
di&ri Izooel ECR 1-3303.
86. Weiss and Weiss, Eval"f"ion_: methorfs forstudyin~progra.msandf1!Jli~ies (Prentice Hall, 1998) p. 19-23.
87. C-179/90, Mere; convenz,onal, JH»"!odi Cienova v. SiilerUrgtca Gabnellt, (199rJ ECR 1-05889.
88. C-31/87, Beentjes o. Holland h988} ECR 1-04631'
89. C-87/94' Com~;JS;on v. B_elgi~ (Walloon Buses) h996} ECR 1-2043.
90. C-275/98• Unttron ScandInavia v. 3-S h999} ECR 1-8291.
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EC Directive. In Telaustria, the Court considered that public services conces-
sions, which are excluded from the public procurement Directives scope, are
nonetheless bound by the Treaty positive obligations. Finally, in Contse," regard-
ing an award criteria, if it was more easily fulfilled by a national from the con-
tracting authority member State, then non-discrimination would be put in
jeopardy.
The recitals of the current procurement Directives also mention this principle."
In the ANA V decision?' the CJEU accepted that such wide interpretation of the
equal treatment principle exists, even though it has not stated that equal treat-
ment should apply to all situations." It has been argued that is doubtful that the
free movement provisions prohibit all unjustified differentiation."
(2) Transparency
Transparency is not a principle expressly conformed by the Treaty, but more of a
consequent principle, derived from non-discrimination and equal treatment and
further developed by the CJEU. It was raised to Community-wide principle after
the already mentioned Telaustria decision by the CJEU96 and a subsequent com-
munication of the Commission." In Telaustria, the Court ruled that all contract-
ing authorities are bound to comply with the Treaty's positive obligations in most
public contracts, including the ones not covered by the Directives. In this light,
the transparency principle requires that a certain level or degree of publicity shall
91. C-234/03, Contse v. Ingesa [20051 ECR 1-09315.
92. Recital 2 of Directive 2004118 (Public Sector Directive) and recital 9 of Directive 2004/17 {Utilities
Directive}.
9J. Case C-4IO/04, Anavv. Comunedi Bari ECR [z006} 1-3303.
94. Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&:MaxweU, 2005) p. 198.
95. Krugner, 'The principles of equal treatment and transparency and the Commission interpretative
Communication on concessions' (2003) 5 PPLR.
96. Even before the Telaustria ruling, in the Unitron Scandinavia case, the CJEU considered that the
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality was applicable to contracts not covered by
Directive 93/36 and that it included also a transparency obligation.
97. Commission, Interpretative communication on concessionsuntkr Community law (2000).
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be applied to all public contracts." even those below the thresholds set by the Di-
rectives. The objective of this obligation is to ensure the ability to review the
compliance with the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationali-
ty, even though it's not clear from the ruling exactly what constitutes the obliga-
tion of transparency."
In subsequent decisions,100 the CJEU has maintained this position, even if criti-
cism has surfaced meanwhile.'?' While the reasoning behind the option to pro-
mote transparency is clear - to protect the internal market and level the playing
field to foster access from foreign firms to public procurement in other member
States - it still leaves unanswered relevant questions. This includes, for instance,
the uncertainty created by not specifying exactly in what consists the obligation
of transparency.'?' which contracts are covered (only concessions or also contracts
with values beneath the thresholds) or why should a Community principle be ap-
plied to a contract not deemed relevant to be within the scope of the Directives
since it has a value below the threshold or is expressly excluded from their
scope?"? The Commission has also taken a stand on this issue in recent years,
98. This vague obligation was clarified in the Coname decision (C-23I/03, Coname u. Comune di Cingia de' Botti
[2005] ECR 1-8612, as imposing member States the obligation to give potential foreign bidders information
before the concession's award.
99. Arrowsmith, The law of puhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 190-191, arguing
that the advertising requirement could be satisfied in many cases by using the flexible forms of publicity
allowed under the Directive 2004/18 (Utilities Directive).
100. Such as, for instance in Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen 'V. Gemeinde Brixen [2005] ECR 1-8612 and the
aforementioned Coname case.
101. Brown, 'The obligation to advertise betting shop licences under the EC principle of transparency: Case
C-260/05 Commission v Italy' (2008) I PPLR, Brown, 'Seeing through transparency: the European Court's
Case Law on the requirement to Advertise Public Contracts and Concessions under the EC Treaty' (2007) I
PPLR McGowan, 'Clarity at last? Low value contracts and transparency obligations' (200]) 4 PPLR, Trepte,
Public'procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), Arrowsmith, The law oJ puhlic and utilities
fJ!OCUrement(znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), Hordjik and Meulenbelt, 'A Bridge Too Far: Why the European
Commission's Attempts to Construct an Obligation to Tender outside the Scope of the Public Procurement
Directives shoyld be Dismissed' (2005) 3 PPLR, Kriigner, 'The principles of equal treatment and
transparency and the Commission interpretative Communication on concessions' (2003) 5 PPLR, Treumer
and Werlauff, 'The leveragelrinciple: secondary Community law as a lever for the development of primary
Community law' (2003) 14 E R, Braun, 'A Matter of Principlets) - the Treatment of Contracts falling outside
the Scope of the Public Procurem~nt Dire.c~iY'es'(1000) 9 PPLR. ..
102. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublIC and utilttm procurement (znd, ~weet&Maxwell, 2005), P·197, Hordjik and
Meulenbelt 'A Bridge Too Far: Why the European CommISSIOn S Attempts to Construct an Obligation to
Tender outside the Scope of the Public Procurement Directives shoyld be Dismissed' (1005) 3 PPLR, Braun,
'A Matter of Principle(s) - the Treatment of Contracts falling outside the Scope of the Public Procurement
Directives' (2000) 9 PPLR.
103. Trepte, Publicprocurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007) p. 10 and 11.
considering that the obligations under this principle include both advertising and
a competition respecting the equal treatment principle.'?'
(3) Proportionality
The principle of proportionally is originally an administrative law principle of
German origin that has been included in the Treaty as a Community principle. It
is present in a number of other European legal systems including Portugal and
Spain. In public procurement, the principle of proportionality is used to assess if
a discriminatory action can be deemed as necessary and justified. The action fails
the proportionality test if a different action, less offensive to Community rules,
can have an equivalent effect in the realisation of the objective.'?'
4. Treaty provisions applicable topublic procurement
The lack of specific provisions in the Treaty related to public procurement does
not mean that some of its rules related with trade and development of the com-
mon market are not applicable to procurement. The influence of articles 31, 41,
20,49 and 346 in public procurement has long been registered.':"
The traditional view on the Treaty provisions stated that they imposed only nega-
tive obligations to member States. More recently, the CJEU in the aforernen-
104. In both the Interpretative Communication on Concessions under Community Law, {lO00}, OJ CI21h
and the Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully
subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives (OJ 2006 CI79h). These communications
does not create new legislative rules, but only guidance and suggestions related with transparency. On the
topic of the effects of communications, see the case T-2S8/06, Commission v. Germawy.
105. An example of its a~lication by the CJEU is C-331/88, The ~en v. Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and
Food and Secretary of State or Health h990} ECR 1-04023, where it was ruled that a I1mitation of an economic
activity was only accepta Ie if it passed the proportionality test.
106. On the the topic of Community freedoms, Craig and De Burca, E.U Law <4th, Oxford University Press,
2007) chapters 17 through 22 and Wyatt et al., Wyatt and Dashwood.· European Union Law (5th, Thomson
Sweet&Maxwell, 2006), Part V.
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tioned Telaustria decision and the Commission"? have defended that Treaty pro-
visions do include positive obligations for member States. This is particularly
relevant for contracts falling outside the procurement Directives' scope.
b)Free movement of goods (articles 3I and 4-I)
According to articles 31 and 41 of the Treaty, the EU is based on a customs union,
and in consequence three different sets of restrictions to the free movement of
goods in public procurement are forbidden: i) quantitative restrictions on imports
and exports between member States or direct discriminarion.''" ii) measures of
equivalent effect or indirect discrimination;"? iii) and measures that may restrict
trade without being directly or indirectly discriminatory.
Regarding the first aspect, national governments are not allowed to impose quo-
tas on imports or exports on goods from or to other member States. The second
aspect, contained in article 41 of the Treaty, is particularly relevant to the field of
public procurement, and its elimination has been considered of considerable diffi-
culty."° It prohibits both measures clearly discriminating against foreign goods
and the ones rendering access to a market more difficult for those goods.
A sub-principle of the free movement of goods is the principle of mutual recogni-
tion, another prime example of EU law developed by the eJEU with the objective
107. Commission, C:ommunication0". the .Community law applica~/e.to contract awa~ds not or n~tfolly JUbjectto .the
J1rM!isionof the PUb/1CProcurement Directives (2006} and Commission, Interpretative commumcatton on concessions
Under Community ItlW(2000).
108. Prime examples of direct discrimination case law are the C-263/85, Commission v. Italy h99d ECR
1-02457, C-21/88, Du Pont de Nemours v. Unite Sanitaria Locale No 2 Di Carrara h990] ECR 1-00889, and
C-243/89, Commission v Den1flllf'k[1990] ECR 1-00889·
109. Measures have equivalent effect when they hind~r, or are c~pable of hindering, intra-Community trade,
as per the CJEU decisions in C-8/74, Procureur du ROl v. Dassonvllle h97t] ECR 1-00837 and C-I2o/78. Rewe-
Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfor Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 1979] ECR 1-00649. In the field of
f,ublic procurement, C-21!88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No 2 Di Carrara h990]-00889, C-45/87, Commission v. Ireland h988] ECR 1-4958, C-272/9I, Comission v. Italy h994] ECR 1-01409
and C-359/93, Commission v Netkerlands h995] ECR ~-00157. . . .
no. Weiss and Weiss, EvaluatIon: methodsfor studymgprograms and 'polkies (Prentice Hall, 1998) p. 23.
of developing the internal market. In Cassis de Dijon;" the Court considered that
a company was entitled to sell its products on a member State if they had been
legally produced, sold or supplied in another member State. This principle is rele-
vant for public procurement as it requires contracting authorities to accept ten-
derers presenting goods that have been legally produced, sold or supplied in
another member State.
b) Free provision of services and right of establishment (articles
43and49)
Articles 43 and 49 establish the right of nationals from member States to both es-
tablish themselves in the territory of another, directly or by means of an agency
or branch and also the offering of their services in any country part of the Com-
munity. Thus, a principle of national treatment is due to all nationals (citizens or
private bodies) irrespective of their exact member State of origin. II2
These principles are considered similar and founded in the above referenced prin-
ciple of norr-discrimination."! Once more, there is no discussion over the applica-
tion of these freedoms to the State and public contracting authorities. As a con-
sequence, in public procurement access to public contracts cannot be restricted
to non-nationals established either permanently or temporarily in any member
State.
As with free movement of goods, these freedoms preclude direct and indirect dis-
crimination.!" They are also subject to derogation for motives of public morality,
III. C-J20/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfor Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon).
112. It appears that now article 49 covers also measures restricting cross border trade in services where these
do not discriminate between national and foreign service suppliers and do not comply with the derogations
to this principle or with the principle of proportionality. This has been the position of the CJEU in the
Contse decision, for instance.
113. Trepte, Puhlicprocurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007) p. 10.
114. An example of an indirect discrimination happened in Italy, where a national law demanded that
contracting authorities reserved up to 30% of their public works contracts for companies based in the
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security and policy, in accordance with articles 46 and 55of the Treaty. In addi-
tion to the derogations in common with free movement of goods, free provision
of services and right of establishment can be pushed aside in activities connected
with the exercise of official authority.
(3) Exemption of defence contracts (article 296/I(b»
Article 296 of the Treaty is one of the major examples of exemptions to free
trade within member States. It authorises member States to take the measures
deemed as necessary for their essential security, including the procurement of
public contracts for military equipment like warships, fighter planes or missiles
without respect for Treaty provisions, general principles or the Directives' rules.
The scope of this exemption has produced considerable discussion, as for a long
time member States have defended its provisions to exclude from Treaty rules all
measures connected with arms, munitions and war material. The CJEU has taken
a different view, requiring member States to prove that the restrictive measures
are necessary for the safety of their interests. "5 The Commission has also issued a
Communication on this topic sustaining a restrictive approach. ,,6
construction area. The CJEU in the case C-36o/89, Commission v. Italy, b992], ECR 1-3353 ruled that such
provisions favoured national firms and, thus were incompatible with article 49. See also, case C-3/88,
Commission v Italy [.989] ECR 4035.
115. Case C-414/97, Commission v. Kin$dom of Spain [.999] ECR 1-.05585.Nonetheless, t~e CJEU did not make
clear how strictly the _proportionality test needs to be earned. More recently, In the case C-2p/0I,
Commission v. Belgium h003] ECR f-1I859 th~ CJ~~ position s~ggests. memb~r States should have a
reasonable discretion in procurement related WIth military and ann-terrorism equipment. Contrary to this
lax view Advocate General Mazal in the Case C-337/05, Commission v. Italy [2008] ECR 1-02173 (Opinion of
10 July ~007) has defended a more strict approach and a narrower interpretation of the old article's 296(J)b)
exemption.
116. Commission, Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in thefield of defence
procurement, COM(2oo6) 779final.
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5. Directives onpublic procurement
The present section will carry out an overview of current secondary legislation ap-
plicable to European public procurement. Since 1970117successive rounds of Di-
rectives destined to harmonise public procurement in the different member
States of the Community have been adopted. The last round of Directives was
adopted in 2004, with the Directives 2004118 and 2004117.118 This legislative
package contains the bulk public procurement legal framework and the competi-
tive dialogue procedure, which is the aim of the current research project, was first
included in Directive 2004118.
The Green Paper on Public Procurement"? of 1996 ignited a serious discussion on
the future of Community regulations in the field of public procurement. The
original objective of the Commission was not to overhaul the public procurement
legal framework, but simply to open a debate on public procurement."?
In this paper, the Commission criticised member States for a number of sins. It
pointed out errors and excessive time in transposing the Directives, excessive use
of negotiated and accelerated procedures and for the imposition of (too) short
deadlines. The Commission argued also that Treaty principles on liberalisation
were applicable to all public contracts (including those under the Directives
thresholds), States had the obligation of transposing Directives correctly and on
117· In this year the so called Liberalisation Directives (70/32 and 71/304), aimed to eliminate restrictions and
discriminatory measures, were approved. They were replaced by the Coordination Directives (71/305 and
77/62). The first round of Directives was not considered a success and following the 1998 Cechinni Report, it
was deemed appropriate to review them. Between 1988 and 1990 a new set of Directives was approved:
Supplies Directive 8812.95 and 89/665, Works Directive 89/940 and Utilities Directive 90/531. Finally, in 1992
and 1993 a final round of Directives was approved. These included the Consolidated Public Services (92/50),
Public Goods (93/36), Works (93/37) and Utilities (93/38) Directives.
n8. Directive 2004/17 and Directive 2004/18. On the legislative history of each Directive, respectively
Hebly and van Rooij, European puhlic procurement: legislative history of the 'Classic' Directive 2004i181EC (Kluwer
Law Inti, 2007) and Hebly, European puhlic procurement: legislative history of the 'UtilitiesDireaioe: 2oo4iI7IEC
(Kluwer Law Inti, 2008).
119. Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way forward COM (96) 58Jfinal.
120. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004> 41 CMLR p.
1278and 1279.
- 6z-
time, that they were liable for infringing Community law and that public con-
tracts should be instrumental to EU policies (such as social and environmental
policies).
Two years after the Green Paper, a new communication issued by the Commis-
sion'" admitted the need for new legislation. The reasons voiced by the Commis-
sion were two fold: i) to simplify the evermore complex legal regime; ii) to include
more flexibility in public procurement. The competitive dialogue was hailed as a
possibility, along with other novelties like e-procurement, framework agreements
and public-private partnerships to achieve the latter.
In 2000 and 2001 a string of communications from the Cornmission'" and
projects'? were published. In 2002 a Regulation on the Common Procurement
Vocabulary was approved.?' In March 2004 the new public procurement Direc-
rives'" replacing Directives 92/50, 93/36, 93/37 and 93/38 were finally adopted.
Both Directives avoided touching sensitive issues like public-private partnerships
or public services concessions. A Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and
Concessions.':" a Communication on the same topic'" and regulations over the
standard format for notices'" followed in their wake.
121. Commission, Puhlic Procurement in the European Union COM (98) 143final.
121. Commission, Interpretative Communication of the Commission on the Community Law Applicable to Puhlic
Procurement and the Possibilities for Integrating Environmental Considerations into Public Procurement COM (2001)
274 final, Commission, Interpretative Communication of the Commission on the Community Law Applicable to Puhlic
Procurement and the Possibilitiesfor Integrating Social Considerations into Public Procurement COM (2001) 0566 and
Commission, Interpretative communication on concessionsunder Community law (1000).
123. COM (2000) 175 final for public sectors, merging the works and supplies Directives, and COM (2000)
176 final, for the utilities sector. . .
124. Regulation (EC) 1195/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common
Procurement Vocabulary.
125. Directive 2oo4!I7 for the Utilitie~ Se~tor and Dire~tive 2oo4!I8. . . .
126. Commission, Green Paper onpuhlwpnvate partnershIps and Communtty law onpuhl" contracts and concessions
COM (200-P327final. .. . . . .
117. Commission, CommunicatIon from the CommIssIon to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
EcOlWmicand Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law
on Public Procurement and Concessions (2009 569 final, in this Communication, the Commission states that it
intends to regulate public-private partnerships and services concessions by means of a new legal instrument.
128. Regulation (EC) 1564/2005 of September 1005.
The new Directives include also include for the first time a specific reference to
general principles applicable to public procurement, namely equal treatment"?
and transparency.?? even though they had been applied by the CJEU to public
procurement in the past.?'
(I) Directive 2oo41I8
Directive 2oo41I8 sets the legal framework for contracts that have a value'" over
certain thresholds'" and are awarded by the contracting authorities covered.?'
A private contractor awarded'" a contract covered by this regime has to be
picked, in general, after one of the following award procedures: open procedure,
restricted procedure, competitive dialogue, negotiated procedure with a contract
notice, negotiated procedure without a contract notice.?"
This Directive unified under the same legal text provisions that were until then in
different Public Sector Directives. This means that all works, supplies and ser-
vices now follow the same rules, although with caveats. The changes brought by
the Directive were more important than just a simple unification of different
regimes. The main guidelines behind the new legal framework were essentially
two: flexibility and simplification.:" The novelties led to an updated set of provi-
129. As defined in joined cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom v. Etm BeIge boos) ECR I-IS59.
130. Recital 2 of the Public Sector Directive.
131. For example, in cases C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark h993) ECR 1-3353and C-87/94, Commission v.
Belgium h996) ECR 1-2043.
132. On the calculation of a contract's value, Trepte, Public procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford,
2007) chapter 41.
133. In accordance with Regulation (EC) "77/2009, for 20JO the thresholds are €12S,OOO (most central
government contracts), €193,000 (most local and regional contracting authorities) and €4,84S,oOO for works
contracts.
134. Article 1(9) of the Directive. The concept of covered contracting authorities has been expanded by
C]ED's, action in the last few years, Arrowsmith, The law of pUblic and utilities procurement (and,
Sweet&MaxweU, 2005) chapter 5.
135. On award criteria in general: Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Elgar European Law, 2007), Trepte,
Public procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), chapters 7D and JOE.
136. On the different procedures in ~eneral: Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Elgar European Law, 2007)
chapter 9, Trepte, Public procurement In the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007) chapters 7B, 7C and JOE and
Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) chapters 7-10.
137. Commission, Publ" Procurement in toe European Union COM (98) 143final, p. 3.
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sions, which in turn are founded in some new paradigms like the aforementioned
social and environmental considerations.t"
Regarding flexibility, positive innovations were introduced, such as limiting the
application of the utilities rules, through the definition of special and exclusive
rights and the exemption of entities in competitive markets (the telecommunica-
tions sector), removal of uncertainty over the use of electronic communications
and reverse auctions and the addition of competitive dialogue;" framework
agreements'40 and e-cornmerce.!" It has been argued that competitive dialogue,
electronic purchasing'" and dynamic purchasing systems'? may not yield the anti-
cipated results. '44
On simplification, positive and negative aspects can also be pointed out. On the
one hand, fusing three pre-existing legal public sector regimes is positive and
laudable. However, its benefits are hindered in the end by the shortcomings of
the new framework.':" In addition, some rough edges were left in the new regime.
In particular, the alignment of the Directives remains incomplete, the draft is
unclear in important areas and further layers of complication have been added
with competitive dialogue, availability of auctions for certain services, central pur-
chasing bodies, rules on organised crime or the rules on technical specifications.
138. Recitals I, 5, 28 and 34, reflecting the evolution path set by some eJEU decisions. Bovis, 'The new public
pro91rement regime of the European Union: a critical analysis of policy, law and jurisprudence' (1005) 30
ELR p. 610 and 621, Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement'
(z0041 41 CMLR. On social and environmental considerations, in general Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, Social and
environmental policies in EC procurement law : new directives and new directions (Cambridge University Press,
:~9~9~oviS, 'The new public procurement regime of the. Eur,opean Union: a critical analysi~ of policy, law and
jurisprudence' (1005) 30 ELR p. 613-614 and Arrowsrruth, An assessment of the new legislative package on
public procurement' (lOOt) 41 CMLR 1180-1~9I. " . . .
140. Bovis, 'The new public procurement regIme of the European Umon: a critical analysis of policy, law and
jurisprudence' (z005) 30 ELR p. 615 and 616 and Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package
on public procurement' (1004J 41 CMLR 1193-1196.
141. Trepte, Mlic procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 1007) p. 445-451, Arrowsmith, The law of
puhlic anll utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 1005) chapter 10 and Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the
new legislative package on public procurement' (1?04) 41 CMLR 1311-1314.
142• Trepte, PUblicprocurement in the European Union (and, Oxford, 1007) p. 436-445, Arrowsmith, The law of
puhlic and utilities procurement (ll_1d,Sweet&MaxweU, 1005) chapter II and Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the
new legislative package on public procurement' (1004) 41 CMLR 1196-1301.
143. Ibid. 1301-1303-
144. Ibid. 1323.
145. Ibid. 1313and 1314.
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Finally, a general exaggeration in detail makes the current public procurement
rules difficult to interpret and apply.':"
(2) Directive 2004/17
The scope of the Utilities Directive has also undergone relevant changes.':" From
the perspective of contracts covered, telecommunications were dropped, while
postal services are now bound by utilities rules.r" In addition, utilities operating
in competitive markets.:" joint ventures and affiliated undertakings'!" have also
been excluded. This does not amount to a new exemption per se, but to the modi-
fication of the conditions set forth in the previous Directive.
This Directive is applicable to all public authorities, public undertakings and bod-
ies with special and exclusive rights. However the latter concept has been
revised:"
The main differences between this Directive and the Directive 2004118 can be
summarised as follows: i) the thresholds are higher in the Utilities Directive, ex-
cept for works contractsj'" ii) utilities can freely choose between the open, re-
stricted and competitive negotiated procedures; iii) advertising of contracts is
more flexible under the Utilities Directive (through a contract notice, periodic in-
dicative notice, or under a qualification system); iv) in the Utilities Directive spe-
cific exceptions are in place for the requirements of advertisement and cornpeti-
146. Ibid. 1324 and 1325.
147. On the new utilities procurement regime, Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Elgar European Law, 2007)
p. 289-366. Trepte, Pubtic procurement in the European Union (md, Oxford, 2007) chapter 3 and Arrowsmith,
The law o/puhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), chapter 15and 16.
148. Article 6.
149. Article 30 and also Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement'
(2004> 41 CMLR,!. 1309-1311.
150. Article 23 an Ibid. p. 1309-1311.
151. Articles 2(Y and 3 ofthe Directive, Ibid., p. 1306-1309.
151. In accordance with Regulation (Ee) 1177/2009, for 2010 the thresholds are €125,000 (most central
government contracts), €193,000 (most local and regional contracting authorities) and €4,845,OOO for works
contracts.
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tioni'" v) more flexible tender deadlines exist m restricted and competitive
negotiated procedures; vi) the use of qualification lists by utilities to define what
potential bidders may tender a contract is permitted; vii) exclusion of firms may
take place in accordance with objective criteria.'" viii) there are rules on third
country offers; and ix) there are more flexible time limits to publish contract
award notices.
<3> Remedies Directive
An important reason identified by the Commission in the 1980s for the lack of
member States' compliance was the absence of mechanisms for rules enforcement
available to companies in some way injured during a public procurement proce-
dure.!" Bearing this in mind, the Community adopted specific Directives to de-
fine legal remedies available to enforce the application of the public procurement
framework. Directive 89/665 (Remedies Directive) was adopted to regulate the
remedies applicable to contracts covered by Works, Supply and Services Direc-
tives. Directive 92113(Utilities Remedies Directive) was adopted to rule remedies
applicable to contracts under the Utilities Directive. These Directives were re-
cently amended by Directive 2007/66.'56
The enforcement of public procurement rules can be achieved by two different
means: i) action taken by the Commission in the CJEU, in accordance with art i-
153. The new article 30 of the Utilities D~rective is a m~j?r inn~vation in this area, allowing u,tilitie~ to
benefit from particularly advantageous bus mess opporrurunes available only for a short time With prices
below normal market rates,
154. Whereas in the Pub~c Sector, Directiv~, potential tenderers ,m~y be exc~u~ed on the, grounds of l~ck of
technical capacity, financial st,andl!l8 and dJlfere!lt reasons as cnl11:mal convlctl?~S ~r misrepresentation of
information, The Utilities Directive does not include an extensive and explicit list of grounds for the
exclusion of firms,
155. Arrowsmith, The lawofpuhlicandutilitiesprocurement (and, Sw~et&Maxwell, 2005), p, 139,and 145,
156, On this Directive De Koninck and Flamey, European Puhltc Procurement Law-RemedIes: The European
Pu/lli'll Procurement Remedies Directives and 15 Yea_rsof Jurisprudence by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities: Texts and Analy (Kluwer Law International, 20°9),
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cle 226of the Treaty;'? in legal action brought by the injured company before the
national courts."
In the first, the Commission takes action on its own or analyses the complaint of
an aggrieved tenderer and presents a case to the CJEU. The party to the litigation
is the member State and not the contracting authority. Whether or not the Com-
mission follows the complaint, is a matter of its sole discretion."? The aggrieved
tenderer cannot force the Commission to take action against the Member
State.'60
While all the costs are borne by the Commission, the procedures under article
226 are known to be lengthy, with an average duration for preliminary rulings of
over 20 months in 2005.'6' In consequence unless the contract's execution is sus-
pended, it will probably have been performed by the time a decision is produced,
reducing the effectiveness of this alternative .•62
Regarding the second method of enforcement, aggrieved companies will seek
redress under national review bodies, as defined by Directives 89/665 and 92113.
These review bodies, while not necessarily courts in the strict sense,"? have to
157. On the enforcement by the European Commission, Treumer, 'Towards an obligation to terminate
contracts concluded in breach of the E.C. Public Procurement Rules: the End of the Status of Concluded
Public Contracts as Sacred Cows' (2007) 4 PPLR, Pachnou, 'Factors influencing bidders' recourse to the
European Commission to enforce EC procurement law' (2005) 2 PPLR, Delsaux, 'The role of the
Commission in enforcing EC Public Procurement Rules' (2004) 3 PPLR and Arrowsmith, 'The Community's
Legal Framework on Public Procurement; the way forward' (1999) 13CMLR.
158. On these remedies please see Trepte, Public procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007)
chapter 9C, Arrowsmith, 'Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and the Alcatel ruling in
England and Wales and Northern Ireland: a review of the new legislation and guidance' (2006) 3 PPLR,
Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) chapter 21 and Pachnou,
'Factors influencing bidders' recourse to the European Commission to enforce EC procurement law' (2005) 2
PPLR.
159. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 1451.
160. On this topic, please see qEU case T-I26/9S, Duma v Commission h99S] ECR 11-2863 and Craig and De
Burca, E.U. Law 4th, Oxford lfniversity Press, 2007) Chapter 12.
16I. Proceedings of te Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities
(200S), P.9.
162. Although the CJEU can order the suspension of the contract, by means of awarding interim measures
under article 243 of the Treaty.
16J. On the meaning of review body, case C-54/96, DOrsch Consult v. v. BundesbaugeseUschaftBerlin b997] ECR
1-4961 and case C -258/97, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnick Planungs-GesellscFiaftv. 'Lfnukskrankenanstalten-
Betriebsgesellschaft [1999] ECR 1-1405.
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provide effective.l'" rapid" and non-discriminatory " review and be able to award
the remedies of interim measures,"? set aside decisions taken unlawfully'" and
award damages to aggrieved renderers."? These remedies shall be available to all
entities having or having had an interest in tendering for the contract.'?"
The Directive 2007/66 has introduced a mandatory IQ day standstill period be-
tween the decision to award a contract'?' and its signing. It has also included a
minimum time limit for interested parties to file a review procedure.!" Provision
is also made to ensure that the review body is independent from the contracting
authority and has the power to declare the ineffectiveness of the contract'?' for
certain violations, including, for instance, the violation of the standstill rules.'>
Regarding damages, the Directive defines rules for their award to tenderers in-
jured by infringements,"! but neither specifies which ones to award or calculation
methods for such compensation.:" Nonetheless, the CJEU in case C-275/03, Com-
mission v Portugal," was clear to point out that Portugal's burden of proof rules
and demand of fault or negligence was not compatible with the Remedies
Directive.!"
164. Article III of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66. On this principle of
effectiveness Pachnou, 'Enforcement of the EC Procurement Rules: The Standards Required of National
Review Systems under EC Law. in t~e C~ntext of the Principle.ofE.ffectiveness' (2000) 5 PPLR.
165. Article III of both Remedies Dlfect~ves, as amended by D~rect~ve 2007/66.
166. Article 112of both Remedies Directives, as amended by DIrective 2007/66.
167. Article 2!I(a) of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66.
168. Article 21I(b) of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive Z007/66.
169. Article 2/1(c) of both Rem~diespir~ctives, as amended bypir~ctive 2007/66.
170. Article 1/3of both Remedle~ Directives, as amended by Dlr~ctlv~ 2007/66. .
171. Article Za/2 of both Remedies DIrectives, as amended by Directive 2007/66, followmg the CJEU rulings
on cases C-81/98, Alcatel Austrai v. Bundeministerium for Wissenschaft und Verkehr {19991 ECR 1-7671 and
C-2I2/02, Commission v Austria, unpublished.
172• Article 2Cof both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66.
173. According to article 2d12 of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66.
Ineffectiveness is a concepted that is to be provided for by national law. On ineffectiveness and the issues
surrounding it, Clifton, 'Ineffectiveness-The New Deterrent: Will the New Remedies Directive Ensure
Greater Compliance with the ~ubs.tan~ive Procurement Rules in the Classical Sector~' ~2009) 4 PPLR p.166.
On the issues of contract terrrunanon 11;' ge!1eral (focused on the case c-503/04 Commission v German)" (z006]
ECR 1-6885), Treumer, 'Towards an obligation to terrmnate contracts concluded in breach of the E.C. Public
Procurement Rules: the End of the Status of Concluded Public Contracts as Sacred Cows' (2007) 4 PPLR.
174. Golding and Henry, 'The New Remedies Directive of the EC: Standstill and Ineffectiveness' (2006) 3, p.
!itllticle 2!I(c) of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66.
176. Article 2/7 of both Remedies Directives, as amended by Directive 2007/66.
177. C-275/o3, Comm;~s;onv..Portuga( {2f!04!. OJ C 3°0/21. . . .
178. Portugal has reviewed Its public liability law, after more than SIXyears With successive projects hanging
-69 -
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a general overview of the ED framework ap-
plicable to public procurement. We have covered the general principles and ED
freedoms relevant to public procurement, Treaty provisions and the current Di-
rectives that regulate the field. In the next chapter we will proceed further by
examining how the competitive dialogue was created and its regulation in Direc-
tive 2oo4!I8.
in the Parliament. The new Law 67/2007, December 31, states in article 7 that the state shall be liable for the
violation of rules during the award phase of public procurement contracts, even the ones under the
Directives thresholds. Apparently, this drafting resolves the violation of Communi!y law decide by the CJEU
in the aforementioned case. In the end it will depend on the Courts apphcation of the new law.
Traditionally, administrative courts have demanded fault or negligence to be proved and refused to award
damages for lost profits.
Chapter 4 - The competitive dialogue in
European public procurement
I. Introduction
This chapter analyses how competitive dialogue has been implemented in Direc-
tive 2oo4!I8, which created the procedure and allowed member States to trans-
pose it to their own legislations. !79 First, it will review the historical background
of the procedure, from the 1996 Green Paper'" to the final text of Directive
2oo4!I8, including the influences on its creation. Then we will analyse the
grounds for its use and characteristics as set forth in the Public Sector Directive.
Finally, an overview of problems identified by academics will follow.
z. Historical background
In 1996 the Green Paper Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way
forward'8! was published by the Commission, launching a lengthy period of discus-
sion regarding European public procurement. This Green Paper did not antic-
ipate the need for changes to the legal regime, aiming instead to fine tune existing
regulations. Nonetheless, in 1998 the Communication Public Procurement in the Eu-
ropean Union!82the objective of revising public procurement rules was assumed, on
the basis of a need to simplify the complex framework and increase flexibility to
respond to market developments.:"
179. According to Direc~ive 2004/18 recital ~6.tr~sposition of fra~ewo~k agreements, central purchasing
bodies, dynamic purch~mg systems, ~Iectromc auctlo~s and co~petlt1ve dialogue was not mandatory.
180. Commission, Public Procurement In the European Union: Explonng the way forward COM (96) r83final PPLR
181. Ibid. / .\
182. Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union COM 198/143final
183. Ibid., P.4·
The Commission accepted the need to facilitate technical dialogue and short-
comings in both the open and restricted procedures, especially for awarding par-
ticularly complex contracts.f" where buyers are aware of their needs but may not
know the best solution to meet them. The Commission conceded that it would
be appropriate to develop a "competitive dialogue" procedure, envisaged as a
standard procedure to operate alongside open and restricted procedures and re-
placing the existing negotiated procedure.i" The acceptance by the Commission
of the need for a new flexible procedure for complex contracts came from its own
policy of public-private partnerships for Trans-European network projects, pub-
lished in the year before'" the 1998 Communication.l"
In May 2000, the Commission presented proposals for two new Directives.l"
One was for consolidating contracts regulated until then by the Works, Supply
and Services Directives."? The second was for contracts falling under the Utilities
Directive.'?" On the first version a new type of negotiated procedure'?' was includ-
ed to be used in particularly complex contracts. Contracts were defined as partic-
ularly complex when the public contracting authority is unable to objectively de-
fine the technical or other means needed to meet its requirements and also
unable to objectively assess technical or financial solutions available in the mar-
ket.!" This procedure included a number of procedural requirements that did not
exist in the regular negotiated procedure. Although it was named as a new type of
184. Ibid., P.7.
185· Ibid., P·7.
186. Co.mmissio~, Communication of the European Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament, to the
Economic and SOCIalCommittee and to the Committee of the Regiom on Public Private Partnerships in Tram-European
Network Projects, COM (97) 453final, section 2.1.
187. Trepte, Publicprocurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), P'405.
188. On the projects, Boyle, 'Critique of the Commission's proposal for a new Directive on the Co-
ordination of Procedures for Public Contracts COM (2000) 275 final, as updated by discussions in the
working group' (2001) 2 PPLR and Arrowsmith, 'The European Commission's proposals for new Directives
on Public and Utilities Procurement' (2000) 9 PPLR.
189. Directives 93/37, 93/36 and 92/50, respectively.
190. Directive 93/38.
191. Articles 29Ma) and 30 of the project.
192. Which, as we will see in section 4.(2)(a) infra, is identical to the current definition of particularly
complex contracts.
"negotiated procedure" the extra conditions clearly transformed it into something
different. One can say it was a preliminary draft of what would become competi-
tive dialogue in 2004. The rules on this procedure were strongly criticised on
different grounds: (i) they were more restrictive than the rules of the competitive
negotiated procedure, and so unsuitable for particularly complex contracts; (ii)
some of the rules were not exclusive to the new procedure and could be applied
to the competitive negotiated procedure, such as the express provision that al-
lows authorities to make payments; (iii) some of the rules should arguably be ap-
plied to the competitive negotiated procedure although probably were not; (iv)
the drafting style introduced inconsistencies and doubts on the interpretation of
the Direcrive.!"
In 2002 a new draft of the Directives was circulated. This draft included a new
version of competitive dialogue, which responded to the previous strong
criticism.
Finally, in 2004, competitive dialogue was finally included in the current Public
Sector Directive, in recitals 16, 31,39 and 41 and articles tltt, 29, 38/3, 40, 44/3 and
5312. In that year, the Green Paper Public Private Partnerships and Community Law
and Public Contracts and Concessions'" suggested competitive dialogue might be used
for the award of contractual public-private partnerships.
In 2005, an explanatory note on the procedure by the Commission ensued,'?'
where major integrated transport infrastructure projects, large computer net-
works or projects involving complex and structured financing were pointed out as
areas where competitive dialogue might be used.'?" The major integrated trans-
193. Ibid.. ..... .
194. Commission, Green Paper onpuhltc-pnvate partnershtps and Commumty law on puhltc contracts and concessions
COM (200.,J 327final.
195. Commission, Explanatory note - competitiv_edialogue - classicdirective (2005). . "
196. Suggesting computer networks are being purchased on a regular baSISby both public and private
companies and, perhaps, the competitive dialogue should not be used for these contracts, Rubach-Larsen,
'Competitive Dialogue' in R Nielsen and S Treumer (eds), The new EU puhlic procurement directives (Djof
port networks where the Commission suggests competitive dialogue might be of
use are utilities contracts.
In 2008, the Commission interpretative communication on the application of Community
law on Public Procurement and Concessions to institutionalised PPP (JpPP) has once
more identified competitive dialogue as the award procedure to use if the public-
private partnership project faces particular financial or legal complexity.'?'
J. Possible influences in the creation of competitive dialogue
Even though the history and possible origins of the competitive dialogue are not
central for this research project, some remarks on this topic are relevant for the
overall picture of the procedure.
The need for more flexible procurement procedures was recognised in the United
Kingdom for at least 20 years.l" This is more so in the area of Public Finance Ini-
tiative (PFI) contracts.?" where the complexity of these partnership projects
made clear that the standard open and restricted procedures of the Public Sector
Directives were not adequate as procurement mechanisms. zoo
Different reasons have been named for the inadequacy of standard procedures for
the procurement of complex contracts: i) non-consideration of the particularities
raised by complex projects in the drafting of the 1990S Public Sector Directives;'?'
ii) need for at least 5 tenderers in open and restrictive procedures, which is un-
Publishing, 2005) p. 70.
197· Commission, Commission interpretative communication on the application of Community (2008), P: 4-5
198. Burnett, Competitive dialogue - A practical guitk (EIPA, 201O) P.19-21, Farley, 'Directive 2004/18EC and
the competitive dialogue: A case study on the application of the competitive dialogue procedure to the NHS
LIFT' (2007) 2 European PPLR p. 67.
199. COM(2002) 236.
200. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR p.
1280, and Brown, 'The impact of the new procurement directive in large public infrastructure projects:
competitive dialogue or better the devil you know' (2004> 4 PPLR On the fact that two-stage procedures
were already existe in procurement frameworks outside the European Union, Trepte, Public procurement in the
European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), P.405, in particular note 105.
201. Braun, 'Strict compliance versus commercial reality: The practical application of EC public
procurement law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative' bo03J EL], p. 577.
reasonable in complex projects where the costs to prepare a final bid are prohibi-
tive; iii) need to define the technical specifications completely from the beginning
of the procedure; iv) limited scope for dialogue during the procedure; v) and limit-
ed scope for dialogue also after the choosing of the winning bid. aoa
In the light of the open and restricted procedures' shortcomings, the UK Gov-
ernment officially sanctioned the use of the competitive negotiated procedure for
the procurement of PFI contracts in a number of its guidelines.'?' The High
Court also accepted the use of the competitive negotiated procedure for the pro-
curement of PFI contracts in the Katbro case.'?' This case remains its sole ruling
on the subject. As a result, procurement practice in the UK of PFI projects prag-
matically followed the more flexible and adapted negotiated procedure, 20~ even
though the grounds for its use were uncertain.t'"
In 2000 the Commission initiated two procedures against the UK207but the two
were quietly dropped without explanation. As a consequence, the CJEU never re-
viewed the extensive grounds on which the competitive negotiated procedure was
used by contracting authorities in this member State.
It may be argued that the British experience of putting commercial reality in
front of strict legal compliance in PFI projects.f" and thus rendering evident the
divergence between law and commercial reality,"? may have led to the wider
recognition of the need to reform the procurement rules of complex contracts.
202. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 629
203. Namely in, Treasury taskforce, How to Follow EC Procurement Procedure and Advertise in the OJEC ( 1998),
Treasury Taskforce, How to appoint work and work with a preferred bidder and Treasury Taskforce, Step by Step
Guide to the PF[ Procurement Process.
204. R. (on the application ofKathro> v Rhondda 9non Taj/County BC ~200l) E~~CAdmin 4527..
205. Braun, 'Strict compliance versus commercial realIty: The practical application of EC public procurement
law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative' (2003) 5EL], p. 579·
206. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 629 and 630
207. The first was on the 'projec.t. f?r t.he rede:-,e1opment .of.the Pimlico School in London, and the second on
the provision of commurury facilities an Ipswich. Commission press release IP/oo/869 of July 27, 2000.
208. Braun, 'Strict compliance versus commercial reality: The practical application of EC public procurement
law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative' (2003) 5EL] p. 585.
209. As Peter Braun found in his Ph.D. thesis: Braun, The practical impact of E. U Public Procurement Law on
PF[ procurement practice in the United Kingdom (2001).
Some of the specific questions Braun highlighted as procedural problems per-
ceived in the UK's PFI practice may be interpreted in this light. From the seven
situations identified by Braun in his research, three are plausible to be identified
as having helped shape competitive dialogue as a mechanism for the procurement
of complex contracts: (i) the need to conduct pre- and post-tender discussions.'"
(ii) the need to change specifications in the course of a tender; (iii) the already
mentioned inadequacy of open and restricted procedures for PFr projects and the
systematic use of the negotiated procedure to procure PFr projects." The wide-
spread use of the negotiated procedure.i" as a more adapted procedure for the
procurement of complex contracts,"! can be identified as a starting point for the
developmenr'" of competitive dialogue. 21;
Itmay be argued that the UKls PFI practice experience in the 1990S may have in-
fluenced the creation of the competitive dialogue procedure. Firstly, it made clear
that the standard procedures as configured by the Public Sector Directives were
not adequate to procure complex contracts, giving the Commission an incentive
to look into the issue. Secondly, it also made clear that there was a need to in-
clude a procurement procedure devised specifically for the procurement of com-
plex contracts, based on the existing competitive negotiated procedure but with
more procedural elements. Third, as per the previous reference to Braun, compet-
210. The restrictions in negotiations with candidates in the open and restricted procedures under Directive
93/37 is summed up by the joint statement of the Council and the Commission on art. 7(4) of the
aforementioned Directive:
"The Council and the Commission state that in open and restricted procedures all negotiations with candidates or tenderers
on fundamental aspectsof contracts, variations which are likely to distort competition, and inparticular onprices, shall be
ruled out; ~owever, discussions with candidates or tenderer: "'!lY be beld but only for the purpose oj. clarifying or
supplementml5 the content of their tenders of the requirements of the contracting authorities and provided this does not
involve discrimination,", in b9941 OJ. L1111114.
211. Ibid. p.85 and Braun, 'Strict compliance versus commercial reality: The practical application of EC
public procurement law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative' (aooj) 5EL] p. 577 and 578.
212. Actively endorsed by HM Treasury and Treasury Task-force official guidance and backing, Ibid. p. 581
and 582.
213- Brown, 'The impact of the new procurement directive in large public infrastructure projects:
competitive dialogue or better the devil you know' (2004> 4 PPLR p.160 and 161.
214. Especially if we consider the competitive dialogue as a negotiated procedure with stronger procedural
elements (and thus less flexible) and not a restricted procedure with some extra flexibility.
215. Kennedy-Loest, 'What can be done at the preferred bidder stage in competitive dialogue' (2006) 6
PPLR p. 316
itive dialogue's rules seem specifically developed to tackle at least some of the
problems identified in that practice.:"
4. The competitive dialogue under Directive 2004fI8
The new competitive dialogue procedure was introduced to be used by contract-
ing authorities wanting to award a particularly complex contract and facing the
necessity of developing the most appropriate solution for its needs through dis-
cussions with tenderers. Situations existed where the open or restricted proce-
dures' lack of flexibility would not be the most appropriate means to tender the
contract. It is aimed, in particular, at PFI projects."?
The rules governing the use of competitive dialogue are scattered throughout var-
ious articles and recitals of the Directive 2004118. While article 29 contains most
of the rules it by no means contains all the rules related to the procedure. Rules
on the procedure can be found in articles r/rrfc), 23/3, 28, 44 to 52 and recitals 31,
39 and 41 of the Directive 2004118.
On a first reading of article 29, competitive dialogue seems a straightforward pro-
cedure. It is light, flexible allowing the contracting authorities a much-needed
leeway in the course of the procedure to award a complex contract. In reality it is
not that simple and uncertainties on the grounds of use and doubts on its rules
exist.2I8 The dissemination of rules in different articles and recitals of the Direc-
216. To such an extent that the the successive changes on the competitive dialogue's drafts from 2000 to
2004 have made more obvious the connection to UK practice and to the HM Treasury guidance.
217. Burnett, 'Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - Towards an optimal approach' (2009) 4
EPPPL p. 190-191, Arrowsmith, 'Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and the Alcatel
ruling in England and \X:'a1~sand Northern Irelan~: a .review of the. new legislation. and guidance' (2006) 3
PPLR, p. 86 and Commission, Green Paper on puhltc-pnvate partnershtps and Communtty law onpuhlic contracts
tmd concessionsCOM (2004J 327 final. Stating that, however, the procedure may not be as useful for these
projects as anticipated Farley, 'Directive 2004/18EC and the competitive dialogue: A case study on the
application of the competitive dialo~e procedure to the NHS LIFT' (2007) 2 European PPLR, p. 68,
Arrowsmith, The law ofpuh/ic and uti/ittes procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), p.630.
218. Burnett 'Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - Towards an optimal afproach' (2009) 4
EPPPL, P.I9I, Treumer, '~he fiel~. ~f application of the competitive dialogue' (2006 6 PPLR, P.307,
Arrowsmith, The law ofpubltc and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&MaxweU, 2005), p.630-31, Arrowsmith, 'An
tive does not facilitate the task of correctly interpreting the procedure and apply-
ing the respective provisions. In addition, the draft of the rules was either not
carefully planned"? or ambiguously laid in on purpose, leaving the definition of
important details to the transpositions to national law, practice and courts.
The first part of the present section covers the flow of the procedure as apparent
in Directive 2004118. The analysis of the problems facing competitive dialogue is
left for the second part of this section.
(r) Flow of the procedure
According to the article I/n(c), competitive dialogue procedure allows the con-
tracting authority to carry on a dialogue with the admitted candidates so that one
or more solutions to the "particularly complex contract" can be be found and the
candidates asked to submit their tenders.
The procedure is initiated with the publication of a contract notice by the con-
tracting authority simply setting out its needs and requirements, as stated in arti-
cle 2912 of the Directive.'?" Contrary to the open and restricted procedures, this
contract notice does not need to include detailed specifications but only an out-
line. The contract notice or accompanying descriptive document should also
specify if the dialogue will include successive phases to reduce the number of so-
Iutions,:" maximum and minimum number of candidates and objective criteria to
assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (004) 41 CMLR, p. 1277, Brown, 'The
impact of the new procurement directive in large public infrastructure projects: competitive dialogue or
better the devil you know' (004) 4 PPLR, p.160 and Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004> 13 PPLR,
P·178.
219. Which could explain some of the general vagueness permeating the draft of the procedure.
220. Articles 2912, 3512 and Annex VII of the Directive 2oo41I8.
221. Article 29/4 of the Directive 2004118.
choose admitted candidates and winning tender.?" since the only award criterion
available is the most economically advantageous tender one."!
After the contract notice is published, the contracting authority then chooses
from the candidates that registered their interest the ones that are technically
and financially sound. Those are then carried through to the dialogue phase of the
procedure.r" The assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of
candidates is done in accordance with articles 44 through 52. The contracting au-
thority may shortlist and limit the number of candidates and solutions to discuss
in the dialogue phase, as long as it is mentioned in the contract notice, along with
the objective criteria for making the selection. To ensure competition, at least
three have to be retained for the discussions in the dialogue phase.:"
The dialogue phase can be used by the contracting authorities to discuss with
candidates all aspects of the contract to tender.?" leaving significant leeway for di-
alogue after the tendering has commenced. The keyword is flexibility for the con-
tracting authority to structure this phase of the procedure. This is a marked de-
parture from the rules for the open and restricted procedures that restrict
discussions after the start of the procedure.
While there are no limits to what can be discussed, the Directive is more strict in
relation to how the dialogue should be carried out. According to article 29/3 the
contracting authority has to ensure equal treatment and cannot provide informa-
tion to candidates in a discriminatory way or reveal the confidential information
proposed by one candidate without his agreement.
222. Annex VII, 19 and 20 of the Directive 2~04h8. .,. .
223. The lowest price criteria cannot be used m the competl~lve dialogue, articles 29/1 and 53. This appears to
be sensible, given the fact that the contra,et to be awarded will be complex and cannot be reduced simply to a
question of who presents .the ~heapest prtce,
224. Article 291} of the DI,rectl,ve 2004"8.
225. Article 4413 of the D,lrect,lve 2004/18,
226. Article 29/3 of the Directive 2004118,
The dialogue phase can be carried out in successive stages so to reduce the num-
ber of solutions to be discussed,"? including multiple proposal/tendering stages.:"
The elimination of candidates and solutions has to be mentioned in the contract
notice and adhere to the pre-defined award criteria. Dialogue shall continue until
the appropriate solution or solutions for the need of the contracting authority
have been found."? With the end of the dialogue phase - assuming that at least
one solution was deemed as acceptable - the contracting authority invites candi-
dates to submit their tenders.
The final tenders submitted must include all the elements deemed required or
necessary for the performance of the contracr'" and can be clarified, specified
and fine-tuned at the request of the contracting authority.'?' This cannot be used
by the contracting authority to change the basic features of the tender.
The assessment of the tenders is done in accordance with the award criteria in-
eluded in the contract notice, which, must be the most economically advanta-
geous tender, as defined per article 53of the Directive.'?'
After the final tenders have been submitted and the most economically advanta-
geous one selected, the contracting authority may, at its request, ask for clarifica-
tion of aspects contained in any of the tenders and for the commitments to be
confirmed.'?' Again, no substantial aspects tenders can be changed at this stage.
227. Article 29/4 of the Directive 2oo4!I8.
228. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR, p.
1277-
229. Article 29/5 of the Directive 2oo4!I8.
230. Article 29/6 ofthe Directive.
231. Article 29/6 of the Directive.
232. Article 29/7 of the Directive.
233. Article 29/7 of the Directive.
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(2) Questions and problems already identified with the
competitive dialogue
A number of different problems with the current competitive dialogue draft have
already been identified in the literature. For the purposes of this thesis, these
have been divided in: i) uncertainty on the grounds for its use; ii) assessment of
the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates, iii) dialogue phase;
iv) final tender; v) scope for changes and negotiations before and vi) after the eval-
uation of tenders.
(a)Groundsforuse of the procedure
According to article 2911, the use of competitive dialogue procedure is limited to
the award of particularly complex contracts, where the use of open and restricted
procedures will not allow the award of the contract. Three points shall be stressed
from the definition included this article. Firstly, following the rule of article 28,
where the open and restricted procedures are considered as the only standard
procedures, competitive dialogue use is limited to these specific sets of circum-
stances and it has been argued that the procedure has an exceptional narure.?'
Under this view, competitive dialogue is not a standard procedure in the sense
the open and restricted are. The opposite view has also been argued, since com-
petitive dialogue is more structured and transparent then the negotiated
procedure.t"
134. Hjelmborg et al., Public procurement law : the EU directive on public contracts (Djef Pub, 1006), p.28),
Treumer, 'The field of application of the competitive dialogue' (1006) 6 PPLR, p.jrj, Arguing for the
exceptional nature of the competitive dialogue according to French law, Delelis, 'Le dialogue competitif
(%007) ) Revue du Tresor p. 180. . . .
135. Farley, 'Directive 1004!I8EC and the competitive dialogue: A case study on the application of the
competitive dialogue procedure to the NHS LIFT' (2007) 2 European PPLR, p. 62 and Arrowsmith, The lawol
huh/I( and utilities procurement (lnd, Sweet&Maxwell, 1005) p. 631-635. Considering competitive dialogue as a
-r.;pecial procedure" and not an exceptional one such as the negotiated procedure, Commission, Explanatory
note - competitive dialogue - classicdirective (2005), p.z,
Secondly, is the impossibility of a contracting authority using the open or re-
stricted procedures to award the contract.i" If interpreted strictly, then the con-
tracting authority could only use the competitive dialogue if and when it is effec-
tively impossible to draft the specifications as per article 23.'37 A broad
interpretation, on the other hand, would also cover situations where the contract-
ing authority, although able to define technical specifications, does not know in
advance all the possible solutions for its need and, in consequence, is not sure on
what is the best solution.i"
Thirdly, article 2911 does not define the legal concept of particularly complex con-
tracts,"? a fundamental concept if one wants to clearly determine the circum-
stances for which competitive dialogue is available. Guidance for the definition of
the particularly complex concept is to be found only by jointly reading article
I/n(c) and recital 31 of Directive 2004118. According to article r/rrfc), a contract is
deemed as particularly complex when contracting authorities are unable to objec-
tively define the technical specifications capable of satisfying its needs or objec-
tives and/or is unable to objectively specify the legal or financial make up of a
project. '40 Therefore, at least one of these three conditions has to be present to
enable the use of competitive dialogue. This inability to draft the specifications
has to be without fault on the part of the contracting authority.':"
236. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 4' CMLR,
P.1277. One should bear in mind also the trend requiring a more complete disclosure of award criteria, their
weighting and sub-criteria set forth by the qEU in C-532/06, Lianakis u. Municipality of Alexandropoulis ECR
[2008} 1-0025'. On this decision, Lee, 'Implications of the Lianakis Decision' (2010) 3 PPLR, p. 4T56 and
Kruger, 'Superiority in Experience and Skills may Distinguish a Better Tender Bid! Critical Reflections from
Norway on the Lianakis Ruling' (2009) 3PPLR.
237. Treumer, The field of application of the competitive dialogue' (2006) 6 PPLR, P.307 and Treumer,
'Competitive Dialogue' (2004> '3 PPLR p. 179.
238. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 634.
239. Arguing the same, Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004) 13PPLR p. '78-'79.
240. Trepte considers that the use of the word "objectively" suggests the procedure should not be used
lightly only because the contracting authority lacks the expertise to define the technical requirements,
Trepte, Public procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), P.446. .
241. Leaving without an answer the question of what happens when fault from the contracting authority
exists. In reality, the contracting authority is barred from usina the competitive dialogue, but at the ~ame
time it is unable to draft the specifications with the level of detail it would be required in a open or restricted
procedure.
Recital 31 sheds some extra light on the concept of "particularly complex" while
adding some extra complexity. It states that the contracting authority's impossi-
bility of defining the technical means of article 23, legal make-up and financial
make-up has to be objective and the conduct of the contracting authority fault-
less. On the other hand, recital 31 also adds some examples of what can or can
sometimes be considered as particularly complex contracts, namely important in-
tegrated transport infrastructure projects,':" large computer networks or projects
involving complex and structured financing in which the legal/financial make-up
cannot be defined in advance.
Related with this question is the apparent conflict between article 29 and article
l/n(c)!43 On the one hand, article 29 may be interpreted as implying that the con-
tracting authority has a degree of discretion to consider if the use of the open or
restricted procedures will not allow the award of the contract, without further in-
sight on how the contracting authority should reach that conclusion. On the oth-
er hand, article I/n(c), supported by recital 31, stresses the objectivity of the im-
possibility in defining the technical means or legal/financial make-up and appears
to limit the scope of discretion. It has been argued that the first option is the
correct.t" leaving the contracting authority with the ability to assess if its better
to define a precise specification from the onset, albeit framed by the objective el-
ement of a reasonable procuring entity."! The second possibility, of the grounds
142• This field of application is further stressed by the Commission on its explanatory note, Commission,
Explanatory note - competitive dialogue - classicdirectiv_e(1?05). .
143. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on pubhc procurement' (1004> 41 CMLR,
~:;?lrrowsmith, The I~ ofpuhlic and utili~ie!procurement (znd, S~eet&M~e~, 1<:>05),p.63~. Assu~ng only
that it "provides a certam. amount of fleXl~ibty to the Contractmg authority , Without bemg entirely clear
Trepte, Public procurement In the European URton (l~d, Oxford, 1007), P·446 .,
145. Arrowsmith, 'An assc:ssment of the new legislative pac~age ~)fl ~ubhc procur.e~ent' (1004> 41 CMLR,
p.1l77. and Brown, 'The Impact of the new procurement directive m large public infrastructure projects:
competitive dialogue or bett~r. the devil you know' (2004>.4 PI!LR. p. 178. With an opposing view if the
Commission views on th,e original .proP?sal fo~ the new Directive m COM (2000)275 are factored in the
interpretation, Treumer, Competitive Dialogue (2004) 13PPLR, P·178.
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for use having to be assessed "objectively" and limited by the strict wording by ar-
ticle I/n(c) and recital 31, has also been argued.t"
In light of the above, the grounds for use of the procedure will depend on the in-
terpretation given to three abstract concepts present in different articles of the
Directive. These concepts are particularly complex contracts, the impossibility of
using an open and restricted procedure and the objective inability to define tech-
nical means, legal or financial make-up of the contract.
(b) Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability
of candidates
Candidates that are to participate in the dialogue stage have to be selected in ac-
cordance with articles 44 through 52 of Directive 2004118. The contracting au-
thority shall indicate the minimum number of candidates (at least three) and dis-
close the objective criteria that are to be applied.:" It has been argued that if less
than the minimum number of candidates meets the requirements, the contracting
authority may still proceed with the procedure.r"
(c) Dialogue phase
A number of issues are present in the dialogue phase and are unadressed by the
Directive. Problems surrounding confidentiality, use of successive stages, elimina-
tion of solutions or candidates, how to organise the dialogue stage and conduct
meetings are at play.
246. Treumer, 'The field of apelication of the competitive dialogue' (2006) 6 PPLR P.313.
247. Arrowsmith, The law oJ public and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&MaxweU, 2005), p. 640-641,
Commission, Explanatory note - competitive dialogue - classic directive (2005), P.4-5 and Treumer, 'Competitive
Dialogue' (2004} 13PPLR, p.180-lg2. On selection and award criteria in general, Treumer, 'The Distinction
between Selection and Award Criteria in EC Public Procurement Law: A Rule without Exception' (2009) 4
PPLR, p. 103-111.
248. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&MaxweU, 2005), p. 641.
The most important problem in this phase is probably the definition on how to
guarantee equal treatment to candidates"? and ensure that confidentiality is
maintained as required by article 29/3 of Directive 20041I8. According to this arti-
cle, the contracting authority must guarantee equal treatment among all tenderers
and abstain from revealing each solution to other participants. "Cherry picking"
of the best bits of solutions from different candidates is apparently forbidden,'?'
thus limiting the possibility of a contracting authority creating a mixed solution
that would be the best suited for its needs." It has been argued that it will be
tempting for contracting authorities to set aside cherry picking while searching
for value for money. '52 The ban on "cherry picking" may have the caveat of the
candidate forfeiting the protection granted by article 29/3 on its own accord, ei-
ther during the dialogue itself or, perhaps, as a tender condition.t"
It is debatable how the successive stages authorised by article 29/4 may actually
be irnplemented'?' and if "reducing solutions" means that only solutions may be
dropped or the respective candidates are to be excluded from continuing in the
dialogue alsO.255 I t has been argued that the elimination covers not only the solu-
tions but also the candidate.i" and that this may reduce the transaction costs for
all parties involved."? However, it has been suggested, since the Directive only
mentions the elimination of "solutions" and not of candidates, that only solutions
249. Ibid., p. 64r648.
250. Charveron, 'Competitive dialogue threatens PFI ' (1007) 18 Construction Law, P·z9, Brown, 'The impact
of the new procurement directive in large public infrastructure projects: competitive dialogue or better the
devil you know' (1004> 4 PPLR p. I73 and Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004) 13 PPLR, P·178.
251. The original proposal of the Commission (Article 30(6) of COM(2000) 175) allowed "cherry picking" of
solutions by the contracting authority and was met with strong criticism by the industry.
252. Ibid., p.181-181.
253. Ibid., p.181-182. Expressing an opposing view to this possibility, citing this would create a new selection
criterion not foreseen in articles 45 through 52 of the Directive Z004/18, Rubach-Larsen, 'Competitive
Dialogue' in R Nielsen and S Treumer (eds), The new EU puhlic procurement directives (Djof Publishing, 2005),
p. 76-77- f h di . . I bli fi254. Brown, 'The impact 0 t e n~w procun;ment recnve ID arge pu c in rastructure projects:
competitive dialogue or better t~e devil r'?~know (2004> 4 PPLR, P·174·
255. Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhllc and util,t,es procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 1005) p. 646-647.
256. Ibid. p.646.
257. Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (1004> 13PPLR, p. 181.
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may be eliminated whereas the candidates themselves are to be kept and invited
to take part in the tender stager"
Furthermore, one can also argue that the lack of information on how to actually
run this stage or to organise the meetings with the candidates may pose relevant
questions. How should the meetings be processed? Who should be the first parti-
cipant and should the order be changed for subsequent meetings or if successive
stages are used?
(d) Final tenders
Regarding the final tenders, two related questions arise: the number of candidates
to be invited to present final tenders and the state of completeness tenders must
achieve at that stage."?
According to article 44/4, competition at the tender stage is necessary but only if
the number of acceptable solutions allows for it. Therefore, it seems reasonable
that two tenders would be enough to ensure competition at this point of the pro-
cedure and this number appears to be reasonable in face of the high costs of
producing complete bids"? for complex projects."! But it can also be argued that
since the required number to initiate a dialogue is three, the number of final ten-
ders should also reflect this minimum. Another potential problem is the possibili-
ty of the contracting authority not inviting for the tender stage some of the can-
didates that reached the end of the dialogue. How can this decision be checked
258. Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p.646.
259. Ibid. p. 649·
260. With this opinion, Ibid. p. 649 and Brown, 'The impact of the new procurement directive in large
public infrastructure projects: competitive dialogue or better the devil you know' (2004) 4 PPLR, P·178.
261. And even one candidate and only a single solution are to be accepted by the contracting authority, if the
tenderers have not agreed in raising the limitations of Article 29/4 as it cannot create a common
specification, Trepte, Puhlic procurement in the European Union (znd, Oxford, 2007), P.451.
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by dismissed candidates, especially if the confidentiality restriction IS still rn
On the second question, it has ben argued that to request a state of completeness
in the "final tenders" as it is implied by article 29/6 may not be the best option in
complex projects like PFIs as the costs of preparing such bids can be high and
dissuade potential candidates of participating in the tender on the first place. In
PFI projects, the benefits of competition need to be balanced with the high costs
of preparing and evaluating multiple bids .•63
(e) Scope for changes and negotiations before evaluating tenders
Article 29/6 allows tenders to be "clarified, specified and fine-tuned at the request
of the contracting authority". The scope of application of these provisions is
debatable .•64
The clarifications, specifications and fine-tuning of tenders prior to evaluation
specified in article 29/6, raises a number of issues regarding the possibilities actu-
ally given to companies and contracting authorities. In particular, it can be debat-
ed what amendments to improve tenders are acceptable, if non-compliant tenders
may be brought to compliance and if further information may be requested from
tenderers.
Regarding the amendments to improve tenders, it has been argued that article
29/6 is simply a restatement of a principle already applied to the open and re-
stricted procedures.i" However, it has been argued that article 29/6 should be in-
262. Raising a similar issue.Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004> 13PPLR, P·178.
263. Arrowsmith, The law of publIC and utillttes procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 650-65 and
Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR, P.I277.
264. The Commission guidance is fairly stri~t i~ limiting what can be discussed at this stage, Commission,
Exp/anlltory note -competi~iv~dialogue -clllS!;cd".ectlV~(2005). . '.
265. Council and Commission , Declaration concemmg art. 714of Publ,c Works Directioe 93/37 (994).
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terpreted bearing in consideration the fact competitive dialogue is to be used for
the award of particularly complex contracts.r" Under this interpretation changes
to tenders are acceptable if they are kept within certain qualitative and quantita-
tive means {such as the basic features of the existing tenders"? or the call for the
tender which would be likely to distort competition or to have a discriminatory
effect)268and equal treatment of tenderers is ensured.r" Equal treatment may im-
ply treating differently the tenderers if the contracting authority can demonstrate
they are in different positions.'?" It has also been suggested that the possibility of
improving tenders after their submission may be used by contracting authorities
to reduce the amount of information given to the candidates at the end of the di-
alogue stage, because any outstanding issues may be dealt at this point.?'
On bringing non-compliant tenders into compliance, it has been argued that the
scope of article 29/6 could cover the necessary changes.'?'
The possibility of contracting authorities requesting further information from
tenderers relevant for the award of the contract can also be discussed. It has been
suggested that it is possible to request such information on an open or restricted
procedure.'?' As competitive dialogue is available only for the tendering of partic-
ularly complex contracts, it has been argued the increased complexity of these
projects should warrant more flexibility for the contracting authority to request
information.?'
266. Arrowsm!th, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 6W656.
267. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR,
p.1277-
268. Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004) 13PPLR p. 183.
269. Arrowsmith, Tbe law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 655-656.
270. Ibid. p. 656.
271. Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004> 13PPLR p. 184.
272. Arrowsmith, 'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR,
P.I277, albeit recognising as not clear if the concept should include changes to features that will be compared
in the evaluation and Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), p.
654-658.
273· Ibid. 543-544·
274· Ibid. p. 657.
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Finally, it is not clear if only the contracting authority may request changes to
tenders under article 29/6, as apparent from the actual text.?"
(0 Scope for changes and negotiations after selecting the winner
Article 29/7 allows for the clarification and confirmation of commitments that do
not modify substantial aspects of the tender and do not pose a risk of competi-
tion distortion and discrimination. The wording of this paragraph is ambiguous
and open for interpretation, as "clarify" and "confirm" appear not to allow
changes, while the reference to "substantial" seems to imply that there is room
for changes as long as they are not-substantial.:"
This has been suggested that in the case of PFIs in the UK. In this country, typi-
cally, some issues are left to be discussed after a winning tenderer has been cho-
sen, like the financial due diligence,"? planning permissions, the detail of designs
and surveys.'?' It as also been argued that the lack of flexibility for negotiations in
this stage can put in jeopardy the usefulness of the procedure for PFI practice."?
A scenario where the possibility of having changes in the winning tender appears
to be possible is when the change arises from a reason external to the contracting
authority, as long as competition is not distorted.f"
175. Treumer, 'Competitive Dial<?gue' (2~~4? 13PPLR p. 184. .
176. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublIC and utilItIes procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 1005), p.661, Arrowsmith,
'An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement' (2004) 41 CMLR, p. 1277 and Brown,
'The impact of the new procurement directive in large public infrastructure projects: competitive dialogue or
better the devil you know' (1004) 4 PPLR p. 175·
177. In Portugal, on the negotiated procedu~es for the award of public-private partnership contracts for the
construction and running of four news hosplt~s on th~ ~ast few years, the banks had. to commit the funding
for the project from the onset and no financial due diligence was done after the wmner had been chosen.
Furthermore, the banks were part of the consortia.
178. Kennedy-Loest, 'What ~an ~e do~e. at the .preferred. bidder stage in ,co,mpetitive dialogue' (2006) ?
PPLR, P.316. With an opposing VIew, cmng the Issue of bid creep, Auton, It s good to talk' L1oo9J Pub"c
Fintmee16, p. 16. ., . .
179. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublIC and util,t,es procurement (znd, Sweet&MaxweU, 2005), p.63I.
180. Ibid., p.66,-662.
Finally, the existence of a general ban on detailed discussions after the submission
of tenders (either before or after selecting the winner) may raise the question if it
would not have been preferable to simply adapt the scope of the negotiated pro-
cedure with prior notification to include the contracts covered by competitive
dialogue.t"
5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the historical background to the competitive dia-
logue and how it has been introduced by Directive 2oo4!I8. Furthermore, we
have analysed the issues it raises, particularly on the grounds for use, dialogue
stage and tender stage. From the analysis it is apparent that the current draft of
the competitive dialogue at ED level raises a number of questions that are still to
be entirely overcome.
After carrying out an overview of at ED level of public procurement in general
and of competitive dialogue in particular, in the next chapters we will proceed
with the analysis in the target countries. In the following chapter, public procure-
ment in Portugal will be discussed.
281. Rubach-Larsen, 'Competitive Dialogue' in R Nielsen and S Treumer (eds), The neta EU public procurement
directives (Djof Publishing, 2005) P.78.
Chapter S
Portugal
Public procurement •ID
t, Introduction
Portugal has a long tradition in regulating public procurement. Procedures for
awarding contracts, legal regimes applicable to their performance and review
mechanisms have existed for a long time. This tradition dates back to the middle
of the 19th century and led to the progressive development of a national public
procurement framework during the zoth century as we will see below.
Portugal acceded to the EEC in 1986 and kept improving and updating its exist-
ing procurement framework in accordance with each successive rounds of pro-
curement Directives. National laws were restructured, reworded and adapted to
accommodate each round of Directives. Currently, the bulk of public procure-
ment framework is part of the Public Contracts Code of 2008.
In this chapter we will set out an overview of the public procurement rules in
Portugal .
.2. Background topublic procurement
(r) Introduction
It is impossible to explain the Portuguese public procurement system without a
brief mention of closely associated areas like the distinct legal regimes for the
performance of public contracts or the rules regarding administrative and judicial
review mechanisms. In Portugal all these issues are interconnected and do not al-
low for an analysis restricted to procurement. This sub-section will thus be divid-
ed into two different parts. The first part will cover the traditional qualification of
contracts according to the different legal regimes regarding their execution, influ-
enced by French law (administrative contracts on one side, and private contracts
of the administration on the other). The second part will summarise the more re-
cent ED influence on this topic, in particular the concept of public contracts.
(2) Different nature of contracts entered into by public
administration in Portugal
Portuguese public administration and administrative law were heavily influenced
by the approach developed in France during the 18th century.i" A cornerstone of
this system was the paradigm that the administration could do no wrong. That is
to say, the State could dictate whatever it wanted and have, in general, free reign
over the activities it wished to carry out. Administrative law was originally creat-
ed to maintain this status quo. It has been considered a miracle that the Adminis-
tration decided to restrict itself by submitting to the rule of Iaw,"" albeit not the
general law but a special or statutory (administrative) law which left it with plenty
of room to manoeuvre.
In the field of public procurement the adoption of the French modelled to the
dichotomy between administrative contracts and private contracts of the admin-
istration. According to the traditional view on this issue, each type had a different
nature, thus justifying the need for different subsets of rules.284 The different rules
covered the legal regime applicable to the substance of the contract and also the
review mechanisms available to the private party.
28z. For a general introduction to the history background on Portuguese public administration, Freitas do
Amaral, Curso de Direito Admmistratiuo (jrd, zooe), Chapter I and Pereira da Silva, Em busca do acto
administratiuo perdido Wmedina, 1998), Chapter I.
283. Freitas do Amaral, Cursode Direito Administratioo (jrd, 2006), p. 160.
284. In particular, the different nature was used to justify the existence of exorbitant powers ([ait du Prince)
held by the public party that would give it leverage to change the contract or apply fines without the
agreement of the private party or a decision by a reviewbody.
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Administrative contracts were subject to administrative law and to the adminis-
trative jurisdiction for reviews. Private contracts of the administration, were sub-
ject to private law and to the judicial jurisdiction. It was of paramount impor-
tance to assess the legal nature of each contract to determine what sets of rules
would be applicable, since the paradigms of each subset are fundamentally differ-
ent. The existence of actual differences between the two has sparked a long-
standing discussion in Portuguese Iiterarure.t" More recently, under the influence
of EU law and the national law on the administrative jurisdiction, the differences
between the two types have been watered down and the concept of public con-
tracts has emerged.
(a) Administrative contracts
Historically, administrative contracts were considered as a magnanimous conces-
sion by the public administration of its powers.t" as it would be cooperating with
a private party to achieve the public good,"" which had taken the form of con-
tract and not the most typical form of an administrative act. In consequence,
such contracts reflected a non-balanced relation of power between the parties.
285. On this topic, for all see Freitas ~o ~aral, Curs_ode Direito Admi,!i~trat~o (Almedina, 20<;>1),Chapter 4,
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, 0 concursopublIco naformafao do contrato admmlstratl'Vo <Lex, 1994>, Servulo Correia
Legalidade e autonomia contratual nos contratos administratiuos (AImed ina, 1986), Part II and Marcello Caetano:
Manual de Direito Administrativo (roth, 1973) p. 569 onwards. These authors have defended the autonomous
nature of administrative contracts, with the criteria to sustain this position suffering changes and mutations
over the years and differences amo.ng scho~a~s. For instan~~, Fr~itas do A~aral considered that the
administrative contract ~ defined by ItS subnusslo.n .to an. adnumst.rauve legal regime and the _prosecuti~n of
an object connected WIth the core of the administrative function, Freitas do Amaral, Curso de Direito
Administrativo (Alrnedina, 20CI) p. 516-519, whereas Servulo Correia stated that the leading argument
justifying the autonomy of the administrative contract was the statutory criteria, founded on the opinion
that administrative law is a special area of law, fundamentally different from private law and created to
specifically regulate the activity of the administration Servulo Correia, Legalidade e autonomia contratual nos
contratos administrativos (Almedina, 1986), p. 393-406. With an opposi"8 view, Estorninho, Requiem pelo
contrato administrativo (1988). This author considered the differences as artificial or arbitrary and unjustified.
In the absence of legal arguments to sustain the concept of administrative contract, in reality its substantive
regime should be gOY'emed by private law. ~ore recently, Goncalves, 0 contrato administrativo : uma instituicao
do direito administrattvo do nossotempo (Almedina, 2003).
286. Marcello Caetano, Manual de Direito Administrativo (loth, 1973>, p. 588, defined the concept of
administrative contract as "f...l th~ contract betwet;" the Admin~~atio,! and another body with the objective of
llSSociatingsuch body for a period of t~me to the carrymg .of ~n adm'ntstrat~~ /JOW!'", !'Y .m~a,,! of supplying goods or
services to bepaid asagreedand by keepm~ thepower oj revlewmgfor the admmlStratl'VeJunsdlctlon. "
287. Freitas do Amaral, Cursode Diretto Administratioo (Almedina, 2001), p. 496-497.
The public body had the possibility of dictating changes to the terms of the con-
tract without consulting the private party or to apply fines without a prior deci-
sion from a review body. The review process was also geared to protect the ad-
ministration. Only "final and decisive administrative acts" could be subject to
review and the process included a previous mandatory administrative review be-
fore the aggrieved private party could file for judicial review.t" Public works, pub-
lie works concessions and public services concessions were considered as quintes-
sential administrative contracts.t"
(b) Private contracts of the administration
Private contracts of the administration, on the other hand were subject to private
law, similarly to contracts agreed by two private parties. In relation to these, the
contracting authority has the same rights and obligations as a private party, since
the Civil Code makes no distinction on the nature of the parties. The same was
reflected in judicial review as the private courts and its respective law were com-
petent to resolve all types of disputes arising from these contracts.
Although the two regimes are still to be totally merged, the most obvious differ-
ences (public party powers and jurisdiction for review) have been watered down
by influence of the ED public procurement framework and successive develop-
ments in the national laws, namely in the administrative court's process.'?" sub-
stantive and administrative procedure laws.'?'
288. Before the reform of 2002.
289. A listing by exemplification could be found in article 17812of the Public Procedure Code. The list in this
article was not exhaustive, and other contracts could be deemed as administrative if certain conditions were
met. The exact content of these conditions depended on the diverse theories developed by scholars. On this
topic, Esteves de Oliveira et al., COdigo do proctdimmto administrtZtivo - commtado (znd, Almedina, 1999>,
Estorninho, A fuga para 0 direito privado <Almedina,1995)and Rebelo de Sousa e SalgadoMatos p.26n09.
290. The paramount influence of the administrative court's process laws in the development .of
administrative substantive law has been recognised, see for all Pereira da Silva,Em busc« do acto administrattvo
perdido Wmedina, 1998).
291. In Portuguese law, procedures before administrative authorities and administrative courts represent
distinct legal concepts. The first one is translated by the author as "administrative procedure" whereas the
(c) Public contracts
The concept of "public contract" was first introduced in Portugal because of the
accession to the EEC in 1986. Due to the obligation to transpose the ED public
procurement framework, the award of contracts by public bodies was suddenly
subject to broadly the same rules and principles irrespective of the classification
of the contract as administrative or private.'?' The introduction of the "public
contract" concept reduced the relevance of the traditional division between ad-
ministrative contracts and private contracts of the administration during their
procurement phase. Regarding the substantive legal regimes and jurisdiction em-
powered to solve disputes, the differences subsisted until recently.
In 1998 the Decree-Law 134/98 transposed into national legislation the Directive
89/665 or Remedies Directive. This law introduced some major changes in the re-
view process of award procedures, in particular: i) a new urgent judicial review
procedure only for the issues arising from the procurement procedures of public
contractsr'" ii) interim measures to protect interests of private parties at risk of
abuse; iii) rules regarding the State obligation to inform the European Commis-
sion and powers of the latter to intervene. Although this law was not included as
part of a general overhaul of the administrative court's procedure law, the rules it
second is hereby translated by "administrative court's process".
292. The first of the national laws regulating pubhc procurement that adopted a neutral view on the
dichotomy between administrative and private contracts of the administration was the Decree-Law 55/95,
regulating uni.fo~y at the time the procurement of a number of "public contracts", irrespective of their
doctrinal qualification. . ....
293. It has built up a1so.on a major change ~o the Portuguese Const!tutlon during the Review of '997. On the
then new article 268/4 ~t was .finally establt.s~«:d that ~lt1zens or pnv~t~ pan;les ID general were entitled to a
complete and fair judicial review of all acnvmes carrte~ by the administrarion, The Decree-Law 13+'98 did
not solve the problem of what were the consequences If an act done by the contracting authority during a
public procurement procedure was deemed unlawful, rendering the award to a certain contractor also
unlawfUl, particularly when the judicial decision was taken with the contract already executed.
introduced were so alien to the rest of the existing frameworks that they sparked
a long overdue reform of the administrative court's process laws.'?'
The reform in 2004295 of the administrative court's process law put an end to the
difference regarding which jurisdiction had the power to sort out disputes arising
from public contracts.t'" The Statute on the Administrative and Tax Courts (Law
1312002) and the Administrative Court Process Law (Law I5ho02) stated that all
issues (including the execution) of all contracts subject to any type of award pro-
cedure were to be submitted to the administrative jurisdiction, supporting the
public contract concept. Virtually all contracts entered into by the administration
are covered by these provisions, irrespective of their doctrinal classification, ren-
dering them subject to the same jurisdiction and to the same rules regarding the
review procedure.:"
(d) Currently
The changes of paradigm mentioned In the previous sub-section have filtered
down to the Public Contracts Code adopted in 2008 (Law 18ho08).298 Under this
law, regarding procurement procedures, all and every contract entered into by the
contracting authorities covered are public contracts. This law, however, keeps the
distinction between administrative and private contracts regarding the perfor-
mance of the contract.
294. A.re~orm that .would.finally,bring in line administrative courts lawwith the changes to the Portuguese
ConstJtu~l?n mentioned m the previous footnote, and not only in regard public procurement but all the
State acnvity,
295. Although known as the reform of 2004, the relevant lawswere approved in 2002, with their entry into
force deferred until 2004.
296. For a comparative note of different European countries administrative court's process systems and a
long history of the Portuguese administrative court's process laws (from 1832 to the reform of 2004>, please
see ServuloCorreia, Direito do Contentioso Administrtrtivo (Lex, 2005).
297. It should be noted also that the powers of the court to overturn decisions of the administration and to
condemn it to decide or act on a certain waywere vastly expanded.
298. The Public Contracts Code transposed Directives 2004/17 and 2004118.
According to article I of the Public Contracts Code, the rules on the performance
of contracts are applicable only to administrative contracts. Administrative con-
tracts are defined as the willful agreement between the administration and anoth-
er (private or public) party that establish an administrative relationship. ''19
Public works, goods'?" and services, public works and services concessions are all
classified as administrative contracts in the Public Contracts Code and their per-
formance is regulated through the rules contained in it and not private law. On
these contracts, the contracting authority is still entitled to unilaterally change
clauses for public interest reasons, apply sanctions if they are provided for in the
contract (without going to court) and even cancel the contract.'?' The changes to
clauses and the cancelation (if founded only in public interest) lead to the com-
pensation of the counter party.'?' The compensation is due to re-establish the
"financial balance" of the contract since the counter party is not at fault.
Private contracts of the administration are all the contracts that do not establish
an administrative relationship according to the Public Contracts Code and their
performance remains regulated by private law such as the Civil Code.
The lines between the two types of contracts are now more clear and reflect
differences where they existed all along: in the performance of the contract. The
award procedures and judicial review process are unified and oblivious to this dis-
tinction. The discussion remains, however, on what is an administrative relation-
ship for the purposes of determining the set of rules applicable to the perfor-
mance of the contract.
299. Article 1/6 of the Public Contracts Code states that contracts shall be administrative when: they are
classified by law or the parties as such; the .{'erformanc~ is subi~ct to rules with an administrative nature; they
replace an administrative act; exercise public powers; give special powers over the exercise of State functions;
they are subject to a public pf()(:ureme~t p~ocedure and the party replaces (even if partially) the contracting
authority in the performance of Its artributions.
300. Including the renting of goods. .
301. Article 302 (c), (d) and (e) respe~tively of the Pubhc Contracts Code.
302. Articles 314 and 334 of the Pubhc Contracts Code.
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(3)Judicial review
Regarding the judicial review process itself, the Administrative Court Process
Law includes a section (articles 100 through 103) specific to public procurement
judicial review. The rules of this law give ample access to the courts to any inter-
ested party, in particular tenderers that may feel aggrieved. For instance, contrary
to the previous regime they no longer have to exhaust any administrative review
possibilities before being granted the possibility of filing for judicial review on a
court. There are no pre-conditions to be met that could be use to limit access to
judicial reviews.
Aggrieved tenderers may request from the court the annulment of any decision
taken by the contracting authority that affects them negatively. For instance, they
may request the annulment of a decision excluding them from the procedure or
the award to another tenderer.'?' In addition, bidders may file for an injunction to
freeze the development of a tender procedure or even the signing of a contract.'?'
Although the court does not have the power to replace the contracting authority
in assessing the actual merits of a tender and to award the contract itself,'?' it has
the power to declare illegal and annul the decision if any wrongdoing is found.
The contracting authority will have then to re-take the decision without repeat-
ing the illegality. If the court considers one award criterion as illegal, for instance,
303- Even the content of technical specifications may be challenged by tenderers, according to article 100/3
of the Administrative Court Process Law.
304. Articles 112 through 127 of the Administrative Court Process Law. Injunctions have a temporary nature
and are intended to protect the interests of the requester while the main judicial process is under way. They
do not influence in any way the decision of the main judicial process. Even if an injunction to stop a contract
being signed was awarded, that does not mean the court will, in the end, judge the award to be iUegal and
have it annulled.
305. It is still considered in Portugal that assessing the "substantive value" of any decision belongs exclusively
to the administration as a margin of discretion and courts cannot overrule decisions taken within it scope.
the decision will have to be re-taken without that criterion being taken into
account.
Judicial review in public procurement is classified as urgent in the Administrative
Court Process Law.306 As a consequence, time limits are shorter"? and it takes
precedence inside the court over standard cases.r"
Furthermore, the process is not completely balanced between the parties, as the
contracting authority is forced to send the court all of the relevant data and docu-
ments pertaining to the decision being challenged"? The aggrieved bidder is then
given access to all this data and is entitled to make amendments to the filing.
Transposition of the Directive 2007/66 {Remedies Directive} is still pending.
3. Public procurement in Portugal
(r) Introduction
As stated above, Portugal has a long tradition regarding the rules on public pro-
curement. To be more specific, this tradition dates back to the middle of the 19th
century, with the enactment of the Law of July 22, 1850 regarding the rules and
principles governing the award of public works contracts {roads only}. Until Por-
tugal's accession to the EEC, a number of laws and regulations were published re-
inforcing the framework, expanding its scope and including innovations such as
new procedures.!"
306. Article 10] of the Administrative Court Process Law.
307. According ~oarticle ]0]. o~the Administrative Court Proce~s Law, the aggri~ed party.must. fi~efor thejudicial review, m general, within ,;memonth: After .the process IS started, allthe internal time limits of the
judicial process are accelerated m .c0!Dparlson WIth ~tan~d cases. For instance, the reply from the
contractmg authority must be filedWIthin20 daysof notification under penalty of default.
308. Analysing ~he public procureI?ent judicial review syste~, Gon,.~~es, '~valia,.ao do regime juridico do
contencioso pre-contra~ ur~nte (2007) 62, Cademas de Just1fa Admlms~a_tlVa. .
309. This is due to the principle of transparency permeating all the activity carried out by the Portuguese
administration.
310. Such as the the General Regulation of Public Accounts from 1881,the Ministerial Order 7702 from 1933,
the Decree-Law 41375from 1957or the Decree-Laws 48234and 48871from 1968. For a detailed overview of
After acceding to the EEC and before the Public Contracts Code (Decree-Law
1812008) came into force, procurement rules on different types of contracts were
scattered in different laws."' After each successive round of Directives was ap-
proved, a number of laws would be enacted to transpose them.!" They followed
the classification found in the Directives of public works, services and goods con-
tracts. When the need arose, a new law would be approved to regulate an area not
covered by existing laws."! Only the Public Contracts Code unified the national
procurement regime under the same law.!" It includes the rules needed to trans-
pose the Directives 2004117 and 2004118 and also much more on contracts or top-
ics not covered by these Directives."!
The major last round of updates to the national procurement framework before
the current Public Contracts Code, occurred between 1999 and 2001. Decree-
Law 59/99r transposed Directive 93/37 and regulated the award of public works
contracts. A few months later Decree-Law 197/99317 was approved. It regulated
the award of public goods and services, transposing Directives 92/50 and 93/36.
This last Decree-Law included also a number of principles"! that were considered
Portu~ese public procurement history please see for all Olazabal Cabral, 0 concurso pUblico nos contratos
administratioos (Livraria Almedina, 1997).
311. The rules regarding damages and judicial review today are still in their own laws. The first in the Decree-
Law 67120°7, December jrst and the second in the Administrative Courts Process Law. It makes sense to
keep them separated as they are applicable to all the State's activity and not only to public procurement. See,
Ibid., p. 65.
312. Such as the Decree-Law 235/86 (transposing the Directives 7113°4 and 71/305), Decree-Law 24192.
(apP.licable to a number of goods contracts), Decree-Law 405/93 (works), Decree-Law 55195 (goods, works and
servlce~). For these laws please see,Andrade da Silva, Regime juridico das empreitadas de obras publkas {8th,
Alme~m~, 2003>, Bernardino, ~quisifdO de bens e servifos no administrafdo pUblica (and, A1medina, 2.00y, Esteves
de Oliveira and Esteves de Oliveira, Concursos e outros procedimentos de adjudicafllo administrativa (Almedina,
1998), Olazabal Cabral, 0 concursopUblico nos contratos administratiuos (Livraria Almedina, 1997) and Andrade
da Silva, Regime jUrldico das empreitadas de obraspflblicas (4th, 1995).
313. As an example, see further down in this section the 2.003 Law on public-private partnerships.
314. Although, as we will see further down in section devoted to the Public Contracts Code, not all of the
relevant rules on public procurement ended up being included in the Public Contracts Code.
315. As the rules on public works and services concessions or the contracts under the Directives threshold.
316. On this law please see, Andrade da Silva, Regime juridico das empreitadas de obras pUblicas (Sth, A1medina,
2003) and Ferreira, 'Public Procurement Law in Portugal: An Overview' (999) 5 PPLR, p. 2.2.5-2.41.
317. On this law please see. Ibid.
318. Principles of legality and public interest (article 7), transparency and advertising (article 8), equality
(article 9), competition (article 10), impartiality (article II), proportionality (article 12.), good faith {article I'y,
stability (article 14) and responsibility (article 15)·
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applicable to all public procurement, and not only to the contracts covered by its
scope.
In 2001 the law regulating the Utilities Sector was approved (Decree-Law
22312001), transposing Directive 93/38.
Two years later, in 2003 a law on public-private partnerships (Decree-Law
8612003) was approved and is still in force today, with amendments introduced by
the Decree-Law 14112006. It defines what is to be considered a public-private
partnership, the conditions under which the State can opt to use this contract
type and the division of risk. This Decree-Law does not regulate the actual pro-
curement procedure for public-private partnerships, simply stating that the com-
mon rules on public procurement shall be followed. It includes, nonetheless,
some rules governing the launch of public-private partnerships before the award
procedure has started."?
Decree-Law 112005 established the regime for the procurement of goods, services
and electronic communication networks, equipment and related services. It was
subsequently revoked when the new Public Contracts Code entered into force in
July 2008.
In 2007 Decree-Law 37/2007 created a National Agency for Public Purchases,
possibly based on the dynamic purchasing concept as present in Directive
2004/18. It does not seem clear exactly what were the grounds for the Portuguese
government to create this Agency. This law is still in force and has not been
affected by the Public Contracts Code.320
319. On these contracts, Andr~de and RaqueJ, 'Public-~rivate Partnersh!p in Portugal - The Legal Structure
of the Public-Private Partnership Contract and the Peripheral Contracts (2010) 5 EPPPL, p. 46-53 and Canto
e Castro, 'Uma apreciacao ~eral do. Regime Juridico geral aplicavel as Parcerias Pliblico-Privadas' [2009]
Revista de CiinciasEmpresariatseJuridlcas.. .
320. Unless it is deemed as contrary to the Pubhc Contracts Code as per article 14(2) of the Decree-Law no
181z008.
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The transposition of Directive 2009/81 on defence and security procurement is
still pending in Portugal.
(2) Public Contracts Code of 2008
In 2008 the new Public Contracts Code (Decree-Law 1812008) was published and
came into force. The first draft of the Public Contracts Code was made available
in May 2006 for public discussion, with a second one in 2007. This law came into
force more than two years after the deadline for the transposition of the Direc-
tives 2004iI7 and 2004iI8.
Portugal does not use guidance or government issued regulations to complement
or explain its laws and the Public Contracts Code is no exception to the rule. All
the legally relevant matters are included either in decree-laws or laws, both of
these instruments sharing the same value level in the pyramid of Portuguese legal
rules.?'
There are, however, rules in the Portuguese legal system with a value inferior to
laws, such as government decrees or ministerial orders approved by specific min-
istries. Their aim is to complement technical aspects of laws and decree-laws and
have to abide by them. An example would be forms templates or the publication
of hunting permits.
The Public Contracts Code transposes Directives 2004iI7, 2004h8 and 2005/51
modernising the national procurement framework and bringing it up to date with
321. The Decree-Law and Law differ in the approval process. The first is approved by the Governrnen~ either
under its own legislative capacity as stated in the 1976 Constitution or by an authorisation by the Parliament,
Laws are approved by the Parliament under its general legislative capacity.
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the EU Directives on public procurement. For the first time in Portuguese histo-
ry, public procurement rules are finally unified'" under the same Iaw.!"
The Public Contracts Code aims to create a coherent procurement framework
not limited to the objective scopes of the Directives. It covers, for instance, con-
tracts such as the concessions of public works and services'" or public-private
partnerships. It also includes award procedures such as the direct award'" or the
open procedure with a negotiated phase, available for contracts not covered by
the scope of the Directives. The law makers chose to restructure the content of
the Directives to fit with the pre-existing national practice.
The scope of Public Contracts Law is defined by means of a general clause en-
compassing all public contracts that are or should be subject to competition (arti-
cle 16 of the Public Contracts Code). It has transposed correctly the EU concept
of body governed by public law, contrary to what happened in Decree-Laws 59/99
and 197/99. The number of award procedures has been reduced.?" Modernisation
included the transposition of the new procedures mentioned in Chapter 4, name-
ly competitive dialogue, electronic auctions, framework agreements, dynamic pur-
chasing systems and a "centralised purchasing body" that the Public Contracts
Code recital states as a direct import from the Directives. The Public Contracts
Code has also divided the assessment of the economic, technical or professional
322. Alrhouah with some glaring omissions such as the already mention~~ public-private partnership~ law,
the law on PUblic Real Estate (Decree-Law 28012007) or the law on Acquisition, Management and Selling of
Goods within the State's Private Domain (Decree-Law 30/94>.
323. Please see section 2 of the current chapter. . .. , . _ , .
324. On concess!ons In Portugal please see, Siza y~elra,. Regime das concessoes de obras pubhcas e de
services publicos (2007) 64, Cademos deJustlfo AdmlnlstrottvO, p. 47-54·
325. An almost completely discretionary proce~ure, available up to the limit of euro 150,000 for public
works contracts, euro 75,000 for goods and services contracts and euro roo.coo for other contracts except
concession of public works, public services and society contracts, as per Public Contracts Code articles 19 to
21. It is also available in specific circumstances irrespective of the value, such as when a previous open or
restricted tender has not produced a contract due to the lack of tenders, qualified tenderers or acceptable
tenders as per Public Contracts Code articles 23 to 27· On this procedure, Raimundo, 'Direct Award of
Public Contracts: the new Portuguese Public Contracts Code in liglit ofEU Law' (20JO) 4 PPLR.
326. The restricted procedure without presentation of candidates or the prior consultation procedure were
dropped on the new law.
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ability of candidates into two different models, simple and complex, whereas be-
fore only a single method of evaluation was present in the national law.
One of the major innovations of the Public Contracts Code are the new award
criteria rules. These were developed as a way to reduce the scope of discretion by
contracting authorities and to uphold the principles of transparency and
cornpetition.!"
New electronic methods of participation in the procedures were introduced, aim-
ing to reduce the time spent on carrying each procedure. As per the Directives'
possibility, social and environmental social policies were adopted. Regarding the
costs of a contract, the Public Contracts Code moved from the contract estimat-
ed cost to the maximum economic benefit to be obtained by the contractor, thus
establishing a cap for the expense arising from each contract.i"
Of all the innovations introduced by the Public Contracts Code one is central to
this thesis, which is the competitive dialogue and the way it has been transposed
and used in Portugal. Some of the remaining innovations are also incidentally rel-
evant for this research project as they conflict with or complement the Por-
tuguese transposition of competitive dialogue.
(3) Amendments to the Public Contracts Code
The Public Contracts Code has been amended three times since entering into
force. Decree-Law 3412009 established exceptional measures to tackle the finan-
317. According to the three persons involved in the drafting of the Public Contracts Code interviewed by the
author.
318. This represents a substantial departure from the Directives 1004/17 and 1004118 and shows the need of
the Portuguese lawmakers to curb the national practice of bidders presenting (not abnormaO low tenders to
win the contract and try to increase their profit margin during the execution of the contract by means of
extra works or charges. The Decree-Laws 59/99 and 197/99 on tender procedures, revoked by the Public
Contracts Code, allowed for expenditure increase in awarded contracts without any control on the
contracting authority of up to 15%. Therefore. bidders would present lower tenders than otherwise they
would and bet on bending the contracting authority during the execution of the contract.
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cial crisis, including the reduction of time frames for the restricted procedure and
the possibility of the direct award procedure to be used up to a maximum of two
million euros in certain circumstances. This regime is in force until the end of
2010.
The second amendment to the Public Contracts CodeJ29 has ended the transition-
al period where contracting authorities could still use paper means and made
mandatory the use of electronic means to conduct the procedure.
In October 2009 the Public Contracts Code suffered a third revision'" to facili-
tate the procurement of R&D contracts, particularly by research institutions.
4. Conclusion
In the current chapter we have provided an overview of public procurement in
Portugal. It was seen that the country has a long tradition in regulating public
procurement, dating well before the accession to the EU. This tradition was
based in the French model of dividing the contracts entered into by the adminis-
tration in administrative and private contracts. Recent developments and the ap-
pearance of the concept of public contracts have rendered the discussion almost
useless. We have also seen how judicial review is processed in the country and the
current legal regime regulating public procurement. The Public Contracts Code
of 2008 introduced the competitive dialogue procedure into the country and its
regulation will be analysed in the following chapter.
329. Decree-Law 223/z009·
330. Decree-Law 278ho09.
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Chapter 6
Portugal
Competitive dialogue •m
I. Introduction
We have seen in Chapter 4 the rules on competitive dialogue as set by Directive
2oo41I8. In the current chapter we will analyse how the Portuguese national law
implements competitive dialogue and the issues raised by the transposition.
This chapter will be divided into eight main sections. After the introduction we
will provide a short overview of how the procedure fits in the current procure-
ment framework. In the third we will present the flow of the procedure. In the
fourth the grounds for use will be analysed. In the fifth we will present how the
procedure is to be conducted. Finally, a detailed analysis of the phases of the pro-
cedure with the highlighting of the major issues will ensue in sections 6 through
8.
The content of this chapter includes both the author's interpretation and the
product of the interviews carried out with the three persons that have have parti-
cipated in the draft of the Public Contracts Code mentioned in Chapter 2.33'All
mentions to interviewees in the present chapter pertain to them only and not to
the interviewees from the empirical research stage.
2. Competitive dialogue in tbe Public Contracts Code
The Portuguese law makers took a conscious option of creating a common legal
framework across different procurement procedures." That is, they all start from
331. The interview guide is available as Annex III.
332. According to the people interviewed by the author involved in the draft of the Public Contracts Code.
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the common rules found on the open procedure with specific rules only for what
is (or should be) different. This drafting style leads to some specific issues particu-
lar to the Portuguese transposition of competitive dialogue, such as the grounds
of use, the impossibility of eliminating candidates and/or solutions, the need to
identify a single solution and mandatorily draft a common set of specifications,
and eventually, the lack of specific rules on discussions before or after the pre-
ferred bidder has been chosen.
The original draft of competitive dialogue was less detailed and much closer to
the Directive's blueprint.t" After an initial public discussion phase of May 2006 it
was substantially changed and eventually taken out of the working drafts. I t end-
ed up being included by political decision in the end of 2006334 but with many
changes to adapt it to the national framework. According to the respondents in-
terviewed, this was done to mold the procedure to national practice and culture,
where a margin of discretion and discussions with participants are uncommon.
The rules on competitive dialogue are divided into three different sections of the
Public Contracts Code. In Part II, Title I, Chapter III (articles 30 and 33(1)(2) of
the Public Contracts Code) the grounds for its use are to be found, in parallel
with the special circumstances in which other procedures can also be adopted."
In Part II, Title III, Chapter V (articles 214 to 218 of the Public Contracts Code)
the general rules on the use of the procedure are defined. Since article 204 of the
Public Contracts Code states the subsidiary application of the restricted proce-
dure rules, Chapter III, articles 162 to 192 of the Public Contracts Code on this
procedure have to be taken into account.t" Finally, some articles from the rules
333. According to two of the respondents.
334. As confirmed by two ?f the interviewees. J?>'namicpurchasing systems were also brought back as it was
considered it wasworthwhile to make them availablealso.
335. The general rules on defining the appropriate procedure for each contract are on Chapter II and they
depend essentially on the value of the c~:mtract. . . .
336. For a detailed overview of the interplay between the compennve dialogue and locally developed
alternatives for the award of particularly complex contracts, please see Telles, 'Competitive dialogue in
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regulating the open procedure are also applicable, such as articles 92, 93 and 99 of
the Public Contracts Code on negotiations after the tender stage and confirma-
tion of commitments.
Law makers opted to include in the transposition a number of supplementary
rules on competitive dialogue that are not based in Directive 2004118. Some of
these rules restrict the grounds for use of the procedure in the Public Contracts
Code. Others limit the numbers of solutions a candidate can provide to the con-
tracting authority or do not allow for the exclusion of candidates during the dia-
logue. The Portuguese law also mandates the draft of a common set of specifica-
tions and tenders to be based on them and not the solutions developed during the
dialogue stage. Discussions before and after choosing the winner also appear to
be very limited.
Finally, the Public Contracts Code regulates competitive dialogue with the rules
from articles and recitals of Directive 2004118.
3. Flow oftbe procedure
Before analysing in depth competitive dialogue in Portugal, and as means of ren-
dering easier for the reader to understand what is discussed in detail in subse-
quent sections, this section will briefly cover the flow of the procedure.
The competitive dialogue in the Portuguese Public Contracts Code is divided
into three different phases. The first phase covers the presentation of candidates
and the assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candi-
dates. The second covers the proposal of solutions and the dialogue itself and the
third the analysis of tenders and the award of the contract.
Portugal' (2010) 1PPLR, p. 1-32.
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The procedure starts with the publication of the notice in the official journals and
the presentation of the potential candidates, who will then have their economic,
technical or professional ability assessed. This is done either through a simple or a
complex system."?
After the candidates have been assessed and before the start of the dialogue itself,
they are invited to submit a single interim solution. The contracting authority
analyses each candidate's solution and eliminates the candidates whose solution is
not adequate to fulfill its need before the dialogue starts. Dialogue then ensues
with the qualified candidates who had their solutions accepted, with the aim of
discussing all the issues related to the execution of the contract and to create a
common set of technical specifications.
Dialogue with the candidates lasts until either one solution that best meets the
needs of the contracting authority is identified or all are considered as inade-
quate. The contracting authority then notifies the candidates of its decision. If a
solution has been found, it will used as a basis for the technical specifications un-
der which all candidates will tender.
The candidates are invited to submit their tenders and the contract awarded to
the most economic advantageous tender. There is no phase similar to the fine-
tuning stage of article 29/6 of the Directive 2004118, although the contracting au-
thority may request information from the tenderer as it would in the open and re-
stricted procedures. After the preferred bidder has been selected, it is possible to
confirm commitments and limited amendments to the winning bid, again under
the same circumstances as in any open or restricted procedure.
337. The differences will be explained in detail in section 8(J) of the current chapter.
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From the flow of the procedure it is clear that in Portugal, after the submission of
tenders, competitive dialogue is identical to the open or restricted procedures,
since no specific rules for competitive dialogue exist.
4. Groundsfor use
In both the EU and national frameworks the procedure is to be used for the
award of complex contracts, when it is impossible to define the technical, legal or
financial make-up of a contract. Three major differences between the two frame-
works can be highlighted. The first is that in Portugal, the grounds for use appear
to be more limited than the scope theoretically admitted by Directive 2004118, as
the Public Contracts Code is more demanding in the filling of the requirements
for the use of the procedure. Secondly, the Public Contracts Code excludes the
use of the procedure for the award of some contracts on the utilities sector.
Thirdly, in Portugal, the procedure may be used freely to award contracts of a val-
ue inferior to the thresholds as long as they fulfill all the substantive
requirements.
The rules on the grounds for use can be found in articles 30 and 33 of the Public
Contracts Code which we will proceed to analyse now.
(I) General rules on the grounds for use
According to article 3011 of the Public Contracts Code, competitive dialogue can
be used for the award of any type of contracts" as long as it is particularly complex
and the complexity renders impossible (and not only inadequate) the use of the
338. This includes public works, goods and services, works and services concessions, society and public
private partnership contracts.
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open or restricted procedures. This appears to limit the use of the procedure in
Portugal to those situations where defining the specifications at the onset is im-
possible, seemingly adopting a strict view"? on the grounds for use of this
procedure.
Paragraph two of article 30 of the Public Contracts Code is akin to article I/n(c)
of Directive 2004h8. It explains what is deemed as a particularly complex con-
tract. The Directive states that a contract is particularly complex when the con-
tracting authority is "not ohjectively able" to define the technical means, legal or
financial make-up of a contract. For the purposes of the Portuguese law, however,
a contract shall be deemed complex if for the contracting authority is ohjectively
impossihle to define either the technical solution,340 technical means'" or financial or
legal make-up of the contract.!" Therefore, it appears that if the Portuguese con-
tracting authority is able to define a technical solution (even if not the best, since
it is no longer ohjectively impossible for a solution to be defined) it may not use
competitive dialogue to award the contract.
Two of the respondents stated that the subtle change in both the wording of arti-
cle 30h and 30/2 of the Public Contracts Code was done consciously for two main
reasons. Firstly, the draft was adopted as a signal to contracting authorities that
they should not overuse the procedure. This care and apparent fear of abuses by
contracting authorities is present throughout the draft of competitive dialogue in
the Public Contracts Code.343 Secondly, according to one of the respondents, it
was also adopted because the objective of the dialogue is to draft a common set of
specifications and not have a competition of different solutions at the tender
339. As we have discussed above in Chapter 4. section 4. on the different interpretations of the grounds of
u~. d340.Article 30h(a) of the PUbli.cContracts Co e.
341. Article 30h(b) of the Publ~cContracts Code.
342• Article 30h(C) of the Public Contracts Code. . .
343. One of the respondents declined to comment on this tOpIC.
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stage. According to this source, competitive dialogue shall only be used when the
contracting authority is unable to draft the technical specifications.r" This opin-
ion confirms the idea suggested above that in Portugal competitive dialogue is
only available when it is actually impossible to use the open and restricted
procedures.
If the view exposed in the previous paragraph is correct, it will not be possible to
use competitive dialogue in situations where the contracting authority is able to
draft specifications but the use of the open or restricted procedures would not
lead to the discovery of the best solution for its needs. It could be argued that not
only the strict interpretation limits the theoretical scope of situations where
competitive dialogue could be used, but also that it leads to the use of procedures
that may not be tailored to find the best solution for the contracting authority's
needs.'"
Further to the above, the procedure is only available if the contracting authority
is unable to identify the technical means needed for the performance of the con-
tract.l" However, if the contracting authority is able to express clearly the perfor-
mance or functional needs it wants to address.t" then it is considered that it may
produce technical specifications detailed enough to launch an open or restricted
procedure. In consequence, competitive dialogue seems to be unavailable in these
situations.
Article 30/3 of the Public Contracts Code has a provision limiting the use of the
procedure to cases where the objective impossibility of defining the technical so-
344. Kirkby, '0 dialogo concorrencial' in Estudos da Contrlltllpio PUhlicll -[ (Coimbra Editora, 1008) p·30n06,
thinks the correct interpretation is to consider the limitation in the light of the Directive 1004118 and the
Commission's Explanatory Note on the competitive dialogue. This author accepts a more liberal
interpretation than apparent by the letter of the law.
345. As argued by Arrowsmith, The IIJWofpublic lind utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&MaxweU, lOOS) p. 634·
346. Article 3012(b) of the Public Contracts Code.
347. These are set by article 49!2(C) and (d) of the Public Contracts Code. They are similar to the rules on
performance and functional requirements set forth by article 2312(b),(c) and (d) of the Directive 200+,18.
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lutions, technical means, financial and legal make up is not due to fault of the
contracting authority. This is similar to the position found in the first part of
Recital 31 of the Directive 2oo4!I8. This recital states that "lclontrecting authori-
ties, which carry out particularly complex projects may, without this being due to any fault
on their part, find it objectively impossible to define the means of satisfying their needs CJ. "
While the recitals of Directives are useful to interpret the content of articles, the
Portuguese law makers opted to elevate what was in Directive 2oo4!I8 as a recital
to the same level of the dispositions found in article 29 of this Directive. In Por-
tugal, competitive dialogue may only be used lawfully if the objective impossibili-
ty has not been created by an action or omission of the contracting authority.
The last paragraph of article 30 of the Public Contracts Code states that the ob-
jective of the procedure is to discuss with potential tenderers all issues stated in
article 3012. No significant changes from what is on the second part of article 29/3
of the Directive 2004118 are to be found, apart from the express mention of envi-
ronmental and horizontal policies. It is strange, nonetheless, to find this para-
graph in article 30, since the chapter of the Public Contracts Code to which it be-
longs is dedicated only to the grounds of use of award procedures and not their
content. It seems out of context and organisationally speaking it would make
much more sense to find this paragraph integrated in the section of the Public
Contracts Code where the procedure is discussed in detail.l"
(2) Rules for utilities contracts
It would be expected to find all the relevant contextual rules for competitive dia-
logue grounds of use in article 30 of the Public Contracts Code. However, in the
348. Articles 104 through 118of the Public Contracts Code.
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chapter immediately following (Chapter IV, "Other rules to choose a procedure")
there is a potentially major limitation regarding the grounds of use of competitive
dialogue. Article 331112 of the Public Contracts Code states that competitive dia-
logue cannot be used at all if the contract is directly and fundamentally connected
with any activity in the utilities sectors (water, energy, transport and postal ser-
vices) and the contracting authority is mentioned in article 711 of the Public Con-
tracts Code.349
In the Directive 2004117, competitive dialogue is not mentioned as a procedure
available but there is no provision forbidding its use. The Public Contracts Code,
on the other hand, expressly disallows the use of competitive dialogue for the
contracts in the utilities sector.!" According to one of the respondents, since the
Directive 2004117 did not mention competitive dialogue, it made no sense to al-
low its use. However, the Commission in its Explanatory Note'" mentions some
utilities sector contracts such as major integrated transport networks where com-
petitive dialogue might be of use.
It must be said that the aforementioned exclusion does not cover all the con-
tracts that are considered by the Directive 2004117 as utilities contracts, since the
defining element for the Public Contracts Code is not only the type of contract
but also the contracting authority. The objective of the law makers was to make
sure that the contracting authorities were covered by the scope of Directive
2004118352 always used the procurement procedures established in this Directive
and not the lighter procedures of the Directive 2004/17.353 In consequence, in
349. Article 7/1of the Public Contracts Code lists the contracting authorities in the utilities sector.
350. It seems possible for the contracting authorities mentioned in article 711 of the Public Contracts Code
to use the competitive dialogue for the award of contracts not specificallyand fundamentally linked with the
utilities sector activities. Since the main business activity of such authorities is exactly connected with
utilities, it seems difficult to think of an example of a particularly complex contract that they might want to
tender under the competitive dialogue.
351. Commission, Explanatory note - competitive dialogue - classic directive (ZOOS) P.3. .
35z. Article 1/9 of the Directive Z004118, transposed with similar content by article z/l and zl2 of the Public
Contracts Code.
353. Medeiros, 'Ambito do novo regime da contratacao publica a luz do principio da concorrencia' (2008) 69,
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Portugal, State, regional or local authorities, public institutes, public founda-
tions/54 public associations and associations composed by one or more of the pre-
vious, have to award their contracts as per the general rules of public procure-
ment even if the contract itself is objectively a utilities contract.l" The nature of
the contracting authority is relevant to determine which set of rules is applica-
ble.356 Therefore, Portuguese rules for utilities contracts cover only the utilities
contracts awarded by some contracting authorities, namely the ones referred to in
article 711of the Public Contracts Code:
• Any body not covered by article2 of the Public Contracts Code, even if estab-
lished for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest with
industrial or commercial character and operating in the utilities sector and
subject to a dominant influence by any of the entities mentioned in article 2;
• Any body not covered by article 2 of the Public Contracts Code benefiting
from special or exclusive rights not awarded after a procurement procedure
with international publicity whereas such rights:
• Reserve to those bodies (by themselves or in conjunction with other
entities) the exercise of activities in the utilities sectors;
• Substantially affect the capacity of other entities to operate in the same
sectors;
• Any body incorporated exclusively by one of the contracting authorities men-
tioned above or by them financed, for the most part; or subject to manage-
ment supervision; or having and administrative, managerial or supervisory
CadernosdeJustifll Ad~inistrlltivll p.28-29· . .
354. With the exceptIon of the ones mentioned In the La,,: 6212007.
355. Where these bodies' for the most part finance, subject them to management supervision or appoint
more than half of the administrative, managerial and supervisory boards of such associations.
356. This is a marked dep~re from the previous.legal regime covering utilities contracts. Until the Public
Contracts Code, the defining element was the objective scope of the contract. For more information, see
Ibid. and Medeiros, 'A contratacao publica nos sectores com regime especial: agua, energia, transportes e
telecomunicat;6es' (Paper) (2004)·
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board, more than half of whose members are appointed by such contracting
authorities, destined for the exercise of activities in the utilities sectors.
The contracting authorities above mentioned are clearly covered by the utilities
rules in the Public Contracts Code and, thus, forbidden from using competitive
dialogue to award a contract in the utilities sector, as per article 331112 of the same
law. What is not so clear is if the bodies governed by public law'" are also covered
by this limitation, and arguments can be found supporting both theories. On the
one hand, since article 12 of the Public Contracts Code extends the utilities
regime subjective scope to include the entities referred to by its article 212 - the
bodies governed by public law - one could argue that they are also bound by arti-
cle 3311and 3312 of the Public Contracts Code and, thus, unable to use competi-
tive dialogue to award contracts in the utilities sector. On the other hand, article
3311makes an explicit reference to the contracting authorities of article 711 of the
Public Contracts Code only, without mentioning the authorities of article 12. In
addition, one could argue that if the law makers would have wanted the authori-
ties of article 12 to be covered by all the rules on the utilities sector, then it would
have included them directly in article 711. Even so, none of the arguments seems
to be decisive and it is still to be concluded if the contracting authorities of the
article 12 of the Public Contracts Code, which as we have seen are the bodies gov-
erned by public law, as envisaged by the Directive 2004118, are covered by the
limitation on the grounds for use of competitive dialogue.
Irrespective of the precise scope of entities covered, the Portuguese law makers
introduced an arbitrary limitation to the use of competitive dialogue in article 3311
and 3312 of the Public Contracts Code. One could imagine that a contracting au-
thority awarding a contract under the scope of the Directive 2004117 could devel-
357. As defined by article 1/9 of the Directive 2004/18.
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op a negotiated procedure with similar characteristics to competitive dialogue. In
Portugal it seems that such option is not possible. Furthermore, the negotiated
procedure has its own structure, with four specific phases that are mandatory:
presentation of candidates and assessment of the economic, technical or profes-
sional ability of candidates; presentation and analysis of preliminary tenders; ten-
der negotiation; analysis final tenders and award."! The structure may appear sim-
ilar, but the inclusion of a proposals negotiation phase, albeit without any sort of
limitation whatsoever, seems to imply that the objectives of this phase are differ-
ent than the dialogue phase of competitive dialogue, thus leading to the discus-
sion of the exact contents of the concepts negotiation and dialogue. It does not
seem farfetched that dialogue (as configured in the dialogue phase of competitive
dialogue procedure) could be construed as a form of negotiation and, in conse-
quence, lead to the availability of competitive dialogue's dialogue phase under the
negotiated procedure guise. But that does not entail that such negotiated proce-
dure is a competitive dialogue as each procedure has its own specific sets of rules.
It can be argued that in face of Directive's 2004iI7 more flexible framework, the
relevance of competitive dialogue would be limited. Even so, in Portugal a con-
tracting authority covered by article 711of the Public Contracts Code may not use
competitive dialogue to tender utilities contracts.
(J) Contracts under the thresholds of Directive 2004/18
Finally, regarding the grounds for the use of competitive dialogue in Portugal, and
in the absence of any provision stating otherwise, this procedure can be used to
award contracts under the thresholds of Directive 2004118, provided the condi-
358. Articles 193 through 203 of the Public Contracts Code.
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tions established in the national law are followed. Whereas typically the award
procedures have been divided in prior national laws and in the Public Contracts
Code by the value of the conrract.:" competitive dialogue has no grounds for its
use based in value. All its grounds for use are based in substantive factors without
a minimum value. Therefore, whatever the cost, if the contract is deemed as par-
ticularly complex and all the legal conditions are met, there is no reason limiting
the use of this procedure. As an example, if for an IT system for the control of
warehouse stocks valued around €IOO,000300 the complexities in its development
warranted that all the substantive conditions for the use of competitive dialogue
were met, there is no legal reason for the contracting authority not to use this
procedure.
(4) Public-private partnership contracts
As mentioned above in Chapter 4, the Commission has pointed to public-private
partnership contracts'" as being a prime example of an area where competitive di-
alogue procedure might be used.
In section 2 of the current chapter we have seen that competitive dialogue cannot
be used for the award of utilities contracts by certain contracting authorities. Fur-
thermore, as explained elsewhere.r" contracting authorities are used to award
contracts not covered by the scope of the Directive 2004118, including public-pri-
vate partnership contracts, through the open procedure with a negotiation phase.
359. From the open procedure as default procedure for all contracts above a certain national threshold to the
direct award to all contracts under also a national threshold.
360. It is a value below the current thresholds. In accordance with Regulation (EC) 117712009, for 2010 the
thresholds are €U5,000 (most central government contracts), €193,000 (most local and regional contracting
authorities) and €4,845,000 for works contracts.
361. On these contracts, see Andrade and Santos Raquel, 'Public-Private Partnership in Portugal> The Legal
Structure of the Public-Private Partnership Contract and the Peripheral Contracts' (2010) 5 EPPPL, p. 46-53
and Branco, 'Portugal: A Closer Look at Public-Private Partnerships' (2000) 4 EPPPL.
362. Telles, 'Competitive dialogue in Portugal' (zoro) 1PPLR, p. 1-32.
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For all other public-private partnerships, competitive dialogue is in theory avail-
able. However as mentioned in Chapter 5 above, Decree-Law 8612003 that regu-
lates these contracts in Portugal is still applicable and has not been revoked by
the Public Contracts Code. The compatibility of its legal regime with competi-
tive dialogue has been questioned, in particular the need to make a thorough as-
sessment of the technical and financial viability of the project before the formal
launch of the tender.t" In addition, the said law presupposes that the launch of
the actual tender will include detailed technical specifications, thus precluding
the possibility of competitive dialogue being used.364 Therefore, it can be argued
that until Decree-Law 8612003 is updated it will not be possible to use competi-
tive dialogue to award public-private partnerships in Portugal. However, it has
been argued also that the Decree-Law is not applicable to the tender stage and its
rules cover only the preparatory stage of the contract."!
;. Conduct of the procedure
According to article 204/1 of the Public Contracts Code, when no specific rules
exist, competitive dialogue procedure follows the rules of the restricted proce-
dure with prior assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of
tenderers with the necessary adaptations.f" As an example, the assessment of the
economic, technical or professional ability of candidates, for instance, will be
done according to the rules established in articles 167 through 188 of the Public
Contracts Code.
363. Kirkby, '0 dialogo concorrencial' in Estudos da Contrataf4o PUhlica -1 (Coimbra Editora, 1008), p. 307.
364. Ibid., p. 307.
365. Ibid., p. 310. . .
366. Prior to the Public Contracts Code two different o/Pes of restncted procedures were present in national
legislation: one with prior assessment of t~e econom.Ic, technical or professional ability of. ca!ldidates and
another without. The second was ~opped l~ the. PUb!ICContracts Code. Although the descriptive name was
maintained it now expresses what ISdefined In Directive 2004/18 as the restncted procedure.
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The second paragraph of article 204 contains two limitations regarding the con-
duct of the procedure. Firstly, the use of electronic auctions during a competitive
dialogue procedure is prohibited. Secondly, contracting authorities are not per-
mitted to include a negotiation phase, such as the one established in article 149 of
the Public Contracts Code for the open procedure with a negotiation phase. This
might indicate that the dialogue stage is to be taken as a stage to have discussions
and not negotiations."?
6.3ury for theprocedure
The competitive dialogue procedure is managed by the jury for the procedure on
behalf of the contracting authority. The rules for composition, functioning and
powers are identical to the open or restricted procedures.r"
The jury will have an odd number of members with a minimum of three. Direc-
tors or employees of the contracting authority are not barred from serving as
members.
Decisions by the jury are taken by majority and abstention is not admitred.r" Any
voting declarations are to be included in the minutes of meeting.?" If deemed ap-
propriate, the jury may hire experts or consultants to assist it in the decision
making process. Experts and consultants are entitled to take part in the meetings
without voting rights.r"
The jury is empowered to assess the economic, technical or professional ability of
candidates and also the tenders submitted. I t is also responsible for drafting the
367. The author was told by one of the respondents that the concept of "negotiations" was to be interpreted
strictly and was to be available only for the open procedure with a negotiated phase or the negotiated
procedure. Negotiations should not happen during the dialogue stage.
368. Articles 67 through 69 of the Public Contracts Code.
369. Article 69/3 of the Public Contracts Code.
370. Article 69/4 of the Public Contracts Code.
371. Article 69/6 of the Public Contracts Code.
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respective reports on these assessments. The jury does not take a final decision on
any of these matters, as this power remains in the contracting authority.?'
Specifically to competitive dialogue, the jury will also have to draft the report on
the dialogue stage and suggest to the contracting authority which solutions is the
winning or if none is good enough to meet the needs of the contracting authori-
ty.373It is debatable if the contracting authority may delegate to the jury the deci-
sion on the winning solution as it is not expressly forbidden by the Public Con-
tracts Law. However, it can be argued that the act of selecting the winning
solution may have an impact on candidates not totally dissimilar to an exclu-
sion.?" Further to this point, if the decision is that no solution is good enough to
meet the needs of the contracting authority, then it effectively ends the proce-
dure and is similar to excluding all the candidates.
7.Tender documents
Tenders in Portugal traditionally have two different sets of documents which are
disclosed to potential candidates at the beginning of the procedure. One is the
set of "tender documents" consisting mostly of legal rules and procedural notes.
The other is the "technical specifications" where the exact conditions on what is
being procured are defined."! Regarding competitive dialogue, the Public Con-
tracts Code kept this division, with one article on the descriptive document and
another on technical specifications.
372. Article 70/1 and h of the Public Contracts Cod~ ..According to paragraph 2 of article 70, .the cont~acting
authority IS n~t. entitled t.o delegate the final decision on the assessment of the economic, technical or
professional ability of cand~dates or the award of the contract.
373. Article 115 of the Public ~ontracts Code. . . .
374. Selecting a winning solution does not mean the remat.n~ng candidates have been ~xcluded since they are
to be invited to the tender stage. However, the remairung candidates may consider this represents a
disadvantage and decide not to submit a tender.
375. AlthoUgh the border line is not dearly defined and the same content may appear in both sets of
documents.
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Tender documents of a competitive dialogue {article 206h of the Public Con-
tracts Code} shall include all the elements that are needed for the restricted pro-
cedure with prior assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of
tenderers (article 164 of the Public Contracts Code) identifying both the contract
and the contracting authority.
If payments for the development of solutions are to be made to candidates, this
information has to be included in the notice'"
As per article 44/3 of the Directive 2004118 the minimum number of candidates
to admit to the dialogue stage is three.
Award criteria for the contract have also to be disclosed at this point. As in the
Directive, if the contracting authority cannot disclose the exact values of the cri-
teria it will have, at least, to order them from the most to the least important."?
On the technical specifications, as competitive dialogue shall be used in particu-
larly complex contracts where at least one of the elements making up the con-
tract cannot be defined beforehand, no detailed technical specifications have to
be clearly set before the ending of the dialogue phase. At this point, contracting
authorities have to define an outline or guide to include in the descriptive docu-
ment. The Portuguese Public Contracts Code reflects this in article 207/3- In arti-
cle 20712 it mandates the disclosure of information such as the website or elec-
tronic platform where information is to be found. It also includes a reference to
administrative duties that have to be done by the contracting authority, such as
taking note of the name and email address of the interested parties that have re-
quested those materials {article 133/4 of the Public Contracts Code}.
376. Article 29/8 of the Directive 2004/18 has no provisions on the moment the information on the payment
of solutions should be made to the candidates.
377. Article 206/4 of the Public Contracts Code.
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8. Phases of the procedure
In the Public Contracts Code competitive dialogue is divided into three phases.?'
i) presentation of candidates and assessment of the economic, technical or profes-
sional ability of candidates; ii) presentation of solutions and dialogue with quali-
fied candidates; iii) presentation of tenders and award.
(I) Presentation of candidates and assessment of the economic,
technical or professional ability of candidates
The competitive dialogue procedure starts with the publication of the notice in
the national Official Joumal (Ditino da Republica) according to article 20811 of the
Public Contracts Code. In the event that the contract to be awarded through a
competitive dialogue is a public works, public works concession, goods or services
contract then the notice has always to be published also in the Official J ournal of
the European Union, irrespective of the base price defined in the technical speci-
fications."" This seems to be a sensible solution by the law makers to increase
awareness on the contract outside the country, thus potentially raising the num-
ber of candidates interested in participating in the dialogue.
The reference to "price estimation in the technical specifications" by article 20812
of the Public Contracts Code may be construed as a mistake by the law makers
since no "technical specifications" are to be published with the contract notice,
but only a descriptive document/" which can be much less detailed than the
"technical specifications" used at the beginning of an open or restricted proce-
dure. It also makes no sense to presuppose a price at this stage since we are
378. Article 205 of the Public Contracts Code.
379. Article 2081z of the ~b1ic. Contracts Code. .
380. Articles 291z of the Directive and 207 of the Public Contracts Code.
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talking of a particularly complex contract which, by design, the contracting au-
thority is unable to fully determine at the beginning of the procedure. In some
cases, the contracting authority may be unable to determine a price at this point,
if for instance, it does not know the exact scope of the contract or the legal and
financial make-up. It seems thus strange, and probably difficult, to demand the
contracting authority to disclose a price in these circumstances.
(a) Systems available for the assessment of the economic, technical
or professional ability of candidates
The assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates is
done in accordance with articles 168 through 188 of the Public Contracts Code.
Two different methods are, in theory, available to the contracting authority, one
"complex" and another "simple". These methods share most of their provisions.
The common rules are present, namely, in the articles 167 through 178 and 182
through 188 of the Public Contracts Code. The specific rules on the complex
method are stated in articles 181 and 184/3 and the ones on the simple method in
articles 179 and 180. Directive 2004118 in articles 44,47 and 48 does not have any
details on which method to adopt if more than one is available to the contracting
authority.
Two of the interviewees explained that there was no intention of limiting the op-
tions of the contracting authority at this stage.
(b) The complex system
The complex system is based on a selection model founded on the criteria of best
technical and financial ability {article 18Ih12 of the Public Contracts Code}. At
the beginning of the competitive dialogue procedure, according to articles
164!I(m)(ii) and 20612 of the Public Contracts Code the contracting authority
must state the number of candidates that it will qualify, which cannot be less than
three. However, one of the interviewees saw no problem in carrying out with the
procedure even if less than three were qualified. The criteria to evaluate the can-
didates have to be disclosed at this point. These criteria imply the application of
a demanding evaluation model similar to the one used to evaluate tenders on
open procedures when the contract is to be awarded based on the most economi-
cally advantageous criteria.t"
In the preliminary report'" candidates achieving the minimum standard will then
be ranked according to their score. Per articles 164!I(m)(ii) and 20612 of the Pub-
lic Contracts Code, this method allows for the exclusion of some candidates, as
long as at least three are invited to take part in the next phase of the competitive
dialogue procedure.
In accordance with article 181/3of the Public Contracts Code, the contracting au-
thority is bound to select the higher ranked candidates until it reaches the num-
ber pre-defined in the technical specifications (open and restricted procedure) or
descriptive document (competitive dlaloguer.t" The contracting authority is twice
bound in the qualification of candidates: to the number candidates previously
chosen and to the order of the ranking. In no way can a contracting authority de-
cide at this moment to re-define the number of candidates to carry out to the fol-
lowing phases of the procedure, nor to pick a candidate deemed as suitable but
classified lower in the ranking.
381. Article 139 of the Public Contracts Code. All interviewees were ~Iear in heralding the demanding new
proposals' evaluation model as one of the landmark advances of the national law.
381.. Presumably also in the final report. . . .
383. Two of the respondents c~nfirmed this when asked which of the c.an?ldates should be ca~ried to the
next phase were clear in answenng that the best and only the best. That IS, If five are deemed suitable, and a
limit of three had been pre-defined. then only the best three are to be invited.
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The pre-determination of the number of candidates to be carried forward leads to
another problem. Such a system is geared for the restricted procedure where the
contracting authority is well aware of the needs it is procuring and has to produce
at the beginning of the procedure a detailed technical specification. With com-
petitive dialogue the contracting authority may have doubts on what exactly it
wants to procure either at a technical, legal or financial level. With this in mind,
the contracting authority does not have to provide detailed specifications at the
beginning of the procedure, but only a descriptive document which does not need
to be as detailed as the technical specifications for a restricted procedure. Ac-
cording to article 1641I(m){i)the selection model in which the complex system is
based has to be published at the onset of the procedure, which makes sense for
the restricted procedure. However, that article expressly demands an extremely
detailed selection model to be disclosed including criteria, sub-criteria, weight-
ings, scales and mathematical formulae. The issue here is that this level of detail
may not be achievable by the contracting authority in all competitive dialogue
procedures as the procedure is to be used in situations where the contracting au-
thority is unsure about certain conditions of the contract to tender. It is not far-
fetched to think of an example where the contracting authority may have opted
for the complex method and drafted the evaluation model accordingly only to
find out during the dialogue that it had picked the three best candidates to pro-
vide solutions for the wrong need. On the other hand, if the contracting authority
has done some previous research on its needs, maybe it will be able to draft an ad-
equate selection system. That is why the author deems this system mayor may
not be adequate, mainly depending on the starring point of the procuring entity.
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(c) The simple system
The simple system of article 179 of the Public Contracts Code states that all can-
didates with the necessary technical and financial ability are entitled to submit
tenders. Candidates are considered as financially able simply if a bank statement
is produced in accordance with the model supplied in Annex VI of the Public
Contracts Code. No rules are present on how to evaluate the technical ability of
candidates.
The distinguishing feature of this system is that all candidates fulfilling the mini-
mum requirements set forth by the contracting authority have to take part in the
procedure and numbers cannot be limited in advance. This makes sense in a re-
stricted procedure for which the rule on article 179 was originally devised. How-
ever, when applied to competitive dialogue the impossibility of restricting the
number of candidates with this model may have the consequence of fostering dia-
logue stages where an extensive number of candidates take part, increasing the
transaction costs for the contracting authority. In addition, in Portugal contract-
ing authorities are barred from excluding solutions or candidates during the dia-
logue stage.
Article 20612 of the Public Contracts Code, however, has a provision stating that
the number of candidates to qualify may be limited to a minimum of three.P"
This provision is completely incompatible with the simple model as described
above because the assessment made by the simple system is a binary test: the can-
didate either has or does not have the qualities required by the contracting au-
thority to take part in the procedure. This would not be a problem if the simple
system allowed for the marking of candidates on a list, from the best to the least
384. As article 44/3 of Directive 2004h8 does.
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suited, as the complex system does. Alas, it does not. In consequence, all candi-
dates making the cut have to be invited to take part in the dialogue stage. Article
20612 is to be interpreted then as being applicable only to the complex system.
One can argue that the simple system is adapted to facilitate and speed up the
tendering of straightforward contracts. As competitive dialogue shall be used only
in the case of complex contracts and the specific qualities or characteristics of the
candidates will determine the quality of the discussions during the dialogue phase
and not only prospective tenders. I t seems logical that the previous assessment of
the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates shall be done in ac-
cordance with the method that better pursues the objectives of competitive dia-
logue. If one compares both systems side by side, it seems that the complex sys-
tem - albeit more cumbersome - is more geared to the needs of competitive
dialogue. The complex system allows for the ranking of candidates and the exclu-
sion of qualified candidates, whereas the simple does not. The complex system
also thoroughly checks the abilities (technical and financial) of any candidate
through an evaluation model similar to the tenders evaluation, determining in the
process which candidates are the best qualified for the tender, whereas the simple
system for the financial ability only demands the compatibility of candidates with
a set of minimum requirements.
(d) Rules common to both systems
Whatever the method that the contracting authority uses, a preliminary report
must be drafted stating which candidates will probably be admitted and which
will probably be excluded. As per the Portuguese tradition, between the prelimi-
nary report and the final decision the candidates are entitled to present their
opinion to the contracting authority (articles 184 and 185 of the Public Contracts
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Code}.385After the final report, the contracting authority is then bound (accord-
ing to the epigraph of article 187 of the Public Contracts Code) to select the qual-
ified candidates within 44 days of the start of the selection process. The qualified
candidates are then carried to the next phase of the procedure on an equal foot-
ing (article 187/2 of the Public Contracts Code).
Whereas article 44/3 of the Directive allows for a smaller number of candidates to
be qualified as long as genuine competition is ensured, there is no such provision
in the Portuguese law. Article 20612386 clearly states the minimum number is three
without any sort of exceptions and does not provide a clear path to the contract-
ing authority to continue the procedure if only two candidates are considered
suitable.
b)Presentation of solutions and dialogue
After the contracting authority has assessed the economic, technical or professio-
nal ability of candidates, the ones deemed as suitable are then simultaneously in-
vited to present their solutions.l" The invitation has to comply with some formal-
ities, namely by providing invitees with the identification of the procedure
{including the reference number attributed by the national and European Official
Journals}, the deadline to submit solutions and what foreign languages are to be
admitted in the dialogue if any.388
385- What constitutes a form of mandatory standstill. If the decision changes by influence of the candidates
position - the cont.racting authority .i~ not bound to upheld them - then a !lew prelimin~ report shall be
issued with the revised probable decision ~~ a new pe.nod ?f consultatlO~s I~ opened. This can be repeated
as many times as needed to have a final decision that IS Identical to the prelim mary report.
386. The article 20612 of the Public Contracts Code includes a provision specific to tile competitive dialogue,
whereas the use of the rules from the restricted procedure, such as the reference to article 164!I(m)(ji) are
only to be applied subsidiarilv, that is if no specific rule regarding the competitive dialogue exists.
387. Article 209/1 of the Public Contracts Code. .
388. Article 20912 of the Public Contracts Code. When quened one of the respondents said this rule was
here to make it similar to that of article 5.8/1 of the Public Contracts Code. It is of worthy note that he then
proceeded to say that if h~ were draft~ng today he may have had a more open opinion regarding the
possibility of accepting solutions drafted m other languages.
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The solution has to be drafted in Portuguese IS" following the rules stated by arti-
cle 62 of the Public Contracts Code for tenders in general. The jury will then
produce a preliminary report where it will justify the admission and exclusion of
solutions to be carried to the dialogue. According to article 21212 of the Public
Contracts Code the jury shall propose the exclusion of solutions if any of the fol-
lowing occurs: i) were presented after the deadline; ii) did not follow the rules on
form of article 62 of the Public Contracts Code; iii) were drafted in a non-accept-
ed language; iv) or were "manifestly inadequate" to fulfill the needs of the con-
tracting authority.
(a) Presentation of a single solution by each candidate
Each admitted candidate can present only one solution,'?" in what seems an arbi-
trary limitation imposed by the Portuguese law makers. On the one hand, this
may reduce the scope of possible solutions to be found during this procedure. On
the other hand, it can be argued it will focus candidates' efforts on what they con-
sider their best solution for the need of the contracting authority and on im-
proving such solution. It may also keep costs down since each candidate can only
put resources into developing one solution. However, under specific circum-
stances where only few companies have the expertise in a certain field, it could he
more productive having them developing and delivering more than one solution.
For instance, in an IT project, a company may have two different products that
may suit the contracting authority hut it is limited from the beginning to choos-
ing one to present in competitive dialogue. It seems an unnecessary limitation hy
389. Although some of the documents may be delivered in a different language if allowed by the invitation,
article 211 or the Public Contracts Code.
390. Article 210/2 of the Public Contracts Code.
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the Public Contracts Code that may harm the dialogue effectiveness in specific
situations, or even collide with the principle of competition.
The reason for this limitation may be due to the fact that the interim solution
presented by the candidate will be assessed at the start of the dialogue stage.
Further to the issue of restriction to a single solution, it should be added that the
Public Contracts Code also disallows the possibility of the contracting authority
side-stepping the mentioned limitation by means of admitting variant solutions.
Articles ziolz and 59/7of the Public Contracts Code read in parallel make it clear
that the intention of the law makers was to limit the discussion to a single solu-
tion per candidate. The first article limits from the onset the possibility of having
more than a single solution in competitive dialogue and the second'" clearly
states that in the absence of a reference to the possibility of having variant pro-
posals in the tender documents, they cannot be presented. All interviewees said
that the decision was taken as to make competitive dialogue as similar as possible
to the open and restricted procedures and forcing candidates to play their best
hand in the solution they choose.
(b) Evaluation of preliminary solutions
The jury will recommend to the contracting authority which solutions should be
carried to the dialogue phase and which should be dropped. It is not clearly re-
solved by the Portuguese law how those preliminary solutions are to be evaluated.
In other words, the law does not specify what criteria should be used to assess
them. The assessment of economic, technical or professional ability of candi-
391• Although ,it is a rule present in the Chapter regarding open pr~edure, it ~h~1 ,be applicable t~ the
competitive dialogue as the rules on, the open procedure, ~e, apphc~ble subsidiarily to the restncted
procedure and, in turn, the rules on this procedure are subsidiarily applicable to the competitive dialogue,
Variants are, however, admitted at the tender stage,
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dates'" and final tenders are bound to a number of specific rules reducing the
contracting authority's discretion during the evaluation. On the admission or ex-
clusion of interim proposals, article 212 of the Public Contracts Code has a num-
ber of formal rules for the contracting authority to comply with, but nothing on
how to evaluate the substance of the solutions. One could argue that the descrip-
tive document should include some specific rules on the evaluation of the interim
proposals, and nothing in the Public Contracts Code forbids the contracting au-
thority from including such details, although there is no legal obligation to do so
or guidelines on how to include this content in accordance with the national law.
In the event no such specific rules are included, the solution can only be to apply
the award criteria for the assessment of final tenders which has to be disclosed in
the descriptive document.:" This solution mirrors article 29/4 of Directive
2004118 which states that in the event of successive stages taking place to reduce
the number of candidates, the award criteria disclosed in the contract notice or
descriptive document shall be applied.
After receiving each candidate's solution, the jury will then produce a preliminary
report where it will justify their admission or exclusion. It should be noted that
the grounds for exclusion are limited to the ones mentioned in article 21212 of the
Public Contracts Code and applicable general principles.!" All of the reasons list-
ed in article 21212 of the Public Contracts Code are simply formal conditions.?"
apart from one - the test of adequacy of a solution which is a substantial condi-
392. Especiallr if complex system of assessing the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates is
employed as discussed above.
393· Articles 206/3, 14 and I64!I(n)of the Public Contracts Code.
394. On~ of the interviewees admitted the possibility of the contracting auth?riry imposing other ex~lusion
grounds In the tender documents. It seems reasonable to admit that the descriptive document could include
some specific rules on the evaluation of the interim proposals, as nothing in the Public Contracts Code
forbids the contracting authority from including such details, although there is no legalobligation to do so or
guidelines on how to include this content in accordance to the national law.
395. These are the presentation of the solution after the deadline; not following the formal rules on h?w to
submit the solution; using a forei~ language that has not been declared previously as acceptable; and If the
solution is "manifestly inadequate to fulfilfthe needs of the contracting authority.
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tion. This assessment of clear inadequacy is the only moment in the whole proce-
dure where contracting authorities are allowed to exclude solutions. Thus, this
feature may have a paramount importance to the good application of the proce-
dure, especially if the simple method of assessing the economic, technical or pro-
fessional ability of candidates is used. Furthermore, as no rules whatsoever are
given to guide the contracting authority in this process, this seems inconsistent
with all the interviewees opinion that care was taken in the transposition drafting
to reduce the contracting authority's discretion to a minimum and which can be
clearly seen elsewhere, as for instance the option to have only a common set of
specifications at the end of the dialogue, allowing the demanding award criteria
rules to be applied at tender stage.
After consulting candidates prior to the final decision, the jury will submit a final
report to the contracting authority with the list of solutions to admit and/or ex-
clude. This report is not binding and the contracting authority has the discretio-
nary power to agree or not with the findings of the jury.396On this point the Por-
tuguese solution seems to have added a supplementary rule to what is in Directive
2004/18. In fact, it has created a new decision point in the procedure before the
beginning of the dialogue phase. There is no doubt that in Directive 2004118 the
contracting authority can have successive stages in the procedure to eliminate in-
terim proposals put forward by the candidares.'?' The Portuguese law, however,
defines the moment before of the start of the dialogue as the sole one where a so-
lution may be excluded, and only if it is "manifestly inadequate". The candidates
present a solutionr'" subject to evaluation before the beginning of the dialogue
phase, thus potentially reducing the number of candidates to have discussions
396. Article 2.12/4/5/6 of the Public Contracts Code.
397. Article 2.9/4 o~ the Dir~ctiv~. . ..
398. Without any information gIVen on what detatls should be gIven 10 the proposal.
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with during that phase. What seems unavailable is the elimination of solutions
(and in consequence candidates) during the dialogue itself,'?" There is also no ex-
press provision in the Portuguese law on the criteria to evaluate the proposals
submitted before the beginning of the dialogue.'?"
(c) Dialogue itself
The dialogue itself starts after the contracting authority notifies all candidates on
the decision about the solution each has put forward.?" The dialogue between the
candidates and the contracting authority is aimed, in the Public Contracts Code,
to discuss the elements present or absent on each admitted proposal and that are
relevant for the drafting of detailed specifications.':"
Dialogue is subject to a number of formalities. Minimum notification periods,"?
rules on what should be included in the minutes of meeting,'?' rules on who can
be present in the meetings and is entitled to represent the candidate,"? cautions
regarding equal treatment between candidates.t'" and the ban on transmitting
confidential information"? are all present in the Portuguese law.
The option to include and clearly state formalities is typical of the Portuguese
legislative system in general, which tends to take regulation to minute detail.t?"
Even so, this shows that during the transposition of competitive dialogue this
399· Although elimination is still admitted at the end of the dialogue phase, according to article 215 of the
Public Contracts Code.
100.A11 the grounds for the jury to propose an elimination are essentially formal, apart from the "manifestly
inadequate" one.
401. Article 212/6 of the Public Contracts Code.
402. Article 213of the Public Contracts Code.
403· Three days, according to article 21411of the Public Contracts Code.
404·Articles 214/3 and 12013/5 of the Public Contracts Code.
405. Article 21416 of the Public Contracts Code.
406.Article 21412of the Public Contracts Code.
407. Article 21413of the Public Contracts Code.
408. Regulating what information shall be carried in the minutes of meeting seems a little too overboard but
even so can be explained in the way judicial review of tenders is done in Portugal. According to the
Administrative Courts Process Law, the contracting authority (such as all administrative bodies), when
challenged by an aggrieved party has to produce the administrative file, containing everything connected to
the tender, including all decisions and minutes of meeting that led to and sustain such decisions.
procedure was not simply bolted on to an existing framework but that it was
adapted to fit within the national practice.
Dialogue is to be carried out until a single solutiorr'?? best suited for the contract-
ing authority's needs is found or all solutions are deemed as incapable of meeting
them. When such solution is found or no solution has been forthcoming, the jury
will end the dialogue and produce a report justifying its decision and submit it to
the contracting authority.!" It is up to the contracting authority to decide
whether to follow the jury's recommendations."
(d) Impossibility of eliminating candidates during the dialogue
There is no doubt that in Directive 2004118 the contracting authority can have
successive stages in the procedure to eliminate interim proposals put forward by
the candidates.!" In Portugal, however, the Public Contracts Code does not pro-
vide a legal basis for successive stages in competitive dialogue.
As mentioned in subsection (b) of the current section, the Portuguese law defines
only one moment in the procedure when to eliminate solutions, which is this mo-
ment before of the start of the dialogue. Candidates present a solutiorr'" to be as-
sessed before starting the dialogue phase, thus potentially reducing the number of
candidates to have discussions with. What it is clearly unavailable is the elimina-
tion of solutions (and in consequence candidates) during the dialogue itself.t" This
was one of the most discussed points with the interviewees."! One said no proper
409. Only the .singular is prese~t in article 214/5(b) of the Public Contracts Code, without a plural contrary to
what is in Article 2915 of the Directive 2004/18.
410. Article 21511 of the Public Con~racts Code.
411• Article 21512and 13 of the .Pubhc Contracts Code.
412. Article 29/4 of the Directive.
413. Without any information given on what details should be given in the proposal.
414. Although elimination is still admitted at the end of the dialogue phase, according to article 215 of the
Public Contracts Code.
415. Themselves admitting that it was also one ?! the thorniest issue they. faced ~uring the transposition.
The final decision taken was more legal than political, as the Government did not mfluence the outcome of
this point.
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solutions were found to make this possibility work without leaving too much dis-
cretion in the hands of the contracting authority. Another mentioned he was not
comfortable with the solution set forth in article 29/4 of the Directive for the
elimination of candidates - the use of the criteria set forth in the descriptive doc-
ument - as in his view it made no sense to apply award criteria to the elimination
of candidates.!"
The consequence of being impossible to eliminate candidates or solutions during
the dialogue is that we may have dialogue stages which start and end with an un-
expectedly large number of candidates. This issue is particularly acute if the as-
sessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates has been
done through the simple system. Under this system all candidates considered as
suitable, have to be invited to take part in the subsequent stages, irrespective of
their number. In consequence, if a significant number of candidates decides to
take part, it may lead to longer and more expensive dialogues."?
As a way out, one could argue that the contracting authority and the candidate
may agree to stop discussing or developing the inadequate solution. This seems
reasonable, especially bearing in mind that at the end of the dialogue a common
set of specifications will be developed, as we shall discuss in section (3)hereunder.
416. However, the Public Contracts Code, as we have seen, allows the use of the award criteria for other
purposes than to choose the best tender. For instance, in a competitive dialogue where the complex meth~d
of assessing the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates was used, the contracting authonty
as to decide which are the best candidates based on the prospective award criteria. Furthermore, as we ~e
seen in sub-section (b), at the beginning of the dialogue there is some discretion for the contracting authonty
to eliminate solutions which are ID its view inadequate.
417. When queried, one of the respondents said that, at the time of drafting, the scenario of having too many
candidates andlor discussing inadequate solutions was not taken into consideration.
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(e) Ban on sharing confidential information
The issue of confidential information is not as thoroughly detailed as other areas
of competitive dialogue in Portugal. According to article 214/3 of the Public Con-
tracts Code, information is to be treated as confidential by the contracting au-
thority if the candidate classifies it as confidential during the comrnunication.t"
It appears that all the information disclosed by a candidate as confidential, will
have to be treated as such by the contracting authority, without it being entitled
to oppose.
It remains to be seen what happens when candidates transmit information that is
clearly in the public domain and classify it as confidential for whatever reasons
they may have. One could mention, for instance information on a solution that
has been leaked to the press and therefore made public or information already
public before the start of the procedure.
The Portuguese law steered clear of outlining what should be considered as confi-
dential, for instance, information protected by intellectual property laws. In addi-
tion, information that is considered as confidential can only have such a condition
lifted if the candidate expressly allows it in writing."?
Article 214/3 of the Public Contracts Code appears to be drafted in injunctive
terms and it seems that the contracting authority will not be able to establish in
the descriptive document the forfeiture of this protection as a condition of parti-
cipation in the procedure. The law states in strong terms the confidentiality
418. Article 29/3 of the Directive 2004/18 s~ate~ that ':fc}ontractins authorities may not reveal to the other
participants solutions proposed or other confidentIal informatIon communicated by a candidate participating in the
dialogue without bis/ber agreement." On this topic,Rubach-Larsen, 'Competitive Dialogue' in R Nielsen and S
Treumer. ~eds),. The 11fW EU public procurement directives (Diof Publishing, 2005), p. 76 and Treumer,
'Competitive Dialogue (2004> 13PPLR p. 181-183.
419. Article 214/3 of the Public Contracts Code.
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obligation and furthers that it can only be lifted with written and express consent
after the information has been transmitted to the contracting authority. Itwould
be impossible for the candidate to expressly lift the confidentiality condition on
information that is yet to be transmitted to the contracting authoriry.!"
As an alternative to the current legal regime on confidentiality, Portuguese law
makers might have opted to extend the rules on secrecy of tenders to the dia-
logue stage.": According to article 66h of the Public Contracts Code, the tender-
er may request that the tender or parts of it may be classified as secret for reasons
of commercial, industrial, military or other types of secrets "in the terms of the
law". That is, the tenderer has to be very specific on what he requests protection
for and his request must be founded on substantial laws which protect, for in-
stance, trade secrets. In addition, the contracting authority ultimately decides to
grant or withhold the request.
Confidentiality raises another major problem specific to the way competitive dia-
logue procedure is conceived in the Portuguese law. As the dialogue stage leads to
the development of a common set of specifications and not to tenders based on
each candidate's solution, what should happen if confidentiality was raised by the
candidate whose solution was considered as the most appropriate? How can that
"confidential" solution be used as basis for technical specifications for all candi-
dates to tender on? When faced with this unintended consequence, one of the in-
terviewees replied saying that if confidentiality had been raised during the dia-
logue and the candidate was not available to reconsider it at the end of the
dialogue, then it was not an appropriate solution and, thus, should be excluded.
Considering the actual draft, the author does not agree with this view for two ma-
420. One of the interviewees, however, did not find a problem with the possibility of a "blanket
authorisation" condition to be present in the descriptive document.
421. These ruleswere first noted to the author by one of the respondents.
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jor reasons. One, it would make confidentiality a dead letter protection. Two, the
Public Contracts Code does not allow solutions to be excluded after the dialogue
has started. A potential way out might be that confidentiality is only applicable to
the solutions and that, arguably, the technical specifications are no longer a solution
and by definition need to be public. This, however, seems once more as an inge-
nious way of rendering the protection given by confidentiality as useless and is a
consequence of the lack of foresight in the way the procedure was drafted.
However, although the ban on sharing confidential information is clearly present
on the Public Contracts Code the fact contracting authorities will have to draw a
common set of specifications at the end of the dialogue stage leads the author to
wonder if it is as important in this case as in the situations where candidates end
up tendering based on their own solution. If the candidate is tendering based on
his own solution, then any confidential information shared to another candidate
during the dialogue will have an immediate detrimental effect on the competitive-
ness of his own tender. In Portugal, however, the objective of the dialogue is to
draft a common set of specifications and if it is possible for the contracting au-
thority to draft them with elements from various solutions.!" then having more
information on the specifications can arguably increase the competitiveness of a
candidate's tender. Itmust be said though it is not clear if Portuguese contracting
authorities are authorized to draft common technical specifications with ele-
ments from more than one solution. In the case specifications are based on a sin-
gle solution, then confidentiality is as important as when candidates tender based
on their own solutions.
Confidentiality leads to a final issue in the Portuguese law, namely, its relation-
ship with judicial review. In Portugal, for the purpose of judicial review, since
422. This will be discussed in further detail in sub-section (3)(a) of this Chapter.
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2004 access to documents from public bodies relevant to support a certain deci-
sion is very liberal. When faced with judicial review, the public body is mandated
by law to surrender all and every document relevant to the case to be reviewed by
the plaintiff and the court. The issue here is what should the contracting authori-
ty do if faced with the judicial review court procedure of a dialogue where confi-
dentiality has been raised. Should it give all the documents pertaining to the plea,
including the ones that are confidentialr'" Or, should it withhold thernr'"
(3) Presentation of tenders and award
After the end of the dialogue stage, the phase to submit tenders ensues. This
phase is called presentation of tenders and award in the Public Contracts Code.
The contracting authority notifies all qualified candidates whose solutions have
been admitted of the end of the dialogue and invite them to present tenders. This
letter of invitation includes the award criteria model, technical specifications (or
the website where they are to be found)!" and time limit, no less than 40 days, for
candidates to submit the final tender.t"
It is clear that the contracting authority will have to send the candidates a com-
mon set of technical specifications for them to tender on. Fig. I hereunder ex-
plains how passing from the dialogue to the tender stage occurs.
423. The same remarks could be raised on the tender secrecy rules of article 66/1. These, however, are more
limited and the request has to be founded in the law, whereas confidentiality of article 214/3 is automatic and
does not need to be justified.
424. The CJEU in the C-450/06 Varec vs. Belgium ECR bo08) 1-00581, although not entirely clearly, appe.aJS
to value confidentiality above transparency and that the review bodr must keep confidential the informatIon
transmitted to it. On this case, Brown, 'Protection of confidential information in procurement cases before
national review bodies: Varec vs. Belgian State (C-450/o6)' (2008) 4 PPLR, NAII9-123.
425. Article 2171I/2of the Public Contracts Code.
426. Article 218 of the Public Contracts Code.
Common specifications model
(Portugal)
Candidate
A
Dialogue
stage
End
of dialogue
Tender
stage
fig. I
(a) Common technical specifications
At the end of the dialogue stage the contracting authority will have to mandatori-
ly draft a common set of specifications. Candidates will present their tenders
based on those specifications and not on the solution they have developed during
the dialogue stage. What is not clear in the Public Contracts Code is how the
contracting authority will actually draft the technical specifications, hence the
different shades of green used in fig. I above. Two different interpretations to this
issue can be given: i) that the technical specifications will have elements from the
winning solution only; ii) that they may have elements from other solutions or de-
veloped by the contracting authority.
Under the first, since a winning solution had to be identified by the contracting
authority, it will be converted into the technical specifications, without external
elements from other solutions or developed by the contracting authority.
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Under the second, common technical specifications would be composed with ele-
ments from the winning solution and also from solutions presented by the other
candidates or developed by the contracting authority. These technical specifica-
tions would represent, in reality, the best way to fulfill the needs of the contract-
ing authority. It should be added that the identification of the winning solution is
mandated by article 215 (still belonging to section III, which regulates the dia-
logue stage), whereas the obligation to draft the common technical specifications
is specified by article 217 (belonging to section IV, which regulates the presenta-
tion of tenders stage) and makes no reference to the winning solution.
Irrespective of the correct interpretation, one can see the merits of the decision
taken by the Portuguese law makers of identifying a winning solution and having
common technical specifications drafted at the end of the dialogue stage. It
makes work easier for the contracting authority as all other solutions developed
by candidates are discarded. It also makes comparison between tenders easier and
more transparent, facilitating external control, since they are based in the same
set of specifications, just as they would be in an open or restricted procedure.
And more fundamentally, as all interviewees were keen to point out, it makes
possible the application of the award criteria evaluation model set forth in the
Public Contracts Code for the open procedure.
From a different perspective, however, the decision to identify a winning solution
and develop common specifications leads to other problems. Firstly, it makes all
(or almost all) candidates tender based on a solution which is not theirs, thus ere-
ating an imbalanced field of competition, particularly if the technical specifica-
tions are based on a single solution only."? Secondly, it leads to the scrapping of
427. One can argue, however, that the rules are clear from the start of the procedure and is fair commercial
advantage that whomever develops the solution reaps the benefits of preparing a tender based on Its own
work.
much of the development work done during the dialogue. Thirdly, it may also
lead to a reduced field of competition in the later stages of the procedure as the
candidates with the non-winning solution (or that have not contributed signifi-
cantly to the winning solution), when faced with the costs of preparing a tender
from scratch may simply decide not to do so. Fourthly, as we have seen above
when discussing the ban on confidential information it is hard to render protec-
tion of confidentiality compatible with a common set of specifications.
If the second interpretation suggested above is correct, then an extra set of issues
may be raised. Namely, it would imply that cherry picking is possible according to
the Public Contracts Code. When asked about this problem, two of the intervie-
wees seemed unaware of it. They conceded, however, that cherry picking of
different solutions to develop a common set of specifications is not forbidden in
the Public Contracts Code, although one mentioned limitations due to commer-
cial secrets.t" In addition, contracting authorities may have the incentive to guide
candidates during the dialogue stage to a convergent solution that will end up
serving as the base for the technical specifications, especially bearing in mind the
restrictions on discussions after the end of the said dialogue stage.
Whatever the correct interpretation, the option adopted by the Portuguese law
makers raises two more questions. As we have seen, candidates carried to the dia-
logue depend on the merits of the preliminary solution they have developed and
not their own ability to execute a set of specifications. This may lead to situations
where candidates who were capable and interested in submitting a tender based
on the specifications that are drafted at the end of the dialogue, but as they were
not carried to the dialogue due to shortcomings on their own preliminary solution
will not be invited to participate. As the Public Contracts Code is clear in stating
428. Specificatio~s. would stiU have to comply with the neutrality demanded by the CJEU's Unix case
(C-359/93, CommISSIon v. Netherlands [1995] ECR 1-157)·
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that only candidates who had solutions admitted may be invited to participate at
the tender stage. One must ask what is the difference then between having the
solution excluded at the beginning or the end of the dialogue if the actual tender
will not be based it? From a competition point of view it also makes no sense,
since the Public Contracts Code is reducing the level of competition at tendering
stage. On the flip side, this may be construed as allowing candidates which had
dropped of the dialogue stage for whatever reason to come back.?" This may in-
crease competition but also the risk of one or more candidates with admitted so-
lutions stalling the development to save costs thus offloading the development
cost over to other candidates.
Finally, if the objective of the dialogue is to develop a common set of specifica-
tions just as in the open or restricted procedure.?" why not allow any potentially
able company to tender based on those specifications and limit the common set
of specifications to the participants in the dialogue stage?
(b) Candidates to be invited to submit a tender
Articles 21511 and 216 of the Public Contracts Code state the need to identify the
single solution at the end of the dialogue. In addition the contracting authority is
obliged to notify the qualified candidates whose solutions have been admitted.
Article 21511 further demands the jury to "clearly and distinctly" identify the solution
most adapted to fulfill the contracting authority needs. This leaves no margin for
doubt that the Public Contracts Code wants only one solution to be carried to
the tendering phase.
429. As noticed by one of the interviewees.
430. As expressly admitted by one of the interviewees,
Article 217 of the Public Contracts Code states that if a solution to fulfill the
needs of the contracting authority has been found, then the candidates which
have passed the assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of
candidates and had their solutions admitted shall be invited to submit tenders,
presumably following the technical specifications supplied by the contracting au-
thority at that point.?' Apparently, all candidates who had their solutions admit-
ted to the dialogue will be invited to tender based on a common set of technical
specifications, irrespective of their solution having been considered as viable to
fulfill the needs of the contracting authority.
<.)Award
Even though the apparently relevant section of the Public Contracts Code is
headed "Presentation of tenders and award", no rules on the award are to be found
there. Those have to be sought in the subsidiary rules applicable to competitive
dialogue, that is the rules from the restricted procedure. Since the restricted pro-
cedure also has no rules on the award phase, one has to check the subsidiary rules
applicable to this type of procedure. These are the rules on the open procedure.?'
As such, the rules on the award are to be found between articles 139 and 154 of
the Public Contracts Code.433 This means that after tender submission, the rules
applicable to competitive dialogue are exactly the same ones as for the open and
restricted procedures.
To end the procedure, the contracting authority will have to evaluate the tenders
and award the contract. Article 139 of the Public Contracts Code establishes the
431. Article 217/3 of the Publi.c Contracts Code. . .
432. Article 162/1 of the Public Contracts Code states that the rules on the open procedure are subsidiary for
the restricted.
433. Excluding articles 140 .to 145 of the Public Contracts Code on the electronic auction and articles 149
through 154 on the negotratron phase.
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rules on tender evaluation, namely the contents of the evaluation model and in
particular the requirements to draft an appropriate model to find the most eco-
nomically advantageous tender.t" As before, after the tenders have been received,
a preliminary report must be issued and the tenderers are invited to present their
views on the proposed decision.v' followed by the final decision.
(s) Lack of a fine-tuning phase
Article 29/6 of the Directive 2oo41I8 allows for a fine-tuning phase before the
choosing of a preferred bidder when, with some limitations, amendments can be
made to the tenders presented by the candidates.t" Under this article, it may be
possible, for instance, to ask for minor amendments or improvements to the ten-
ders - as long as the principle of equal treatment is not violated and the basic fea-
tures remain untouched -like improvements to the cost structure of a part of the
contract, bringing non-compliant tenders into compliance or to seek further in-
formation to be supplied by the tenderers.t"
In the rules specifically pertaining to competitive dialogue, the Public Contracts
Code does not seem to allow even for such small changes to be made. However,
two of the interviewees argued that article 99 of the Public Contracts Code, al-
lowing for the possibility of fine-tuning after the tender stage for the open proce-
dure, was applicable. During the interviews, both accepted the view that the
tunings were more limited in scope than what is admitted in article 29/6, as they
434. Mathematical formuJas should be used when possible and no data may be dependent on the tenders to
be submitted by the other tenderers, thus ruling out relative qualification schemes.
435. Articles 146 and 147 of the Public Contracts Code.
436. On this topic see,Verschuur, 'Competitive dialogue and the scope for discussion after tenders an~
before selecting the preferred bidder - what is fine-tuning etc' [zo061 PPLR, Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhl,c
and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), p.655-660 and Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' uoo4>
13PPLR p. 184.
437. Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (and, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005), p. 6W657·
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depend on public interest and may not lead to a different final classification.v"
Notwithstanding the opinion of the interviewees, the author begs to differ, as in
reality article 99 (and also article 94 on the confirmation of commitments) of the
Public Contracts Code are not relevant to replace the lack of a fine-tuning phase
as this is done after a bidder has been chosen and not before as allowed by article
Portuguese law, however, allows the contracting authority to request further in-
formation from tenderers in all types of procedures. Article 72 of the Public Con-
tracts Code states that the contracting authority may request any further infor-
mation it considers necessary for the analysis of the tenders. This information
may not change any feature of the tender or even bringing a non-compliant ten-
der into compliance.t" In addition, all new information supplied by tenderers will
have to be made available to its competirors.!"
One can argue that this limitation may lead to a reduced usefulness of the proce-
dure, as it will be more stringent and less flexible than intended by Directive
2004/18. However, it can also be argued that this limitation may be beneficial,
since it forces the contracting authority and the candidates to discuss all the is-
sues during the dialogue stage and not procrastinate over serious issues hoping
they will be easier to deal with later. Potentially, this lack of post-dialogue discus-
sions may have the effect of forcing the candidates to submit very detailed and
complete bids. In this case, this ban would have a beneficial effect at the project
management level by avoiding what has been described as "bid creep"?" when dis-
438. One of the interviewees said this was done to avoid excesses by the contracting authority, as for
instance, according to his .own ~xpe~ence, in ~he case of public-private p~rtnerships in the past, it was
commonplace to ~ave detailed ~Iscusslons at this stage t~at altered substantially the co~t~a~t in respect to
the original techrucal specifications. One can argue that, m the end, the foreclosed possibility actually may
improve the quality of the tender and value for money.
439. Article 7212 of the Public Contracts Code.
440.Article 72/3 of the Public Contracts Code.
441. Auton, 'It's good to talk' {2009} Puhlic Financez6, p.26.
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cussions are allowed after the tenders have been submitted. The detailed bids
from more than one candidate could, however, increase the transaction costs of
the dialogue stage and eventually dissuade candidates of submitting bids, thus
reducing competition.
The lack of specific rules for competitive dialogue similar to the ones found in ar-
ticle 29/6 of the Directive 2004118, may point out that Portuguese law makers
wanted this procedure to be run as an open or restricted procedure after the dia-
logue stage.
Taking into consideration the impossibility of making small changes as allowed
by article 29/6 of Directive 2004h8, it seems that bigger specification changes af-
ter bids are submitted are also disallowed for in Portugal. For example, after the
final tendering stage, the contracting authority might have decided to make some
changes to the specifications+" like risk allocation or the aims and objectives of a
IT contract, as to maximise the benefits from the procurement procedure. The
Public Contracts Code is silent regarding such a possibility'? and as it does not
allow for smaller changes it seems that the possibility of accepting theses changes
without restarting the procedure is also precluded.
(6) Apparent lack of a final phase of amendments and discussions
Article 29/7 Directive 2004/18 also allows for a final phase of amendments and
discussions with the preferred bidder+" to take place after he has been selected,
allowing for some flexibility in finishing the details and clarifying the legal obliga-
442. Arrowsmith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 658-660.
443. On the conclusion o( the interview, one of the interviewees again referring to the lack of negotiation
culture in the country, said Portuguese public administration is used to dictating not negotiating. One of the
respondents also mentioned different cultural traditions of the UK and systems based on the Napoleonic
public administration such as the Portuguese.
444. On this topic see, Kennedy-Loest, 'What can be done at the preferred bidder stage in comretitive
dialogue' (2006) 6 PPLR, Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwel, 2005)
and Treumer, 'Competitive Dialogue' (2004) 13PPLR P.183-185.
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tions of both parties. Bearing in mind the ambiguous wording of the Directive,
however, the exact scope of what is allowed or not is convoluted.t" As examples
of what could be allowed, one could mention changes needed to be carried due to
external changes of circumstances like modifications demanded by the planning
authority during the application for a planning permission.r" The Public Con-
tracts Code does not have a specific stage for amendments and discussions
specifically for competitive dialogue. Contracting authorities may discuss issues
with the winning bidder at this point under the same rules as in any other proce-
dure. The draft of article 99 appears to be more limited than what is allowed by
the article 29/7 of Directive 2004118 but, nonetheless, leaves some room to ac-
commodate changes needed.
As with the lack of scope for discussing tenders, it can be argued that this is ei-
ther positive or negative. Since competitive dialogue is to be used for awarding
particularly complex contracts, it can be argued the maximum of flexibility should
be present. On the other hand, this ban on extensive changes may have positive
effects. At this stage, where the bidder no longer faces competition it is in a bet-
ter bargaining position and can be expected that it will try to extract concessions
from the contracting authority. Not having this possibility may once more force
contracting authorities and candidates to settle as many issues as possible during
the dialogue stage.
9. Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter how the Portuguese national law implements com-
petitive dialogue and the law makers opted to include in the transposition a num-
445. Arrowsmith, The law ofpuhlic and utilities procurement (znd, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005) p. 660-663·
446. Ibid. p. 662.
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ber of supplementary rules that are not based in Directive 2004h8. Furthermore,
it became apparent the transposition into Portuguese law has raised various is-
sues. In particular, issues such as the grounds of use, the impossibility of eliminat-
ing candidates and/or solutions during the dialogue, the need to identify a single
solution and mandatorily draft a common set of specifications, and also the lack
of specific rules on discussions before or after the winner is chosen are raised. Fi-
nally, it appears that a competitive dialogue is to be run as an open or restricted
procedure after tenders are submitted.
The issues described provide ample points for discussions with the interviewees
at the empirical research stage. The next chapter is focused on the findings of
these interviews.
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Chapter 7 - Empirical findings on Portugal
:I. Introduction
In Portugal, the competitive dialogue procedure present in Directive 20041I8 was
transposed by the Public Contracts Code of 2008.447 Contrary to what happened
in Spain, law makers opted to include in the transposition a number of specific
rules on competitive dialogue that are not specifically based in the Directive. For
instance, the grounds for use of the procedure in the Public Contracts Code are
more demanding or narrow as they limit the numbers of solutions a candidate can
provide, do not allow for the exclusion of candidates during the dialogue, require
the draft of a common set of specifications and tenders based in these specifica-
tions and do not include a phase for fine-tuning of tenders. In addition, the Pub-
lic Contracts Code regulates competitive dialogue with both the rules that can be
found in the body of Directive 20041I8 and those in its recitals.
Competitive dialogue has been used five times in Portugal. Consequently, one of
the most obvious questions to ask had to be why it is not being used more. In
face of this lack of use, the author's focus has been on the leading lawyers in pro-
curement and also contracting authorities that one could expect to use competi-
tive dialogue.
This chapter will be divided into various sections. Section 2 explains the situa-
tions where the competitive dialogue procedure was used. Sections rI4 are each
dedicated to a category of issues that were discussed in the interviews. In section
447.1t carne into force in June 2008.
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15 the issues that may be at play in the lack of use of the procedure in Portugal are
discussed.
2.Actual use oftbe procedure
The competitive dialogue has been used only five times in the country, with the
last procedure being launched in March 2010.448 Three were tendered by local
councils, one by an hospital and the last by a public undertaking. No contracting
authority has used the procedure more than once.
Two contracts were tendered for awarding bicycle renting schemes, one for IT
services (workflow management and development of an internal network), one for
consultancy services and one for hospital cleaning. All of these contracts are rela-
tively small value contracts. While the two bicycle renting schemes do not have
an estimated value, the others were advertised with a maximum price of 200,000
- 250,000 euros.
Out of the five procedures, four were advertised in the Tenders Electronic Daily
website.r'? One of the bicycle schemes was not advertised there, notwithstanding
the fact that article 20812 of the Public Contracts Code mandates the publication
in the Official Journal of the European Union of all competitive dialogue proce-
dures for the award of public works, public works concession, goods or services
contracts. The explanation might be that the contracting authority might not be
sure if it would end up with a services or a public-private partnership contract and
considered they did not have to publish it on the Official Journal of the European
Union.
448. Data from the Tenders Electronic Daily website and the Portuguese Official Journal.
449. http://ted.europa.euITEDlbrowselbrowseByBO.do.
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As of September 2010 only one of the five procedures has been concluded. Itwas
launched in 2007 by the hospital to hire cleaning services. The hospital applied
the rules of the Directive 20041I8 directly as it could do so at the time.
The author was told by two of the contracting authoriries+" that have used com-
petitive dialogue that their projects were supposed to conclude during October
2010.
Although the numbers are simply too small to conduct a detailed analysis.!" the
absence of infrastructure or major IT projects tendered in Portugal by means of a
competitive dialogue should be noted.
J. Groundsforuse
(d Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 8 before, the grounds for use of competitive dialogue
procedure in Portugal are mainly set in article 30 of the Public Contracts Code.
According to article 301I, competitive dialogue may be used when the contract to
award is particularly complex and renders impossible the use of the open or re-
stricted procedures. This concept of impossibility is key to understanding the
scope of the grounds of use of competitive dialogue in this country. Article 33 ex-
cludes the use of the procedure in the field of utilities and its analysis will take
place in this section also.
Article 30/2 proceeds to explain what can be considered a particularly complex
contract in a similar fashion to article I/n(c) of Directive 2004118, that is, when it
450. Identifying the projects would might put in jeopardy the confidentiality agreement signed by the author
with his respondents.
451• For a breakdown of the use of t~~ pro~edure <.>0 different membe~ States pleas~ see, de Mars and
Craven, (Paper) (2010) Use of Competitive DIalogue ID the European Union- an AnalYSISfrom the Official
Journal.
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is objectively impossible to define the technical, legal or financial make up of a
contract. The two remaining paragraphs of article 30 further refine the objective
impossibility of the previous paragraph and the scope of the dialogue itself.
As we have seen in Chapter 6, the Portuguese law makers had adopted a stronger
wording regarding the grounds for use of the procedure than what is in Directive
2004h8. For the author, the key difference seems to be the words chosen by the
Portuguese law makers in article 30h. By specifically using impossibility, the law
makers made it clear it wanted to restrict the use of the procedure to a bare mini-
mum.t" This wording was expressly accepted by people involved in the draft of
the law as a conscious decision. The author was told by these interviewees that
they wanted to make clear competitive dialogue was an exceptional procedure,
not to be used lightly by contracting authorities. Concern was expressed about
contracting authorities abusing the procedure if drafted on more ambiguous
terms.
The author asked the interviewees of the empirical research stage how they inter-
preted the grounds for use of the procedure in Portuguese law.
(2) Data: grounds for use of article 30 of the Public Contracts
Code
It remained to be seen if in practice the interpretation of the grounds for use
would follow a similar line to the one assumed by the Portuguese law makers. The
interviews conducted have produced a very clear preference for interpreting com-
petitive dialogue's grounds for use restrictively and exceptionally. 14 have consid-
452. A similar change can be found in article 30/2 that transposes article 1/,,(c) of Directive 2004f18. The
Directive states that a contract is particularly complex when the contracting authority is "not objectively
able" to define the technical, legal or financial make-up of a contract. The Portuguese law states that. a
contract is particularly complex when it is "objectively impossible" to define the technical, legal or financial
make-up ora contract.
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ered it an exceptional procedure and only two have said it was not exceptional.
Interestingly most lawyers expressed views on this topic, whereas only four con-
tracting authorities produced an answer. One of the public sector respondents
said it had been stated in a number of workshops he had attended that the proce-
dure was exceptional.
Eight have also qualified the grounds for use as Iirnited'" or that those should be
interpreted narrowly. Furthermore, nine respondents have interpreted the rules
regarding the impossibility mentioned in article 30 paragraphs I and 2 as an objec-
tive impossibility, thus concluding that the more generous interpretation of the
grounds of use allowed by Directive 2004!I8 according to some is not possible in
Portugal.t" For these respondents it is not possible to use competitive dialogue
when open or restricted procedures are simply inadequate for the objectives.
Furthermore, the same logic of interpretation has been applied to the impossibili-
ty of defining the technical/legal/financial make up of a contract (article 30/2(b»
and lack of means of the contracting authority (30/3).
However, a minority of five respondents have stated otherwise and defended a
more liberal interpretation of the grounds for use of the procedure. For these in-
terviewees, the grounds should be interpreted in accordance with the Directive
2oo4!I8 and amount to an area of discretionary decision by the contracting au-
thority, subject to expost control. It has been argued by a lawyer that, for instance,
the lack of means of a contracting authority can only be assessed under the condi-
tions of the said entity and cannot be interpreted objectively. A contracting au-
thority with a huge budget may be expected to keep a pool of able personnel
where it can have enough manpower to classify as unjustified the use of competi-
453 How of this total six had also considered an exceptional procedure.
45~. Furthermore only three respondents, all lawyers, suggested interpreting the grounds in accordance with
the Directive 2004h8.
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tive dialogue. It has been argued by some interviewees that this is the case with
public companies operating in the utilities sector which, originally, were part of
the State direct administration and were spun off in the last few years. A smaller
authority with a smaller budget, however, should not be expected to have such
manpower readily available. One can argue that consultants can be hired to com-
pensate for the shortfall, and that article 30/3 wants to restrict the use of the pro-
cedure as a means of avoiding getting free consulting. One interviewee offered a
thoughtful and considerate opinion on this subject matter. On his view, the test
of article 30/3 is simply impossible as the contracting authority when launching
the procedure is automatically assuming that it does not have the necessary
means to develop the solutions in house. Even so, it was counter argued that the
ultimate objective of competitive dialogue is to consult the market and thus as-
sess the opinions and ideas of the same consultants that could be hired directly in
the first place.
Regarding contracting authorities that have used the procedure, two have argued
that they did not have a problem in considering that their own specific situations
were covered by the grounds for use of the procedure as stated in the Public Con-
tracts Code. One of them argued, however, that in theory he feels it is hard to de-
fine in which situations the procedure might be used.
On the drafting of article 30, II respondents have considered it not to be clear. In
their view, this article is hard to understand and interpret.t" This may be due to
the use of undetermined legal concepts'" or excessive use of adjectives and ad-
verbs."? It may also be due to the decision taken by the law makers to adopt a le-
gal drafting technique with multiple cross references.t" Finally, it may be
455. Three others have stated they are clear and do not pose an)' sort of problem.
456. Such as "particularly complex" or "objectively impossible" from article 30 paragraphs I and 2.
457. "Objectively impossible" {article JoM, "most adequate" (301l/a), "sufficiently clear and precise" (301l/c),
"effective" (30/J}, "due diligence" (30/31.
458. As we have seen in Chapter 5, this is pervasive to the whole law. Regarding the competitive dialogue, for
-IS6 -
connected to the restrictive interpretation taken by respondents to the grounds
for use, that is to say, they may be adopting preemptively a cautious approach re-
garding the grounds for use due to the uncertainties they face when interpreting
them.
(3) Data: utilities sector exclusion of article 33 of the Public
Contracts Code
Article 33of the Public Contracts Code excludes the use of competitive dialogue
in the utilities sector. As has been explained in Chapter 6, this limitation covers
only public undertakings and not the State itself when conducting procurement
in areas within Directive 2oo4IIis scope. Therefore, the scope of this limitation
is more limited than could be anticipated at first sight.
The Public Contracts Code drafters interviewed by the author said that since the
Directive 2oo41I7 did not expressly include a reference to competitive dialogue,
the correct interpretation would be it was not available for contracts covered by
it.
When asked about the restriction, the response was almost unanimous in dis-
agreeing with the option by the law makers, with a single lawyer supporting the
legal draft. Respondents considered this limitation as arbitrary. The response was
similar when interviewees were asked about the reasons of said restriction. None
bar one could find a reason. One lawyer said this limitation was due to a lack of
confidence by the State, and in consequence by the law makers, in the public un-
dertakings operating in the utilities sector. The State might be afraid the proce-
instance its specific rules end when the dialogue sta~e is concluded. As article 204 remits to the rules of the
restricted procedure, one must check in the respective section of the Public Contracts Code on what rules
are applicable after finishing the dialogue. As no rules are to be found there one must then hop to the rules
on the open procedure which, in the end, are the applicable rules to the procedure after the dialogue has
been concluded.
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dure might be misused by those contracting authorities, while at the same time
wanting to keep access to it when procuring in the utilities sectors.
The single lawyer supporting the current draft said that the utilities sector had
specific requirernentst" and competitive dialogue was not suited to address those
requirements.
(4) Conclusion
Of all the topics of research focused upon during the interviews, the grounds for
use are probably the most important as respondents' views shed light directly on
the reasons why competitive dialogue is having seldom use in Portugal.t'" We
have previously seen that the grounds for use were drafted with the aim of limit-
ing the use. From the data gathered there is a clear trend across respondents of
interpreting them narrowly, arguably more narrowly than in Directive 2004118. It
is the author's belief that these two factors are key to explain the lack of use of
the procedure in Portugal at this stage. Furthermore, the fact experts such as the
lawyers interviewed are dearly interpreting the grounds narrowly may cascade
down to the the entities they advise (either private or public) thus potentially en-
larging the effect detected here.t"
In addition, it could be that contracting authorities considering the use of the
competitive dialogue procedure are perceiving its use as heightening risks such as
judicial review and opting not to take their chances.
However, contracting authorities that have actually used the procedure have had
no problems in considering their situation warranted the use of the procedure.
459. No actual specific requirement was pointed by the interviewee.
460.It will be discussed in more detail in the section 15hereunder, in conjunction with the other factors that
may be at play. .
461. This is not to say the author believes clients will follow lawyers advice blindly, but that they will take
them into consideration in their decision making process.
Finally, the decision taken by the law makers to exclude the use of competitive
dialogue in the utilities sector - albeit smaller in scope than anticipated at the
start - adds further difficulties to the use of the procedure in Portugal.
4. Contract value estimation
(r) Introduction
Article 208/2 of the Public Contracts Code imposes that any contract notice for
projects tendered under competitive dialogue.t" irrespectively of estimated price,
has to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This article, it
may be argued, thus mandates the contracting authority to estimate the value of
the contract to tender by competitive dialogue. This issue had not originally been
included by the author in the interview guide and was first raised by a respondent
at the very end of the first round of interviews in October 2009.
b)Data
Respondents were asked if they thought this rule was mandatory. The answers
collected indicate that the nature of this rule463 is not clear in the Portuguese law.
Four respondents have clearly stated it is not mandatory and offered evidence of
open or restricted procedures where a value was not given at the start of the
procedure.464
462. If it is a public works, public works concession, goods (including renting) or services. Services
concessions and public-private partnerships appear not to be covered by this obligation.
463 This rule is similar to what can be found for the other procedures, thus allowing respondents to draw on
their actual experience with the open or restricted procedure, for instance.
464. However, for budget purp?ses and ~xpense ~ut~orisati.o~ the c<?ntracting authori~ may have to come
u internally with a val~e. For. mstanc~, If a service m a M~mstry thinks a ~on~ract win ~~ more expensive
t~an the threshold its director ISauthonsed to spend, they will need to clear It With the Minister.
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Regarding competitive dialogue, four respondents suggested that defining a price
at the start depended on circumstances, thus reinforcing the idea that it is not a
straightforward mandatory obligation to define a number at that point. For these
interviewees, the most appropriate moment to define a valeu would be when the
technical specifications are drafted at the end of the dialogue stage, which is the
analogous moment to the start of the open and restricted procedures.
It was said that the rule, if mandatory, made sense as giving a ballpark figure for
both the contracting authority and the companies to aim for.4°, However, for
competitive dialogue in some cases - mainly when the contracting authority does
not know the technical solution - it is impossible to establish a value in
(3) Conclusion
Apart from the fact there is considerable doubt on the validity of the claim of the
mandatory nature of establishing a value of the contract from the outset, no clear
trends could be identifiable. If establishing a starting ballpark figure may be con-
sidered helpful to focus the candidates on producing solutions within certain bud-
getary constraints, it was counter-argued that in some cases setting a limit at the
start of the procedure may be simply impossible due to the fact the contracting
authority has simply no idea about it.
Analyzing the notices of competitive dialogue procedures posted on the Tenders
Electronic Daily website, it is possible to see that only two of the four competi-
465. This was suggested by two respondents, since there could be excellent ideas to solve the contracting
authority's need but are simply too expensive.
466.1t can be argued, however, that stating a maximum cap on what the contracting authority is wiDing to
spend may force the candidates to offer solutions that fit within the budget available.
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tive dialogue procedures launched in Portugal there advertised have an estimated
price.
s.Payment of solutions
(I) Introduction
In article 206/I of the Public Contracts Code, as in article 29/8 of Directive
2oo41I8, contracting authorities may specify prices or payments to be made to
candidates. This option has to be expressly included in the contract notice or de-
scriptive document.
b)Data
This topic is another area where a clear trend has been observed. All respondents
but one have supported that paying for solutions is a positive incentive to
prospective candidates and would encourage competition among firms. This was
observed across both lawyers and contracting authorities who stated they sup-
ported these payments."? Furthermore, as developing detailed solutions is poten-
tially very expensive, this may help ease the financial burden. 12 even considered
the payments to be key to competitive dialogue's success by fostering participa-
tion and showing the market that the contracting authority is serious about the
contract and does not want to get consulting for free. Three remarked that the
payments may be helpful to reduce the potential for judicial review. Two suggest-
ed these payments would justify the acquisition of the rights of the best solution
that will end up in the technical specifications at the end of the dialogue stage.
467. One contracting aut..~ority remarked, h~wever, th~t it. supported the payments "in theory". In practice,
the interviewee argued, It would be very difficult to JUStify the extra cost and thought it would raise the
financial cost of the contract.
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The only differing view came from a lawyer who considered these payments to be
contrary to competition. To him, they hinder competition by not making candi-
dates as desperate to win the final contract as they would otherwise be.
In Portugal, payments to tenderers have been used a few times in the utilities sec-
tor with the open procedure with a negotiation phase. Traditionally, either a lim-
ited number of tenderers or the tenderers who present a tender within x% of the
winning bid are compensated for their efforts. Respondents who had a previous
direct experience with this system have all sided with the positive view on the
topic.
A respondent stated that contrary to the open procedure with a negotiation
phase, the leading candidate should get paid for his efforts, since when the techni-
cal specifications are drafted, one does not know the identity of the winning bid-
der. It can be the case that who provides the solution ends up losing the contract
to another tenderer who puts in a more favourable bid. If he were not compensat-
ed for developing the solution then it would be a double blow for this company.
In the few situations where competitive dialogue was actually used, however, con-
tracting authorities have never actually paid for the costs of developing solutions.
(3) Conclusion
A clear trend was identified in the data. Respondents in Portugal consider the
payment of solutions as positive to competitive dialogue. It must be stated how-
ever that, most of these respondents were talking without a previous experience
of paying for solutions.t"
468. Only two of the contracting authorities interviewed had paid for them in the past in other procedures.
-162-
Highlighting the difference in perspective of the respondents, on the few situa-
tions where competitive dialogue was used, no contracting authority offered any
payment.
6. Assessment of the economic, technical orprofessional ability
of candidates
(I) Introduction
According to the Public Contracts Code (articles 167 through 188), Portuguese
contracting authorities can adopt one of two different methods to assess the eco-
nomic, technical or professional ability of prospective tenderers in all award pro-
cedures. Both simple and complex methods are available. As we have seen in
Chapter 6 these two methods are clearly distinct and may lead to different out-
comes when used on a competitive dialogue procedure. The complex method al-
lows for the limitation on the number of candidates, although it is more demand-
ing and may foster litigation by excluded candidates. The simple method is a
binary system where candidates are either approved or not and does not allow for
the number of candidates to be limited in advance.
b)Data
Interviewees were asked about which system they preferred and the perceived
qualities and shortcomings of both. No clear preference among respondents was
found. Eight think the complex model is more adequate. Six have stated a prefer-
ence for the simple model. Eight have said they had no preference for either.
The complex model was considered to allow the contracting authority more con-
trol over the procedure. It was argued by some it might lengthen the proce-
dure,"?' be too complex and a potential focus for judicial review as it implies the
exclusion of candidates. It was deemed particularly appropriate for scenarios
where a significant number of potential candidates was identified before the start
of the procedure, such as public works. The respondents who expressed a particu-
lar preference for this model said that it was more adequate to their perceived
complexity of competitive dialogue.
Some respondents have said the simple model was more adequate in specific
circumstances. For instance, when the pool of potential candidates is known in
advance to be small, such as in cutting edge technology contracts or sectors where
only a handful of known vendors operate. It was also argued by the respondents
who showed a preference for this model that the complex model may be wrongly
used (being too demanding for candidates) and lead to procedures without candi-
dates. However, the same interviewee considered an identical tightening of con-
ditions could happen with the simple procedure and that it had been used by con-
tracting authorities in the past.'?" Contracting authorities wary of excluding
candidates at an early stage of the procedure may also opt for this procedure to
reduce the risk of facing judicial review.
Two lawyers professed no preference for any of the models. They added the re-
mark that neither model was particularly tuned to the needs of competitive dia-
logue. For these respondent, the complex model was too cumbersome to use
while the simple model did not provide the level of control ve, limiting the num-
ber of participants in the dialogue) needed by the contracting authority. Further-
more, one suggested a hybrid model blending characteristics of the two, that is a
469. In comparison with the simple model.
470. A different interviewee quoted an example he knew first hand of a tender where the conditions were. so
demanding a well known Portuguese company expected to comply with was found to not meet the specific
financial requirements set forth by the contracting authority.
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sufficiently simple system that still allowed the contracting authorities to limit
the number of candidates.
In practice, the three contracting authorities applying competitive dialogue inter-
viewed have all followed the simple model to assess the economic, technical or
professional ability of candidates. They alleged that the number of prospective
candidates that might be interested in their project was small. One also said he
did not want to risk any potential litigation by excluded candidates if they had
used the complex system.
(3) Conclusion
Regarding this issue, although no particular trend was identified, the interviews
produced interesting insight. We have seen that the answers can be divided into
three groups: preference for the complex model, preference for the simple model,
no preference whatsoever. We have also seen some reserves or perceived draw-
backs of either method of assessing the economic, technical or professional abili-
ty of candidates. Both systems appear to be appropriate for specific situations
7.Evaluation of solutions
(d Introduction
The Public Contracts Code" contrary to Directive 2004118 (article 29/4) does not
have a provision for contracting authorities to exclude candidates or solutions
during the dialogue.?' However, it includes an evaluation phase before the start of
the dialogue stage. Article 21212 of the Public Contracts Code requires contract-
471. This difference will be discussed further down on section 10.
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ing authorities using competitive dialogue to assess the solutiorr'" presented by
each candidate before starting the discussions. This article sets the conditions un-
der which solutions can be excluded. Of the four conditions established, three are
simply formal and only the last one is substantial. Under this last condition, solu-
tions can be excluded if they are deemed "manifestly inadequate" by the contract-
ing authority.
b)Data
Nine respondents considered the evaluation of solutions at the start of the dia-
logue as a positive introduction by the Portuguese law makers, bringing flexibility
to the procedure, especially bearing in mind the impossibility of excluding during
the dialogue.
Six interviewees, including two contracting authorities, thought this was a nega-
tive innovation and that it may open the door to judicial review. For them this
would add complexity to the procedure and be a possible point of contention.
Furthermore, as the only substantial condition is extremely vague, it may lead to
abuse by contracting authorities.
Itwas expressed by three lawyers that this will probably be an uncontentious ca-
pability that will be rarely used. Two have remarked this resembles a similar pos-
sibility available for other procedures that, after a period of extensive use, con-
tracting authorities no longer use. However, a respondent remarked that if used,
courts would find it difficult to assess the legality as the exclusion is based on an
indeterminate concept and left to the contracting authority to make its own judg-
ment over the adequacy of the solution.
472. Candidates are limited to presenting a single solution only. This issue will be discussed further down on
section 8.
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Apart from two contracting authorities that have expressed a negative view, all of
the remaining have not voiced any opinion on this issue.
Two of the contracting authorities that have used the procedure have not used
this feature. One of them said the thought never crossed their mind whereas the
other asked how could a contracting authority decide at that point if a solution or
was not manifestly adequate.
(3) Conclusion
From the data gathered it appears the jury is still out regarding if this is a positive
or a negative addition by Portuguese lawmakers. It remains to be seen in practice
if the fear of having judicial review due to exclusions at this point shown by some
interviewees is indeed real or not.
8. Single solution
(r) Introduction
Directive 2oo41I8 does not have any express rules on the number of solutions
each candidate can present to the dialogue. The Public Contracts Code (article
210/2) has taken a different approach, setting a limit of a single solution for candi-
dates to present at the start of the dialogue. This single solution is the one being
assessed at the start of the dialogue stage.
(2)Data
Interviewees were asked what they thought about this option by the Portuguese
law makers. 13 respondents, including two contracting authorities that have used
the procedure, have answered with mainly negative comments, showing dissatis-
faction with the legal draft, considering it a potential limitation to the creativity
of candidates.t" Some of the words used by respondents with a negative outlook
were very strong. One said this amounted to perverting the logic of the whole
idea of competitive dialogue. Two others said simply it was an "absurd" option
and a "stupidity" by law makers.
Important nuances were, however present and should be mentioned. Five inter-
viewees considered it as a positive introduction. Three deemed it as a way to fo-
cus the dialogue, avoiding the spreading of resources (both public and private>
across multiple solutions that needed discussion and development. Three suggest-
ed it would reduce transaction costs of the procedure by having the candidates
develop only the solution they consider most feasible.
(3) Conclusion
We have seen from the data gathered that there is a strong body of respondents
considering this innovation of the Portuguese law makers as bringing more harm
than benefit. Having said this, the ideas of helping the dialogue be focused and
reducing the transaction costs for all the parties involved have their merits. Fur-
thermore, since it is impossible to exclude candidates or solutions during the dia-
logue itself in Portugal, having a single solution that can be assessed at the start of
the stage seems to be the only way for the contracting authority to exclude
solutions.
473. One contractin~ authority said it had happened in the past in open procedures. where ~ariants were
admitted that the winning tender came from the variants and that in his experience having vanants had led
to a better contract in the end.
-168 -
9·1)etailo~solutions
(r) Introduction
Further to the issue of candidates only being able to present a single solution and
having that solution evaluated at the start of the dialogue, one of the lawyers in-
terviewed in October 2009 suggested a practical problem was the level of detail
solutions are to provide. This is not a rule expressly provided by the Public Con-
tracts Code but is a logical requirement to define as the solutions are going to be
evaluated at the start of the dialogue (to assess if they are not "manifestly inade-
quate") and also at the end of the dialogue stage. The lawyer was particularly wor-
ried with: i) what should be the level of detail in the solutions; ii) if it could have
variants/sub-solutions; iii) have proprietary elements.f" This is an interesting
point that had not originally been considered by the author. It can be added that
it raises issues connected eventually with the need of demanding a similar level of
detail from candidates when submitting their preliminary solution for evaluation
and also during the dialogue stage to ensure the compliance with the principle of
equal treatment and the non-discriminatory rules of article 214 of the Public Con-
tracts Code.
Interviewees were asked three questions. The first was about the level of detail in
the solutions. The second was on the admissibility of having variants/sub-solu-
tions. The third was on the possibility of a solution having proprietary elements.
474. The interviewee suggested an example where.a candidate would suggest a financing model that only he
could provide. Without going Into too m~ch detail as to aVOIdbreaching the confidentiality agreement, the
scenarro included the financing model being dependent on the candidate leveraging existing relationships
with the contracting authority.
b)Data
Regarding the about the level of detail in the solutions the answers did not pro-
vide a clear indication of a trend. Interviewees were puzzled by the question, and
in hindsight that could be expected as it is not a legal question (in the sense it is
addressed in legislation) but something more practical that only experience may
provide an answer for.
Regarding the admissibility of having variants/sub-solutions, four respondents
have said variants and sub-solutions were admissible, but only for the dialogue
stage. They considered it would be beneficial for the purposes of the procedure to
give candidates some flexibility to provide variants or sub-solutions. No intervie-
wees said it was not possible to have sub-solutions or variants during the dialogue
stage.
No clear trend was found regarding the possibility of a solution having proprie-
tary elements.
(3) Conclusions
The appropriate level of detail in the solutions seems to be a practical issue that is
not possible to assess fully through empirical research without actual experience
in the country. The data has produced a slight indication that candidates may
offer sub-solutions or variants during the dialogue itself, but not at the start of
the dialogue stage when the single solution is to be assessed by the contracting
authority.
IO. Impossibility of excluding candidates or solutions during
• 1'70•
the dialogue stage
(I) Introduction
According to article 29/4 of Directive 2004118, contracting authorities are al-
lowed to define in either the contract notice or descriptive document the possi-
bility of conducting the dialogue in successive stages in order to reduce the num-
ber of candidates or solutions. The Public Contracts Code does not allow for that
in Portugal. In this country, all candidates with a solution admitted to the dia-
logue stage?" have to be invited to participate in the dialogue stage.
Furthermore, although the Portuguese law does not allow for the exclusion of
candidates or solutions, it does not forbid the possibility of the contracting au-
thority and candidates reaching an agreement to stop developing a solution.
b)Data
A clear trend was observable with 12 of the respondents exposing a critical view of
the limitation. It was argued that it rendered the dialogue more complex as the
contracting authority might be forced to discuss with a reasonable number of
candidates and could not focus on the more promising solutions. Furthermore, it
was also argued that without having the fear of being discarded during the dia-
logue, candidates may not feel pressed to present their best effort.
It must be said though that a minority - four lawyers - supported the decision
made by the Portuguese law makers. One of the respondents stated that allowing
for the exclusion of candidates would make the contracting authority produce a
report on its decision which would have to include valuations of not only the ex-
475- In other words that has not been excluded on formal grounds or because being "manifestly inadequate"
at the preliminary evaluation.
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eluded solution but all the others. This would make the contracting authority
evaluate the other solutions during the dialogue. It would imply also having to
hear the excluded candidate as per the national law, thus leading to more delays
and potentially to litigation.
Another lawyer stated that the Portuguese market is too small and the number of
potential candidates limited for this limitation to be of any relevance.
Interviewees were also asked about their views on the possibility of the contract-
ing authority and the candidate reaching an agreement during the dialogue stage
to stop developing the solution. A significant number of 12 respondents consid-
ered it possible and legal. Further to this point, article 216 of the Public Contracts
Code states the need for the contracting authority to invite all the candidates
which had their solution admitted to the dialogue. Of those 12, eight considered
that the candidate had to be invited to present a tender.:"
(3) Conclusions
Two clear trends could be identified regarding the exclusions of candidates during
the dialogue. Firstly, there is a wide negative take on the decision of the Por-
tuguese law makers for not allowing the exclusion of candidates. Secondly, there
is a similar level of support for the possibility of the contracting authority and the
candidate reaching an agreement to stop the development of a solution during
the dialogue stage.
476. Two considered the agreement to amount to a self exclusion, thus implying the candidate was turning
down the possibility of presenting a tender.
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II. Confidentiality
b) Introduction
Article 29/3 of Directive 2oo4!I8 states that the contracting authority may not re-
veal to other candidates a solution or piece of information that has been trans-
mitted with reserve of confidentiality. Article 214/3 of the Public Contracts Code
includes a similar rule."? How to treat confidentiality within competitive dialogue
in the Public Contracts Code is of special importance as after the end of the dia-
logue the contracting authority will have to create common technical specifica-
tions for the final tenders. Therefore, confidentiality mayor may not have impli-
cations further down the procedure after the dialogue stage.
Confidentiality of solutions presented by candidates and the content of discus-
sions with the contracting authority - along with the grounds for use and the draft
of the common specifications - was one of the most contentious issues during
the interviews held in Portugal. A lot of interview time was spent around this
issue.
Interviewees were asked about the characteristics of confidentiality and their
views on it. They were also asked if the rules of article 66 of the Public Contracts
Code on the confidentiality of tenders could have been an alternative solution to
the confidentiality problern.t" Finally, a subset of interviewees with experience in
the utilities sector was also asked about their actual experience with problems of
confidentiality in that sector. In the first round of interviews in October 2009 the
author also asked if confidentiality could be excluded at the start of the dialogue
as a condition of participation in the procedure.
477. With a further reference to the need <;>fauthorisation to be given in writing. .
478. This does no~ m<:an the curr<:nt Public C~>nt.racts Code draft a~comJ_llodat~s such a view. The question
was asked in anticipation as a possible alternative In the case the law IS reviewed In the future.
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(2) Data: confidentiality as currently set inthe national law
The author was unable to identify a clear trend regarding a common interpreta-
tion of confidentiality as set in the Public Contracts Code. Relevant ideas were
floated by the interviewees, but scattered in many different directions without a
unifying theme. The most important information may be the importance given to
confidentiality by interviewees and the fact it was one of the most discussed
items in the interview guide and is seen as a major issue without a clear interpre-
tation to overcome legal insecurity.
Most of the interviewees considered confidentiality to be important within the
procedure but were at odds on how to interpret its characteristics. Responses
were widely varied. They ranged from a respondent considering that the contract-
ing authority had the possibility of vetoing the classification of confidentiality set
by a candidate,"? to confidentiality not ending at all for the elements deemed as
confidential by a candidate that had not been transposed to the common set of
specifications.
Six interviewees offered a view that can be categorized as a functional interpreta-
tion of confidentiality. For these respondents, confidentiality shall be kept only
for the period it makes sense (ie, the dialogue stage) and afterwards only for the
information that actually needs to be considered confidential, that is, all the in-
formation deemed confidential that has not been included in the common set of
specifications. Two lawyers said it should be maintained until the end of the pro-
cedure. Itmust be mentioned though that one of the respondents considered this
to be far from optimal as it only benefits whomever has the solutionis) that end
479. As it is the case for the tenders, as per article 66 of the Public Contracts Code. However, it seems
difficult to sustain that article 214/3 supports this interpretation.
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up in the common set of specifications by giving this candidate more time to pre-
pare its tender. Others considered that confidentiality simply had to end at the
closing of the dialogue stage or else the procedure just did not make sense.
Only one lawyer said he liked how confidentiality had been dealt in the national
law and that no changes were needed. However, when asked to make compatible
his opinion with the common sef of specifications and his support for cherry
picking of elements from different solutions he stated that the compatibility
would depend on the specific circumstances of the situation.
A lawyer offered a thoughtful opinion on the topic, suggesting article 214/3 to be
almost unnecessary. In his view, the general law regulating administrative proce-
dures (Decree-Law 442/91, with subsequent changes) implies that all information
transmitted to an administrative body (such as a contracting authority) has to be
considered confidential until the end of an administrative procedure.r" Said
lawyer added that he interpreted the rules of article 21412, which forbid discrim-
inatory treatment of candidates, as including a non-explicit protection of confi-
dentiality. This lawyer, however, suggested that contracting authorities should in-
clude in the tender documents a rule stating that any information transmitted
during the procedure (including information deemed as confidential) could be
used to create the common set of specifications. The same lawyer put forward
another interesting question: what is the consequence if confidentiality is violat-
ed? Can it affect the validity of the contract or gives right only to a compensation
for damages?
One of the contracting authorities that have used competitive dialogue has opted
to consider all the information transmitted during the meetings as confidential.
Another said confidentiality should only cover the author of the solution and not
480. Procurement procedures in Portugal have the nature of an administrative procedure.
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the technical data itself, particularly when that technical data is not exclusive to
that candidate.
(3) Data: could the rules on secrecy of article 66 have been a viable
alternative?
The author asked interviewees if the rules of article 66 of the Public Contracts
Code could be a viable alternative. A slight majority (five agains three) considered
this to be a more balanced approach but others have rejected it outright as it does
not cover all the interests that may warrant protection under the confidentiality
clause now in place.
(4) Data: actual experience inthe utilities sector
As the author had the opportunity to interview five lawyers and three contracting
authorities who had experience operating in the utilities sector, where the open
procedure with a negotiation phase-" has been extensively used for more than 10
years, he asked if confidentiality was ever a problem in those procedures. Al-
though the situations are not identical, as in the dialogue a solution is being dis-
cussed whereas in the open procedure with a negotiation phase the tender is the
object of the discussions, the author thought they had enough similarities (inter-
ests by candidates/tenderers to protect their commercial secrets and competitive
advantages of their solutionlbid) to justify a question about their particular expe-
rience with confidentiality in the open procedure with a negotiation phase. All in-
terviewees stated that confidentiality was not a deal breaker issue in this proce-
dure with it being asked for rarely. In fact, collectively only two cases of a
481. In this procedure, tenderers present their tenders and the two hest classified are invited to further
negotiate their terms with the contracting authority.
confidentiality request were mentioned, one of them in a purchase of hard mili-
tary equipment.
(s) Data: exclusion of confidentiality at the start of the dialogue
In the interviews this question was asked, there was a clear responses" that the
rules in article 214/3 of the Public Contracts Code are mandatory and thus cannot
be put aside in the contract notice or descriptive document. In face of this posi-
tion, subsequent interviews were focused on the the remaining issues related with
confidentiality.
(6) Conclusion
The data gathered has shown that confidentiality is a contentious issue for the in-
terviewees at this point, without a clear indication on how its rules should be in-
terpreted. It raises a number of questions (such as its scope or duration) that are
still to be fully answered. This state of affairs contributes to the legal uncertainty
surrounding competitive dialogue, and may be a factor dissuading contracting au-
thorities from using it.
I2. Common set of specifications
(r) Introduction
The Public Contracts Code states that at the end of the dialogue stage, the con-
tracting authority shall identify the best solution to meet its needs and then pro-
ceed to draft a common set of technical specifications. The tenders of all candi-
482. Although two interviewees accepted it could be legal as long as the rules were clear at the stan.
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dates that have participated in the discussions will then be based on these
common specifications and not the solutions they had heen discussing with the
contracting authority.
The issue of the common set of specifications and its implications for competi-
tive dialogue was one of the most contentious topics of the interviews held in
Portugal. It was also the topic on which most time was spent during the
interviews.
Interviewees were probed about their opinion on how the common set of specifi-
cations was to be drafted, ie with elements of only one solution or with pans of
different solutions. They were also asked how it could be compatible with possi-
ble patent or intellectual property issues or if they thought it would adversely im-
pact competition. The author asked them to agree or disagree with the possibility
of having a "minimal" or vague set of specifications or alternative specifications
tailor made to each candidate (assuming the solutions were comparable).
b)Data: possibility of cherry picking parts of different solutions
A trend in responses can be identified (with important deviations): 15 of the re-
spondents, including two contracting authorities have used the procedure, have
said clearly that cherry-picking of solutions to create the specifications is accept-
able, even though the Public Contracts Code states that the "best solution" must
be identified at the end of the dialogue. Respondents said the procedure made no
sense if the contracting authority could not create the best framework to have
tenders on. Furthermore, if the technical specifications reflected only the best so-
lution, the other candidates would lose out and probably feel a decision had been
already made about who would end up winning the contract.
Three respondents have said, though, that cherry-picking was illegal since the
Public Contracts Code makes the contracting authority identify the best solution
to fulfill its needs. If allowed, cherry-picking would render this legal imposition
useless. Furthermore, for one of these respondents (a contracting authority) it
could also jeopardise competition, by sending the wrong messages to prospective
candidates that may decide then not to participate at all in the dialogue.
Two interviewees stated that while they did not know if cherry picking was legal
or illegal, they rhetorically challenged anyone to use it as they felt it would in-
crease the risk of a judicial review and problems with the Audit Court.
As a way to bring flexibility into this phase of the procedure, two interviewees
have suggested the possibility of drafting regular technical specifications but with
the possibility of tenderers submitting variant bids.
<.J) Data: patents, intellectual property and trade secrets
Regarding solutions eventually protected by patent or intellectual property laws,
no identifiable trend was found apart from an obvious preoccupation by the re-
spondents with this issue. They were aware of this possibility and worried about
its implications. Two lawyers raised the question of what should happen if at the
end of the dialogue stage a preferred solution is found but due to the aforemen-
tioned patent issues only one candidate can actually implement it. Can the con-
tract be awarded directly without competition? The Public Contracts Code in its
article 24h(b) only allows the transition from a competitive dialogue to the direct
award procedure if all tenders (though not the solutions) have been excluded. In
the same article 24 however, paragraph I(e), if only an entity can perform a con-
tract, then awarding the contract directly is possible. The respondents have
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stopped short of going to the point of stating this last paragraph should be the
way out.
Two other interviewees suggested that whatever was put forward by candidates in
their solution had to be considered as licensed by the company for the purposes
of drafting technical specifications. The interviewee linked this to the payment of
solutions and especially the payment to the developer of the winning solution.
They also suggested stating in the contract notice or descriptive document this li-
censing as to make clear the rules of the game.
<,.) Data: vague technical specifications
Regarding this possibility, no identifiable trend was found, with answers falling at
either end of the scale: possible or impossible (illegal). The same happened with
the possibility of having alternative technical specifications tailor made for each
solution discussed during the dialogue. At this stage the most important point to
make is that not only respondents were aware of the issues raised by having a
common set of specifications but that they were also interested in discussing
ideas to overcome those issues.
(5) Data: identifying awinning solution
Two of the contracting authorities that have used competitive dialogue said that
the need to identify a winning solution at the end of the dialogue stage raised
practical problems. In particular, respondents were worried on how (and also
why) to choose a "best" solution when faced with very similar solutions. Further-
more, they suggested that choosing one solution might alienate the other candi-
dates and lead to reduced competition at the tender stage.
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(6) Conclusions
The option by the Portuguese law makers to make mandatory the drafting of
common technical specifications at the end of the dialogue stage proved polaris-
ing. Many respondents think the national law allows for the possibility of the
cherry picking of solutions to draft those technical specifications. However, legal
risks appear to be associated with this option.
Furthermore, the common technical specifications raised doubts in the respon-
dents on how to deal with eventual patents, intellectual property or trade secrets
contained in the winning solutions.
One of the risks the common technical specifications raise in Portugal is that, al-
though the contracting authority will have to identify a winning solution at the
end of the dialogue stage, the fact that a common set of specifications has to be
drafted, may entice the contracting authority to cherry pick even during the dia-
logue stage and guide the candidates to develop solutions ever more similar.
IJ. Lack of a stage tofine tune tenders
(r) Introduction
According to article 29/6 of Directive 2004118, it is possible for the contracting
authority to request clarifications, further specifications or the fine-tuning of ten-
ders before the preferred bidder is selected. The Public Contracts Code however,
does not include a similar provision and only allows for the contracting authority
to request limited information about the tender, as it could do for any other
procedure.
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It was explained to interviewees that the Directive 2004118 allowed for such a
phase and then asked if they thought this stage would be useful in competitive di-
alogue procedure and what were the benefits or disadvantages of having it.
b)Data
A clear trend was identified with 14 of the respondents, including two contracting
authorities that have used competitive dialogue procedure, stating it made no
sense to exclude such a phase. In a procedure where the exact content of a con-
tract was unclear, the contracting authority should have access to all the help it
could have, including discussing elements of the tenders before the selection of a
preferred bidder. It was also strongly stated that the contracting authority would
benefit more from this phase than tenderers.
A minority of interviewees has defended a different view. Seven respondents'"
have stated strongly that in practice this possibility of suggesting changes to the
tenders at this stage would entail opening a door to abuse and contracting author-
ities could use it to nudge contracts to a firm of their liking.t'" One of these inter-
viewees considered that admitting changes at this stage would violate the princi-
ple of tender stability.
Of the respondents with practical experience in the field of public-private part-
nerships, it is worth noting though that two lawyers argued about the existence of
a practice in that field of asking for changes to tenders after they had been
submitted.
No respondent made any reference to article 72 of the Public Contracts Code
that includes the possibility of the contracting authority requesting further infor-
483. Only one from a contracting authority.
484. One suggested it would be similar to having negotiations.
-Ib-
mation from the tenderers, but not changes to feature of the tender or to bring a
non-compliant tender into compliance.
(3) Conclusion
From the data one can argue that there is a strong criticism to the decision taken
by the law makers to exclude the possibility given in article 29/6 of Directive
2oo4!I8 to have some tuning of tenders before choosing the preferred bidder. A
minority was quite vocal in defending the opposing view, considering this a wel-
come change. In addition, no respondent mentioned article 72 of the Public Con-
tracts Code.
:14.Stage to request clarificationsfrom thepreferred bidder
(r) Introduction
Article 29/7 of Directive 2oo4!I8 includes the possibility of the contracting au-
thority requesting further clarifications or the confirmation of commitments con-
tained in the tender as long as substantial aspects are not changed. The Public
Contracts Code does not have a specific rule for competitive dialogue. It has,
however, a general rule in article 99 valid for all procedures where multiple ten-
ders have been evaluated. This rule appears to be similar to the one found on arti-
cle 29/7, albeit with some further refinements regarding the limitations of what
can be discussed at this stage. According to the national law, changes to the ten-
der need to be grounded in the public interest and cannot include anything
present in another tenderer's bid or one the technical specifications. Respondents
were asked about what they thought could be done on this phase.
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b)Data
No clear trend in how respondents interpreted this rule could be identified. Four
respondents have considered that this phase allowed for the for the confirmations
of previous commitments to be done (as specified in the law). They focused the
possibilities of discussions on financial and insurance-like issues. One contracting
authority was adamant that the so called "financial closing" held at this stage had
been misused in the past and could continue so in the future. He stated in clear
terms that banks would strong arm the contracting authority and the tenderer to
transform clauses that were mandatory in the technical specifications in simple
statements of intentions.t"
Five interviewees, including two contracting authorities that have used the proce-
dure, considered the scope for alterations to be very small at this stage. Only mi-
nor points, or simple adjustments that do not violate the principle of competi-
tion, should be brought up for discussion. As an example, a respondent suggested
the confirmation of previous bank commitments. Another interviewee, on the
other hand, said the parties could discuss everything as long as it was not covered
by the tenders, award criteria and technical specifications.
Finally, another respondent considered that the parties could discuss anything
they were allowed to change during the performance of the contract. In his view,
this stage was nothing more than the anticipation of the unilateral powers of
mandating changes to the contract awarded in specific cases to the contracting
authority.
485. The interviewee provided anecdotal evidence drawn from his experience. Furthermore, at the end of
2009 the Portuguese Audit Court refused to vouch for 6 highway contracts tendered by means of an open
and restricted procedure because banks aggravated the financing terms between the first and the final
tenders leading to more onerous contracts.
(3) Conclusion
It was not possible to identify a trend in this topic. Maybe with actual practice of
the procedure it will be able to assess the usefulness of this stage and the ways it
is actually used.
I5. Potential reasonsfor the lack of use
(I) Introduction
Bearing in mind the limited use of competitive dialogue in Portugal.t" one of the
most pressing questions was to know why it had not been used more. The reasons
herewith exposed are grounded in the findings from the interviews carried and
the author's own interpretation of the data gathered.
This section is divided on various paragraphs, each addressing one potential rea-
son behind the lack of use of the procedure in the country. Sub-section (I) deals
with the relationship between competitive dialogue and public-private partner-
ship contracts in Portugal. Sub-section (2) looks into the limited grounds of use of
the procedure in the country. Sub-section (3)exposes other legal uncertainties. In
sub-section (4) one can find the cultural issues potentially involved. Finally, sub-
section (5)suggests lack of information may be a factor at play too.
(2) Inadequacy for public-private partnership contracts
One of the areas where competitive dialogue was most expected to be used was
the sector of transport, in particular for the construction of Trans-European Net-
486. Only five times so far, as mentioned in section 2 of this Chapter.
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works"? and public-private partnerships.t" These may be done with different
sorts of involvement from private parties, with them providing finance, for in-
stance. In Portugal a legal framework regulating public-private partnerships is in
force since 2003.489 This legal regime was considered by interviewees as unaffect-
ed by the Public Contracts Code.
The author interviewed five lawyers and four contracting authorities that operate
in the utilities sector. These, along with two other lawyers, have extensive experi-
ence with the use of public-private partnerships as configured in the national law.
The author inquired about their view on competitive dialogue being used for ten-
dering public-private partnerships contracts. A very clear trend was identified
with all but one of the respondents saying that it was not appropriate for three
main reasons. First and foremost (only for the utilities sector), contracting au-
thorities may tender by using an open procedure with a negotiation phase since
the 1990S and are happy with it and the results it produces. Under this procedure,
the specifications are defined at the start (as in any other procedure) and tenders
submitted according to those specifications. The two best classified tenderers are
then invited for a negotiation phase to further refine their bids. Respondents
have clearly stated this procedure caters well for the contracting authorities'
needs'?" and also that private parties are used to it.
Secondly, the public-private partnerships law states that the contracting authority
must compare the cost of doing the project with public or with private funding
and can only use a public-private partnership if it is more economic to do so. For
the respondents this forecloses the possibility of using competitive dialogue to
487. According to Recital 31 of Directive 2004h8 and Commission, Explanatory note - competitive dialogue -
classicdirective {Z005).
488. According also to Ibid. and Commission, Commission interpretative communication on the application of
Community (zo08) P.4-5.
489. Decree-Law 8612003, altered by the Decree-Law 14112006). .
490.0ne even said they are getting more and more streamlined and standardised as time goes by, WIth
negotiations covering less and less ground.
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tender public-private partnership contracts as it implies knowing in advance what
to do and how to do it, be it at the technical, legal or financial level.491
Thirdly, in specific sectors where the State has traditionally operated, such as wa-
ter, electricity, road or rail, there is a still a wealth of technical knowledge in con-
tracting authorities, both in the State {Ministries}and public undertakings.
One of the respondents of this subgroup has expressed a different opinion. Ac-
cording to this interviewee, this alleged capability is a "myth" and pointed to the
decision on the location of the new Lisbon airporr'" and the fact no one has ever
built a high speed train line in Portugal. This respondent and another have sug-
gested the use of the competitive dialogue procedure for public-private partner-
ships contracts.
(3) Limited grounds for use and restrictive interpretation
As we have seen in section 3 above, eight interviewees have expressly pointed to
the limits of the grounds for use when asked why it was not being used more.
However, when respondents were asked on how the grounds for use should be in-
terpreted, 14 considered that the use of the procedure should be exceptional and
a further two that the grounds for use were limited. That is to say, a higher num-
ber is actually interpreting the conditions for the use of the procedure restrictive-
ly than the ones who connect their interpretation to the question of why is not
being used more. Therefore, although only eight respondents pointed to the
grounds for use as a reason for the lack of use, their implication in the current
491. Kirkby, '0 dialogo concorrencial' in Estudos da Contratarao PUblica - I (Coimbra Editora, :woS) has
expressed a different view, however.
492. It was originally set to be ~uilt at Ota, some 5okm~ north o~ Lisbon by studies carried in-house by the
Government. Later studies earned and sponsored by pnvate parties have shown that an alternative location
{Alcochete, on the Tagu~ ~outh bank} ~ould b~ ~ore beneficial .. A~ter intense pressure the Government
ended up changing its deCISIOnand the arrport will In the end be built In A1cochete.
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lack of use may be more widespread since 16 have said the procedure had an ex-
ceptional nature or the grounds for use were limited.
For the author, it is very clear that the mainstream interpretation of the grounds
of use is that they are exceptional and competitive dialogue should be used in very
specific cases only. In other words, for Portuguese lawyers and contracting au-
thorities, competitive dialogue use, due to its own design, has to be limited. This
finding dovetails with data gathered by the author in three interviews held with
people involved with the draft of the Public Contracts Code about competitive
dialogue. The author was told that the grounds of use were more restrictive than
those found in Directive 2oo4!I8 on purpose. They wanted to restrict its use in
Portugal to a bare minimum,"? due to a fear of corruption or foul play by con-
tracting authorities.!" Not only are the actual numbers extremely limited in the
almost two years the Public Contracts Code has been in force, but the prevailing
view in the leading procurement lawyers and the contracting authorities inter-
viewed is that competitive dialogue has very narrow grounds of use.
Furthermore, it may be the case that this interpretation may be connected with a
perceived risk of judicial review of using this procedure as mentioned hereunder
in subsection (5).
(4) Other legal uncertainties
Respondents have also cited a number of different issues at play that can be cate-
gorised as "legal uncertainties". In this category we can find issues related mainly
with confidentiality (how to ensure it, when or if to end it, what information to
493. Hence the already mentioned exclusion of its use by some contracting authorities in the utilities sector.
494.The author was also told that in one of the interim versions of the draft the competitive dialogue was
dropped. It was afterwards reinstated by political decision, since the Government felt the need to transpose
all the tools in Directive 2004/18's toolkit.
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transmit to candidates, to hand out or not minutes of meeting) and with the com-
mon set of specifications (how to draft them, with cherry-picking or with a single
solution).
Confidentiality was one of the most contentious issue during the interviews. Both
lawyers and contracting authorities expressed difficulties in explaining exactly its
characteristics and how to render it compatible with the need to draft a common
set of specifications. Furthermore, confidentiality is an opposing principle to the
principle of transparency that, for instance, mandates the need to debrief the los-
ing tenderers of the reasons why they lost the bid. Transparency is paramount in
the other types of procedures such as the open or restricted procedures. How can
a contracting authority sustain the decision to pick a solution as the best if it per-
ceives that parts of this solution or another are covered by confidentiality and
should not be transmitted to the remaining candidates?
Another point where many interviewees were not able to express a clear interpre-
tation was on the possibility of the contracting authority cherry picking parts of
different solutions when drafting the common set of specifications. Although the
possibility of cherry picking was admitted by the majority of respondents, the
fact the Public Contracts Code in its article 215 mandates the contracting author-
ity to identify the preferred solution may be creating a reasonable doubt in their
mind regarding what can or cannot be done.
These legal uncertainties remain unresolved through guidance, soft law, further
regulation, workshops or even actual practice in the country. We may be facing a
case of "when in doubt, do not use it".
(s) Perceived risk of judicial review
Perception of a potential judicial review risk by adopting the procedure may also
be influencing contracting authorities. As we have seen above in Chapter 5, access
to courts by aggrieved bidders looking for remedies is easy.
Contracting authorities and lawyers are unsure on the exact content of certain
rules pertaining to competitive dialogue in national law. This insecurity in inter-
pretation - and lack of practice or routine use - may also be leading interviewees
to consider that courts will face the same dilemma and thus have a chance of
adopting a different view. One lawyer challenged rhetorically anyone to be confi-
dent enough on a certain interpretation of the grounds of use to go through with
it and eventually face the courts. That is not to say the risk was expressly men-
tioned by many respondents, but from the interviews an "unspoken subtext" was
identified by the author that the answers given were perhaps hiding this risk.
Furthermore, some contracts are subject to ex-post review by the National Audit
Court. In late 2009, the National Audit Court ruled five concessions contracts
(tendered by the open procedure with a negotiated phase) where the price had
been revised upwards at the negotiation stage as illegal and refused to give its
agreement for the contract to be signed. This was widely reported in Portuguese
media at the time and some of the interviewees may have had this situation
present when being interviewed by the author.
(6) Cultural issues
Another category that has been appearing in the data can be classified as "cultural
issues". These are issues pertaining to the country that do not derive directly
from the law. In this category we find different issues such as the inertia of con-
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tracting authorities, traditionally used to order, lack of experience in negotiation,
the fact that it may be considered "shameful" for personnel in the contracting au-
thorities to publicly admit they do not know the best solution and thus need to
carry out a competitive dialogue and the lack of political marketing on behalf of
the procedure.
Firstly, regarding inertia of contracting authorities it can be said they have been
dealing with "particularly complex contracts" since procurement became regulat-
ed in the country'?' and have developed in house practices to deal with it that may
be difficult to overcome. As we have seen in Chapter 5, for public-private partner-
ships in the utilities sector contracting authorities have been using the open pro-
cedure with a negotiation phase and are happy with it. Contracting authorities
may not consider that they are launching tenders with insufficient detail or with-
out setting the best solution for its need as it is the only way they have practice of
doing. Furthermore, two lawyers said that contracting authorities when they do
not know how to draft the technical documents for a project usually consult some
companies off the record, perhaps where they know someone.r"
Secondly, contracting authorities are traditionally expected to decide, no to dis-
cuss or ask for help in defining the best solution for its needs. One must not for-
get the matrix of public administration is French!" and that for a long time there
was more knowledge and information on the public than on the private side.
Thirdly, contracting authorities do not tend to have a lot of experience in negoti-
ating. They are used to following very specific sets of rules that make clear to all
involved every step from the start to the finish of an award procedure.v" The au-
495. The problem of how to deal with particularly complex contracts was not born in 2004 with the
Directive 2004/18.
496. This goes in line with the author's previous experience in the country as well.
497. As we have seen in Chapter 5· .
498. The Public Contracts Code has 277 articles devoted to award procedures for a reason.
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thor was told that negotiating or even discussing with companies in the clear (as
would happen on a competitive dialogue procedure) is frowned upon and could be
seen as pandering to private interests or being accused of violating transparency
and equal treatment.
Fourthly, one of the most interesting cultural issues put forward by a respondent
(a lawyer) was that civil servants may frown upon having to publicly "confess" not
knowing the best solution for a need and have to openly request assistance from
private companies. This may be considered shameful and hard for them to ex-
plain to their superiors, who themselves may have superiors to respond to.. In a
sector - public administration - which is traditionally used and expected to order,
having to be humble and accept its own limitations may be hard to do.
Fifthly, a lawyer suggested competitive dialogue is lacking "political marketing"
and publicity as a viable procedure for particularly complex contracts. He has sug-
gested the political calendar in the last few years has not been kind for competi-
tive dialogue since both local and national elections were held in 2009 and the use
of the procedure (longer and for more complex contracts) is not attuned to
produce results in a short time frame.
(7) Lack of information
Finally, lack of information may be at play also. The author asked respondents if
they felt well informed about the procedure and if the amount of information
available was sufficient to allow for the use of competitive dialogue. Although the
overwhelming majority have answered "no" to the first question, one should not
read too much on this result as the way the question was posed can be considered
as an exercise in humility and respondents may have felt the "no" was the most
polite answer. The second question however has produced similar results with re-
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spondents stating that there was a lack of case studies, doctrinal work and work-
shops on the topic.?" They have also stated that in the numerous workshops and
seminars held about the Public Contracts Code competitive dialogue was not as
thoroughly addressed as other procedures. Furthermore, some have also stated
that in workshops competitive dialogue was "dismissed" as a procedure "not to
use".
(8) Conclusion
From the data gathered with the interviews it appears that a conjunction of fac-
tors may be involved in the lack of use of the procedure in this country. To the
author, while analysing the data, two categories have appeared to be more rele-
vant to explain the lack of use of competitive dialogue in Portugal than the rest:
the limited grounds for use and the restrictive interpretation being made by the
leading experts in the country amount to the most important factors in justifying
the lack of use. In addition to these two categories, the author also thinks a per-
ceived risk of judicial review by contracting authorities may be almost as impor-
tant as well. That is not to say they are the only ones or if they were the only fac-
tor the situation would remain the same. The author believes the other factors
unearthed by the research are also at play and should not be put aside.
I6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed in the detail the findings from the 27 interviews
carried out in Portugal. We found not only new issues not forecast in advance,
499. Mul!iple ~e~po~de~ts asked the author t~ submit them his findi~s an~, if pos~ible, to present his
research ID their msntunons, further compounding the need for more qualified information on the subject.
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such as how to deal with apparent need of estimating the contract value at the
start of the procedure, but we have also gathered insight relevant to the issues
presented in Chapter 6. From the data it appears that the draft of the grounds for
use was not only modified on purpose from what is on Directive 2004118 but that
experts in the field are also interpreting them restrictively. This, in the author's
view is the major cause to explain the lack of use of the procedure in Portugal, al-
though it is far from the only one.
Other issues from the implementation of competitive dialogue in Portugal appear
to be obvious, for instance, the way confidentiality is treated or the need to find a
winning solution at the end of the dialogue stage and draft a common set of
specifications.
Finally, it seems that the procedure in Portugal is to be run as an open or restrict-
ed procedure after the submission of tenders as the rules are identical for all
procedures.
After concluding the analysis of competitive dialogue in Portugal, the next chap-
ters will focus in Spain and the same structure (division in public procurement, le-
gal rules and finally findings from the empirical research stage chapters) will be
adopted.
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Chapter 8 - Public procurement inSpain
I. Introduction
Spain, as Portugal, has a long tradition in public procurement. It developed a de-
tailed legal framework to regulate procurement by the State long before acceding
to the EC in 1986. After accession, Spain kept updating its public procurement
legal framework, incorporating the required EU rules as they came into force.
The bulk of legislation applicable to public procurement in Spain at present is
contained in the Law on Public Sector Contracts (Law no 30/2007, October joth)
which transposes Directive 2004iI8.500This lawwas most recently updated in Au-
gust 2010 to accommodate the changes imposed by Directive 2007/66 (Remedies
Directive). Directive 2004iI7 on Utilities Sector procurement was transposed by
Law 31/2007 (October joth). The transposition of Directive 2009/81 on defence
and security procurement is still pending.
In the transposition of Directive 2004iI8, Spain opted to include the new com-
petitive dialogue procedure. Its legal analysis being deferred to the next chapter.
In this chapter we will provide an overview of the procurement legal framework
in Spain. The chapter will start with a short introduction on the country's admin-
istrative organisation, followed by a brief analysis of its procurement history and
concluding with a more detailed overview of the current Law on Public Sector
Contracts, focused on its innovations and particularities. As we will see, the Span-
ish law makers did not limit themselves to transposing the Directives 2004iI8 and
500. More than a year after the deadline set by the Directive itself. The Law on Public Sector Contracts has
been the object of several amendments by means of Royal Decree 81712009, Order of the Ministry of
Economics and Finance 349712009, Royal Decree-Law 612010, Royal Decree-Law 812010, Laws 1412010 and
I5hoIO and Law 3412010.
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2004117, but also included other innovations, some arising from CJEU's case law
and others specific to the country.
z. Administrative organisation of Spain
Before entering into the analysis of public procurement in Spain, both past and
present, a short introduction on the country's administrative organisation is need-
ed to frame and explain some of the options or content of Spanish laws on public
procurement. This will be focused solely on the current administrative division of
the country for its relevance to understanding the Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts in general, and competitive dialogue in particular.?"
With the approval of the current Constitution in 1978, during the transition from
Franco's regime to a democracy, the Spanish state was divided into autonomous
regions, each with legislative and executive powers, thus decentralising the ad-
ministration. No longer did it make sense to talk about the "public administra-
tion" (the State administration) but it was more correct to talk of "public admin-
istrations" (the State, Regional and Local administrations). ~02
Bearing in mind the administrative division of the country, the national parlia-
ment can enact laws which are applicable in all of Spain and the Regional parlia-
ments can approve laws enforceable only within each region. National laws can
include both rules directly applicable in all the country or what is called "basic
legislation", that is, legislation that may not regulate thoroughly an issue, leaving
to each Region a certain scope to detail and refine it. Regional Governments have
thus some room to manoeuvre to adopt specific rules under the "basic legislation"
501. For a more detailed overview of the administrative structure of Spain, please see CoscuUuela Montaner,
Manual de derechoadministrative (19th, Thomson Civitas, 2008), chapters 7 through 12. .
502. Although it is common to use the expression "public administration" as a reference to aU public
administrations.
umbrella, as long as these rules are not contrary to the requirements set forth at
the national level. The exact content of the "basic legislation" concept and its
boundaries have been and still are a matter of open discussion by Spanish
scholars.I"
In relation to public procurement in particular, according to article 1491I(1S)(a)of
the Spanish Constitution, the national Parliament has the power to enact basic
rules to regulate public procurement. In the current Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts, and competitive dialogue for that matter, most of its content is deemed as
"basic regulation", as per final disposition seven.'?" Non basic regulation can be
overruled by laws enacted by each Autonomous Region. The only known case of a
regional law in the field of procurement is in the Navarra Region, where since
2006 a Regional Public Procurement Law is in force.'?'
A further point on the administrative organisation of Spain is worth mentioning.
In 1961, the country created a national consulting body for public procurement,
the public procurement advisory body':" which assists the State in the matters of
procurement. With the division of the country in different Autonomous Regions,
it is within the scope of each Regional Government to establish a similar body
with equivalent attributions, although not all have decided to do SO.507 The public
procurement advisory bodies, both national and regional ones, are entitled to cre-
ate general rules with the aim of improving administrative, technical and econom-
ic aspects of procurement. They are also entitled to issue recommendations ei-
503. See, Ibid., p. 85-89.
504. Although a huge numbe~ of excepti,?ns is ~isted in the said article, ~nly one is relev~nt for the
competitive dialogue. According to this list, article 296 .0l_l the. acc~mpanylflg ~ody that will help the
contracting authority during procedures held by state administrations, IS not a basic law. Its consequences
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
505. Foral Law 20?6/6. Its subjective. scope incl~des the .Regional Parliament and Government, local
authorities and bodies governed by public law based m the regIOn.
506. 7It is currently regulated by the Royal Decree 30/1991, January 18th and article 299 of the new Law on
Public Sector Contracts.
507. Only the Governments of Andalucia, ~r~on, Ba~q~e count!)', Canar_ias, Cantabria, Castilla y Leon,
Catalonia, Extremadura Islas Baleares, GalICI~, La RIOJa, Madn~, Murcia, N.avarra and Valencia have
established a Regional Public Procurement AdVISOryBody. The Regions of Astunas and Castilla-La Mancha
have not.
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ther to a single contracting authority or more generally if they consider
appropriate to do so. However, public procurement advisory bodies rulings and
recommendations are applicable only to the authorities of the same administra-
tion. That is to say, the public procurement advisory body for Catalonia, for in-
stance, is relevant only to Catalan regional authorities but not the national or lo-
cal ones. Furthermore, bodies and entities governed by public law, such as state
owned companies are also not covered.
3.Public procurement history in Spain
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis. Spain has a long tradi-
tion of regulating public procurement. Although, some traces of a legal regime
can be found in the roth century,':" historically, the development of public pro-
curement in Spain can be divided into two major periods: before 1965 and after-
wards.'?" In 1965 the Law on State Contracts entered into force (Decree 9231I965),
which revoked part of the Law of Administration and Accounting of the Public
Treasury from 1911 (itself based on a Decree from 1852). This law aimed to pro-
vide a general regulation of all contracts of the administration. without ever
achieving the goal as it only had a sparse regulation covering essentially procure-
ment procedure and rules on the form of the contract. It was also applicable only
to the procurement of public works and services, thus excluding all other con-
tracts.!" This law was reformed by the Law from December zoth 1952 that laid
508. For instance, in what relates to the execution of public contracts, in particular public works, as
successive governments approved different regimes. . .,
509. Spain followed the French model of public procurement, dividin~ contracts awarded by pubhc bodies ~n
administrative and private contracts of the administration. On the historical evolution of public
procurement in Spain see Garcia de Enterria and Fernandez, Curso dt derecboad",i"istrativo Cr4th, Thom~n
Civitas, 2008) and Boquera Oliver, 'Los contratos de la Administracion desdc 1950 a hoy' (999) 150 Rnnslil
de Admi"istrad6n PU6/i(a.
510. For a ~eneral overview of this period, please see Meilan (;il, 'La acruacion contrarual de la
administracion publica espanola. Una perspecriva histrica' Cl9Kl) 99 Rruista d«Admi"islrad6" PUlJII(4,p. /35·
the groundwork for the Law of State Contracts from 1965.,11This year marks the
start of the consolidation of the Spanish public procurement legal regime, with
the entry into force of the Law on State Contracts (Legislative Decree 9231x965,
April Srh). This law regulated public procurement in Spain for 30 years,": until re-
voked by the Law of Public Administrations Contracts (Law 13!I995) in the 1990S.
The Law on State Contracts kept the traditional distinction in the execution
regime between administrative contracts and private contracts of the administra-
tion'" and has created a common procurement framework for both types of con-
tracts, irrespective of their precise classification as administrative or private.
The Law on State Contracts was replaced in 1995 by the Law of Public Adminis-
trations Contracts."? This was the last law regulating Spanish public procure-
merit" before the entry into force of the current Law on Public Sector Contracts,
Law 30/2007, October joth, Most of its content was considered as "basic legisla-
tion" in the terms we have seen above in the previous section, in relation, for in-
stance, to procurement by local authorities. Regarding its subjective scope, this
law covered all public administrations, although the exact content of this concept
was in reality restrictive. In addition Spain was declared three times by the CJEU
511• It said nothing though about issues arising from the procurement or the validity and nullity of such
contracts.
512. Albeit updated in 1973 (Law 5"973) and 1986 (after acceding to the EC as to render the legal framework
compatible with ~C law) .. .
5'3. The. first includes some specIal. rights or powers f~r the. contractIng authority regarding the
interpretation, modIfication. an? .resolu~l?n of the contracts, including t~e power t~ execute such special
rights without the need of a judicial decision. The second foUows the Spanish legal regime for regular private
contracts similar to what we have seen in Chapter 5 for Portugal.
5'4. This'law was extensively r~v~sed during t~e period it was i.n f~rce. In 1999, th.e Law 53"999, December
28th deeply reformed the exisnng law leading to the publication and entry into force in 2000 of a
"Consolidated Text" by the Royal Legal Decree 2/2000, June 16th. This "Consolidated Text" did not
introduce any changes but merely put on a single law aU the successive changes made to the 1995 law. In
2003 a new law modified the Law on Public Aoministrations Contracts, mairily due to comply with tulings
from the CJED, namely the cases C-463/00 and C-9~/OI Commission 'V. Spain CJE/03/37 and C-283/00
Commission 'V. Spain b003] ECR 1-11697, both for not havmg extended the review mechanisms to the awards
made by public companies th~t should .be considered. as contracting authorities. In addition, the 2003
revision included also an extensive regulation of the public works concession contract. A final revision of the
law entered into force in 2006 (Law 42/2006) to comply with the CJED's decision on case C-84103
Commission 'V. Spain boos] ECR 1-00139.
related with the exclusion of public companies from the list of contracting authorities.
515. For a critical analysis of the originaI,version of the law, please see Ruiz Ojeda, 'The new Spanis Public
Contracts Act: no answer to old problems (1996) I PPLR, CS31-36
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not to have complied with EU law.?" as the subjective scope of the Law of Public
Administrations Contracts did not include public companies as contracting au-
thorities subject to public procurement rules. Regarding the objective scope, the
Law included as a major innovation the express regulation of the different types
of services contracts. From an organisational point of view, a trademark of the
Law on State Contracts was the division into two major parts, which was a
marked departure from the drafting structure from the 1965 law. The first part in-
cluded general rules applicable to all public procurement, whereas the second part
regulated the execution of administrative contracts (public works, management of
public services, goods and public works concessions). This structure would be
dropped in the new Law on Public Sector Contracts.
4. Law on Public Sector Contracts
b) Introduction
The main objective of the Law on Public Sector Contracts (Law 3012007) 511 was
to transpose Directive 20041I8 into Spanish law.!" It revoked the Law on Public
Administrations Contracts!" and brought the public procurement framework in
line with the current EU rules.po As we have mentioned in the introduction of
the current chapter, the transposition was made by means of a detailed imple-
516. The aforementioned rulings from May 15th 200), October 16th 200) C-S4/0) Commission v. Spain [z005]
ECR 1-00139.
517· Contrary to the Portuguese law, this law was drafted completely in private, by the Spanish National
Government. No public consultations were held during the drafting period.
51S. L1avador Cistemes, Contrataci6n AdminiJtrativa (Thomson Aranzadi, 200S) p.J)-)5.
519. With the exception of the private financing of public works concessions, regulated still by articles 253
through 260 of the Law on Public Administrations Contracts, until a specific legal regulation is developed.
520. For a detailed overview of this law, please see Arenas Alegria, 'Amilisis de las principales novedades en
materia de contrataci6n publica' (z008) 73 Contrataci6n Administratio« Pratica, Cosculluela Montaner, Mtm1141
de derecho administrativo 69th, Thomson Civitas, 200S), chapters 16 and 17,Garcia de Enterria and Fernandez,
Curto de deretbo administrativo (14th, Thomson Civitas, 2008) chapter 12 and L1avador Cisternes, Contrataci6n
Administrativa (Thomson Aranzadi, 200S), Moreno Molina, 'The new Spanish Public Sector Procurement
Law (Act 30/2007 of October 30)' (2008) 6 PPLR, NA282-297 and Saz, 'La nueva ley de contratos del sector
publico. ?Un nuevo traje con las mismas rayas' (2007) 174Reoist« de Adm;nistraci6n PUblica, p. 335-366.
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mentation of the relevant Directives. The Law on Public Sector Contracts en-
tered into force on May rst, 2008, more than two years after the deadline set in
Directives 2004118 and 2004117 for the transposition. 52. Although the major drive
to the development of this law was to transpose a new set of Directives, the Span-
ish law makers also seized the opportunity to carry out a more general reform of
the public procurement legal framework in the country, although without creat-
ing a new legislative model that simplified the existing complex system.?' Accord-
ing to its article 3, the Law on Public Sector Contracts regulates the whole of pro-
curement conducted by all public "entities" (Public Administrations and public
bodies), including those not covered by the Directives, although the procurement
in the utilities sector is regulated by Law 31120°7.
Contrary to the previous Law of Public Administrations Contracts, its structure
is no longer divided into two - general and special - parts or books. The current
Law on Public Sector Contracts is organised around a completely different struc-
rure.!" This new law is organised around the different types of contracting author-
ities. It has as Preliminary Title encompassing the first 21 articles and five books.
Book I (articles 22 through 92) includes the general rules applicable to procure-
ment, Book II (articles 93 through 120) deals with the preparation of the contract
to be awarded,"! Book III (articles 121 through 190) deals with the procurement
procedures and award, Book IV (articles 192 through 290) regulates the execu-
521. With the exception o.f the temporary d.ispos.ition 7, which enter~d into force in the day after the
publication of the law, that !SOcto~er jrst, This artlc~e expande.d. the subJectl~e sc;ope of public procurement
to encompass all public bodies consld.ered as ~ontractmg authorities by the Directives 2004/18 and 20?4/17.
522. Moreno Molina, 'The new Spanish Pubhc Sector Procurement Law (Act 30/2007 of October 30) (2008)
6 PPLR NA282-297 p. NA284· Considering the law as simply re_peating existing legislation, Sosa Wagner and
Fuertes: 'La ley de contratos del sector publico y eI murcielago' 12008} Activi~d Jurfdica AranZlldi.
523. According to recitaI III of the Law the old structure was not appropriate for the new enlarged scope
and the need to separate under the same law the transposing rules of Directives 2oo41I8 and 2004"7 and
remaining rules.
524. Books II and III are divide into Titles that follow the aforementioned structure of different headings
for different contracting auth(:>rities. Book II, Title I regulates the preparation of contracts awarded by
public administrations. The Title II of the. same book regulates the preparation of contracts awarded by
other contractin& authorities. Book III, Title I, Chapter I governs the award procedures run by public
administrations. Chapter II governs the award of contracts by other contracting authorities.
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tion, effects and dissolution of administrative contracts, and Book V (articles 291
through 309) includes regulation in formal aspects related with the administrative
bodies or structures involved with procurement. Finally, the Law on Public Sector
Contracts has 33 additional dispositions.
It should be mentioned that the relatively high number of articles in the law <309)
does not make for an easy reading of its content. In various articles."! the drafting
is difficult to read or interpret as the articles are riddled with multiple regulations
in the same paragraph, separated by successions of commas"? or have opposing
"subparagraphs" within the same paragraph."? The multitude of additional (33),
temporary (7) and final dispositions (12) and annexes (3) also do not facilitate read-
ing. In addition, the fact that not all the content of the law is relevant in all situa-
tions, with marked differences in applicable rules depending in the classification
of contracts or contracting authority.?" presents an extra layer of complexity in
what was already a complex piece of legislation.
(2) Major innovations of the Law on Public Sector Contracts
The Spanish Law on Public Sector Contracts includes a number of innovations in
comparison with the previous regime and some particularities worth mentioning,
such as the classification of contracts (either as administrative or private) or the
different jurisdictions (administrative or judicial) where procurement issues can
be argued after all the administrative appeals are exhausted.
525. As we shall see with the articles applicable to the competitive dialogue in the followin~ Chapter 9·
526. As an example, article 165/3 relative to the competitive dialogue has 17 lines divide into only two
sentences.
527. Article 165/4 has two unnumbered "subparagraphs". The first deals with the closure of the competiti~
dialogue stage in the procedure with the same name. The second regulates what happens after the dialogue IS
finished and the submission of tenders. Adding to the confusion article 166 is epigraphed "Presentation and
analysis of tenders", so arguably the second part of article 165/4 would make more sense to be included at the
beginning of article 166.
528. As we will discuss hereunder in the next section.
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Most but not all of the innovations in the Law on Public Sector Contracts are di-
recdy connected with innovations present in Directive 2004/18. The law roughly
follows the Directive's objectives of introducing flexibility and simplification in
the field of public procurement."? As innovations stemmed from the transposed
Directive, one can mention a few such as the inclusion of social and environrnen-
tal considerations in procurement (article 101), and new award procedures or tools
like electronic auction (article 132), competitive dialogue (articles 163 to 167),
framework agreements (I80 to 182), dynamic purchasing systems (articles 183 to
186) and central purchasing bodies (articles 187 to 191).
The Spanish law makers have not limited itself to implementing Directive
2004118, but has also updated other areas of the national procurement framework
in accordance with the case law from the CJEU. For instance, it has included a
new fast track administrative appeal (the special administrative appeal, article 37)
only for the contracts subject to harmonised regulation'" including the possibility
of awarding interim measures to protect the interests of the private parties facing
abuse {article 38),'31 As in the previous legal framework, private parties still have to
go through the fast track administrative appeal before being able to file for judi-
cial review on a court.?'
529. As we have discussed in more detail in Chapter 4·
530. That is, contracts that are covered by the EU procurement rules and a few selected others like the
management of public services for a period larger than five years a~d w~th a cost of at least 500,000 euros.
For remedies arising from contracts not covered, the private parties Will have to resort to the slower pre-
existing review mechanisms fr?m the Law 30/92, N.o~emb~r 26th the ones that were .deemed as incompatible
with Directive 89/665. These Imply firstly an administrative appeal before the aggrieved can start a judicial
review procedure before a court.
531. On this review mechanism see, Saz, 'La nueva ley de contratos del sector publico. ?Un nuevo traje con
las mismas rayas' (2007) 174Reoista de Ad"!;n;straci6n PU/J/;ca, p. 33n66 p. 364-366.
532. This law was most recc::ntly updated 10 ~ugust 2010 ~o accommodate t.he changes imposed by Directive
2007/66 (Remedies Directive) and the r~VIew mechant~ms were extenslv~ly updated, However, as this
amendments came after the cut off date It was not possible to take them IOta account for this thesis. In
addition, the description of the review mechanisms is now outdated since the amendments came into force
in September 2010.
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The Spanish law makers has also decided to expressly include general principles
applicable to public procurement. Equal treatment, non-discrimination, propor-
rionality, transparency and competition, are now part of the law in its article 1.533
There are other novelties unconnected with ED law or its case law. The Law on
Public Sector Contracts has updated the concept of public works concession (ar-
ticle 7), for instance. Previously, the public works concession could include either
both the works and operation or just the latter. In the new law, the public works
concession contract needs to have them both. As an innovation, the merging of
the old consulting and assistance contract with the more general services contract
or the new contract manager.P' can also be mentioned.
A major innovation present in the Law on Public Sector Contracts, which is also
connected with ED rules is the regulation of cooperation contracts between the
public and private sector (article II). These contracts are not governed by Direc-
tives 2004118 and their regulation at ED level by secondary legislation is still
pending.?' These are the contracts'" where a private entity is mandated to per-
form certain tasks necessary to satisfy the general interest for a period of time,
with the payments to be made during the performance of the contract under cer-
tain circumstances. Cooperation contracts are now a contract type in Spain.?'
placed side by side with public works.t" public works concessions.f" public ser-
vices concessions.i" goods'" and services.':" As competitive dialogue is the default
procedure for the award of cooperation contracts, the exact implications for com-
533- Contrary to Portugal. that has withdrawn the mention of these principles from the current Public
Contracts Code.
534. Article 41. This person or entity is responsible for the proper execution of the contract.
535. As we have discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
536. I t should be noted though that the cooperation contract can only be tendered if it is clear that
alternative procurement arragements are not viable. in accordance with article 118 of the Law on Public
Sector Contracts.
537. Article II of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
538. Article 6 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
539. Article 7 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
540. Article 8 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
541. Article 9 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
542. Article 10 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
petitive dialogue will be discussed in detail in the following chaprer.i" The scope
of cooperation contract appears to overlap with existing categories of contracts
such as public works concessions, and determining where either is applicable is
complex.
(3) Particularities of the Law on Public Sector Contracts
A few particularities of this law are worth detailing. First and foremost, the struc-
ture of the Law is organised around the different concepts or types of contracting
authorities (public administrations, non-public administrations), with a different
legal regime for each, leading to the dispersion of the regulation of each contract
to be scattered across the whole law in different chapters.
The most striking particularities to be found in the Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts are the different sets of classifications that can be applicable to the same
contract. Depending on the contracting authority, it can be administrative or pri-
vate. According to its legal definition, a contract can be typical, mixed or atypical.
Depending on the scope of the Directive 2oo41I8, it can be subject or not to har-
monised regulation. As an example, a multi-million euro works contract would be
typical (article 6) or mixed (article 12), administrative {article 191I, (a» if tendered
by a public administration or private (article 201l) if not and subject to har-
monised regulation if its value exceeded the thresholds.
In the face of the complexities raised by the law makers' option mentioned in the
previous paragraph, some clarifications are in order and we will now proceed with
a breakdown of each type of classification.
543. On cooperation co~ltracts in 8~ner~, M~ch?, 'Las formas de ~<.>laboraci6npublico-privada en cl Dcrccho
esp,anol' (:z008) '75 Reoista de admlnlstraClonpuh/lca, p. '57, Salom, El contrato de colaboracion entre cl sector
publico y el sector privado' ~~008) ,8 Reuista Gen~a( de Derecho Admi,!istrafivo and Chinchilla Marib, 'El
nuevo contrato de colaboracion entre cl sector publico y cl sector pnvado (2006) '32 Rruista espanola de
derechoadministrativo, p. 609·
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(a) Classification according to the contracting authority
Following the French tradition of segregating administrative and private con-
tracts.?" public contracts in the Law on Public Sector Contracts can be classified
as administrative or private. The difference in relation with the past is that the di-
vision no longer depends exclusively on the substance or type of contract but also
on the contracting authority awarding it.
A public contract is deemed administrative if awarded by a "public administra-
tion"545as defined in article 312546 and is included in either the list of article 19/I, a)
or the open clause of paragraph I, b). In the list we can find the works (article 6),
public works concessions (article 7), public services concessions (article 8), con-
tracts for goods (article 9), contracts for services (article 10) and public-private co-
operation (article II) contracts, The general clause deems as administrative all the
contracts having a special administrative nature, satisfying public needs directly
connected with the administrative activity.!" All other contracts are private, that
is, contracts entered into by any other contracting authority'" (non-l'public ad-
ministration", as a public company, for example), contracts entered into by a
"public administration" but falling outside the scope mentioned" or contracts
544. On the historical perspective of administrative and private contracts in Spain, please see for all Garcia
de Enterria and Fernandez, Curso de derecho admimstratiuo (rarh, Thomson Civitas, 2008), P: 690-706.
545. Cosculluela Montaner, Manual de derecbo administrativo (19th, Thomson Civitas, 2008) p. 416.
546. The subjective scope of the Law on Public Sector Contracts defines "public administration" as all the
public administrations we have previously mentioned (State, Regional and Local), Social Security managing
bodies, public universities, supervisory bodies with regulatory attributions (Bank of Spain, for instance) and
public bodies depending on any of those entities (as long as their main function is not to sell goods or
services in the open market or most of their incomes does not derive from such sales).
547. According to article 19Mb). In light of the description by the law, one would assume though that only
administrative contracts can be atypical.
548. Article 2011.
549. Article 2011, final part.
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entered into by a "public administration" but specifically considered as private by
the Law on Public Sector Contracts.!"
The classification of a public contract in Spain as administrative or private, has
implications on the jurisdiction responsible for its review. The administrative ju-
risdiction is entitled to review all issues arising from an administrative contract,
either from its award procedure or from its execution. For private contracts it can
only review the award procedure and only if awarded by a "public administration"
and subject also to harmonised regulation, never their execution. The civil juris-
diction is entitled to review the execution of private contracts, and also their
award procedure if they are neither awarded by a "public administration" nor sub-
ject to harmonised regulation.
(b) Classification according to the legal definition
Regarding the legal definition, public contracts in Spain can either be typical,
mixed or atypical. Typical public contracts are the ones specified as such in the
Law on Public Sector Contracts. Works, public works concessions, public ser-
vices concessions, goods, services and cooperation between public and private
sectors, are all typical contracts (article 191I(a».Mixed contracts, as the name im-
plies, share characteristics of two or more typical contracts (article 12). Atypical
contracts, on the other hand are contracts which have a special administrative na-
ture, satisfying public needs directly connected with the administrative activity
(article 19h(b».
550. Article 4h(P)·
(c) Distinction between harmonised and non-harmonised contracts
Public contracts can also be separated between contracts subject or not to har-
monised regulation. By harmonised regulation, the Spanish law makers means the
contracts subjectively and objectively covered by the rules of the Directive
2004h8. For instance, if the public works example above mentioned had a value
over 4,845,000 euro, it would be considered as a contract subject to harmonised
regulation.i" whereas the same type of contract with a value under the threshold
would not. This means that across the law, some rules are only applicable to the
first, as it happens, for instance, with the new fast track review mechanism from
article 37.
One can say that the Law on Public Sector contracts has different levels of detail
and application of its rules depending on the contract itself (administrative or pri-
vate, subject or non-subject to harmonised regulation) and the contracting au-
thority (Public Administration, public body or private body) involved.!"
Finally, it is also noteworthy to mention that contracts with a value inferior to
the ED thresholds, are subject to the general procurement principles.:" but small
value contracts'" can still be awarded directly by contracting authorities without
any sort of competition.
551. As set by the Commission Regulation 117712009.
55z. For a thoroughly detailed breakdown of the differences and the confusion that may arise see, Saz, 'La
nueva ley de contraros del sector publico. ?Un nuevo traje con las mismas rayas' (2007) 174 Revista de
Administracion PUblica,p. 33n66, p. 3W364.
553. As discussed in detail in Chapter J.
554. Contracts with a value lower than 50,000 euros (works) or 18,000 euros (all other types), according to
article 122/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. Arguin~ that the new law may not comply with the
EUprinciples of competition, equal treatment and non-discnmination, Moreno Molina, 'The new Spanish
Public Sector Procurement Law (Act 3012007 of October 30)' (zo08) 6 PPLR, NAz82-Z97, p. NA284-287·
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(d) Updates and amendments to the Law on Public Sector
Contracts
Although the Law on Public Sector Contracts came into force in 2008, it has al-
ready been reviewed and updated five times.
In 2009 Royal-Decree 81712009 developed partially the content of the law, pro-
viding more detail in areas such as the assessment of the economic, technical or
professional ability of candidates, the jury for the procedure or how to calculate
the award criteria.
In 2010 Royal-Decree Law 812010, in response to pressure from financial mar-
kets, put in place limitations on expense growth. Regarding public procurement,
it has made the recourse to concessions and public-private cooperation contracts
more difficult by demanding a prior authorization from the Finance Ministry.
Laws 14 and 1512010 provided very small alterations to the Law on Public Sector
Contracts. The first reduced the performance bond for works concessions to 5%.
The second created new rules to make contracting authorities provide faster pay-
ment for services and goods rendered.
Near the end of this research project, in August 2010, Spain published a new ver-
sion of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. This new law brings the Spanish re-
medies in line with the standard established by Directive 2007166 (Remedies
Directive) .
The changes introduced by this law are not taken into consideration in the cur-
rent research project for two reasons. Firstly, it was published in August 2010 and
came into force the following month, both happening after the cut off date {July
2010) set by the author for changes to legal frameworks. Secondly, the changes in-
troduced, although very profound, are not directly relevant to the topic of the re-
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search since they are not focused on competitive dialogue but only on the
remedies available to bidders.
All references made the Law on Public Sector Contracts in this thesis are to be
construed as referring to the original 2007 for all purposes, including numbering
and the comments on actual reviews of competitive dialogue procedures detailed
in Chapter 9.
s- Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the public procurement regime in Spain, from
the administrative organization of the country to the current Law on Public Sec-
tor Contracts from 2007 and subsequent amendments.
Having presented the legal public procurement framework in general, in the next
chapter we will focus on the implementation of competitive dialogue in Spain.
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Chapter 9 - Competitive dialogue inSpain
I. Introduction
The Law on Public Sector Contracts/55 regulates the competitive dialogue proce-
dure, mainly in Book III, Title I, Chapter I, Section 5, articles 163 through 169. A
number of other articles of this law are also relevant, either directly or indirectly,
to the regulation of competitive dialogue in Spain. These articles are scattered
throughout the Law on Public Sector Contracts.t"
Although in some instances the level of detail in the Law of Public Sector Con-
tracts is greater than that present in Directive 2004/18 regarding competitive dia-
logue,"" one can say that, in general, the procedure has not been regulated in
much detail in the Spanish transposition. Most provisions on competitive dia-
logue are simply direct transpositions of what is already in the Directive with only
a few changes added afterwards. The only remarkable novelty of the Spanish law
is to make the competitive dialogue procedure the default procedure for the
award of public-private cooperation contracts.t"
The Spanish law makes no distinction between the recitals and articles of the Di-
rective 2004lxS, although the purpose of the forrner'" is to interpret what is in-
cluded in the articles.'?" For Spanish law makers, the content of the recitals does
555. Law 3012007·
556. Articles nlt, 26, 45/1, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 7J, 75/5, 93/3, 101/3(b)(C)(d), 118, 119, 120, 12212,12912,130, 135/3,
147, 148, 149, 15?12 13 14 and 15, 154(a) ~d 296 are all relevant to the competitive dialogue and will be
explained in derail fun her down when applicable. . . . .
557. For instance, in the grounds for use of the competitive dialogue one can find a specific rule stating the
procedure as the default for the award of public-private cooperation contracts (article 164/3 of the Law on
Public Sector Contracts) and the assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates
is also subject to extensive regulation (articles 64 through 68, 147 and 149 of the Law on Public Sector
Contracts).
558. Ani~le 164/3 or the ~w on Public Sector Con~ract~. .
559. For instance, m recitals 40 and 41 of the Direcrive 2004/18, where one can find information on the
reduction of candidates during the dialogue phase.
560. As we have seen above in Chapter 3·
- 211-
not seem to have a simply interpretative nature. That is, irrespective, of their spe-
cific place within Directive 2004118, all rules on competitive dialogue were trans-
posed to the Spanish law as having the same value. Consequently, in the Law on
Public Sector Contracts, what was originally in the Directive's recitals sits, side by
side, with the rules from the articles.
In this chapter we will, first present an overview of the flow of the procedure and
then analyse the procedure step by step. The analysis will start with the grounds
of use and then progress with the successive phases, with a structure similar to
the one previously adopted for Chapter 7.
.z. Flow oftbe procedure
The purpose of this section is to give a brief introduction to the way competitive
dialogue is run in Spain, without focusing particularly in any of the potential is-
sues or major differences in relation with Directive 2004118. Such issues and
differences will be highlighted and discussed in detail in the following sections.
The flow of competitive dialogue is remarkably similar to the version present in
Directive 2004118. In the Spanish law competitive dialogue is clearly divided into
into three phases: start of the procedure and requests for participation; dialogue
with candidates; submission and evaluation of tenders.
The competitive dialogue procedure starts with a notice and descriptive docu-
ment that are to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and
national, regional or local official journals. The notice will contain the basic infor-
mation about the procedure needed by the prospective candidates both to submit
their participation requests and also to know the rough features of the procedure.
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To be considered for the dialogue, prospective candidates shall submit their re-
quests for participation to the contracting authority before the deadline stated in
the notice. The contracting authority will then assess which shall be considered as
suitable and pick from that pool of candidates the ones it will carry to the dia-
logue stage.
The dialogue will be carried out by the contracting authority to discuss all aspects
of the contract and to find the solutions that best meets its needs. The dialogue
stage is no more regulated than in Directive 2004118. A lot of scope is left in the
hands of the contracting authority to organise the dialogue as it sees fit, contrary
to the law makers' approach to the open and restricted procedures, which are reg-
ulated in extensive detail.
Having found the best solutions for its needs, the contracting authority informs
the candidates of the end of the dialogue, inviting them to present their tenders.
No details are given on how the tenders are to be presented, that is, if they are to
be based on their own solutions or on a common set of specifications.
The tenders submitted will be assessed in accordance with the award criteria es-
tablished at the beginning of the procedure or at the invitation for the dialogue.
Before a decision is taken, the tenderers may supply clarifications, specifications
and fine-tune their tenders, at the request of the contracting authority, in line
with the scope provided for in article 29/6 of the Directive 2004118.
After the most economically advantageous tender has been chosen by the con-
tracting authority, it can request from the winner further clarifications or the
confirmation of commitments, as long as they do not modify substantial aspects
of the tender or call for tender and do not distort competition or causes discrim-
ination. Once again, this provision is in line with what can be found on article
29/7 of Directive 2004118.
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Finally, the contract can be signed between the contracting authority and the
tenderer.
3. Groundsfor use
(I) Introduction
The grounds for the use of competitive dialogue in Spain can be found in article
164 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. According to this article, the grounds
can be divided into two different sets of circumstances. Firstly, competitive dia-
logue can be used for the award of particularly complex contracts.?' along the
lines of Directive 2oo4/I8. Secondly, competitive dialogue is the default proce-
dure for the award of public-private cooperation contracts.l"
According to article 164/I of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, competitive di-
alogue can be used as an award procedure if two conditions are met. Firstly, the
contract to award has to be a complex contract.l" Secondly, it is necessary that if
the open or restricted procedures were used to award such contract they were not
adequate for the purpose. We will now analyse in more detail each of these two
conditions.
(2) Particularly complex contracts
Regarding the first condition, a contract is deemed as particularly complex when
the contracting authority is objectively unable to either: i) define the technical
means needed to meet its needs or objectives; ii) define the legal or financial
56!. Article 164/1 and iz of the Law on the Public Sector Contracts.
562. Article 164/3 of the Law on the Public Sector Contracts.
563. The definition is made in the number two of the same article.
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make-up of the contract to award.f" In respect to the technical means, the Law
on Public Sector Contracts provides a more detailed interpretation than the Di-
rective. The Spanish law tries to explain the technical means concept by referring
to part of its own rules on technical specificarions.r" Even so, the law does not
provide any clear guidance or explain what should be considered as a particularly
complex contract. Referring back to Directive 2oo4/I8 and to what we have dis-
cussed before.r" it should be noted though that it also does not clearly define the
same concept. On the financial and legal make-up, the Spanish law is completely
silent, leaving both concepts open to interpretation.
(3) Inadequacy of open and restricted procedures
According to article 2911 of Directive 2004118, competitive dialogue can be used
if the contracting authority considers that neither the open nor the restricted
procedure will allow for the award of the contract. This might be construed as
meaning a complete impossibility of awarding the contract, as happens, for in-
stance when it is impossible for the contracting authority to draft the
specifications."?
Article 164/I of the Law on Public Sector Contracts allows for the use of competi-
tive dialogue if the contracting authority considers that neither the open or re-
stricted procedure is adequate to award the contract.!" The express inclusion of
564. Article 16412of the Law ~n the Public Sector Contracts. . .
565. Article 164/2 refers to article 101 of the Law on the Public Sector Contracts. The reference ISnot made
to all the rules on specifications, but only to number three and paragraphs b), C), d) of said article 101. These
paragraphs transp?se article 23/3~b)(c)(d) of. the Directive ~004/1.8 almost word ~y. word with one sole
exception. According to the Span~sh law, environmental ~~~slder~tlOns ~r characteristics may only be taken
into consideration if the contract Impacts or has the possibility of Impactlflg in the environment.
566. Please see Chapter 3· .
567. However, as we have seen ~bove in Chapter 4, acade~lCs have argued that the competitive dialogue may
be used when the open or restricted pr~edure~ were available because the contractmg authority knew of a
solution but not if that was the best solution to Its need.
568. The Spanish translation of the ment~oned article ~f the Direc~ive ~004/~8 is identical to the English
version, so one cannot argue that an error m the translation of the Directive mislead the Spanish law makers
of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
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the word "adequate" in the Spanish law is not present in the Spanish translation
of the Directive. However, it sheds no specific light on how to determine the
boundaries for competitive dialogue'S use. How the contracting authority shall
carry out the assessment or what shortcomings in the open and restricted proce-
dures are liable to deem them as inadequate for the award of a contract, remains
to be seen.
(4) Public-private cooperation contracts
Article 164/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts states that competitive dia-
logue is the default procedure for the award of public-private cooperation con-
tracts. The approach to the definition of this legal concept is not entirely clear, as
the law makers gives its explanation in a single phrase spanning 12 lines with only
5 commas for punctuation.v? The concept can, though, be summarily explained as
follows. These are the contracts'?" where a private entity is mandated to perform
certain tasks necessary to satisfy the general interest for a period of time, with the
payments to be made during the performance of the contract and including at
least one of the following operations:
Construction, installation or transformation of works, equipment, systems
and products or complex goods, as well as its upgrade, refurbishment, explo-
ration or managemenr.'"
• Complete management of complex installations.'"
569. The definition can be found in article II of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. Before launching a
tendering procedure to award a cooperation contract, the contracting authority has to exhaust all other
possibilities it may have at hand, in accordance with article 1112 of the same law.
570. It should be noted though that the cooperation contract can only be tendered if it is clear th~t
alternative procurement arragements are not viable, in accordance with article 118 of the Law on Public
Sector Contracts.
571. Article lIfI(a) of the Law on the Public Sector Contracts.
572. Article IIh(b) of the Law on the Public Sector Contracts.
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• Goods and services with embedded technology especially designed to supply
solutions more advanced than the ones existing in the market.'"
• Services connected to the prosecution of public and general interest by the
State.m
The Spanish law has specifically adopted the term public-private cooperation
contract and not a more widely used term such as public-private partnerships or
concessions, although the long definition covers contracts typically considered as
public-private partnerships or concessions, like the complete management of
complex installations. m
Public-private partnerships is considered an umbrella term at EU level.576 The rea-
sons for the creation of the public-private cooperation contracts, instead of using
public-private partnerships or extending the concept of concessions, are unclear
although one could argue that the law makers wanted to define clearly the con-
tracts covered by article II of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, thus avoiding
terms which could lead to misinterpretation. However, as we have seen in the
section 4(3) of the previous chapter, there is considerable scope for discussion on
what is exactly a public-private cooperation contract and the exact borders be-
tween this type of contracts and the pre-existing concessions are far from clear.
Public works and services concessions remain in the Law on Public Sector Con-
rracts'" and are highly regulated and used extensively in the country. For instance,
during 2009 Spain launched 71 public works concessions tenders, 24 services and
only II public-private cooperation contracts of any kind.t" These numbers lead to
573. Article I1/1(c) of the Law on the Publi~ Sector Contracts.
574. Article I1(r)(d) of the Law on the Pubbc Sector Contracts.
575. Arrowsmith, 'The entity coverage of the EC procurement directives and UK regulations' (2004) 2
PPLR, paragraph 2.16, an hospital.run by a private entity can be considered for these purposes as a complex
installation run completely by a pnvate party.
576. Ibid., paragraph 2.16.
577. On articles 223 through 250 and 251 through 265.
578. Numbers from a search done by the author on the Tenders Electronic Daily website.
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the conclusion the public-private cooperation contract has not replaced the pub-
lic works and services concessions but is being deployed alongside them.
The novelty of article 164/3of the Law on Public Sector Contracts of mandating
that all cooperation contracts have to be awarded by a competitive dialogue can
be interpreted in two ways. It can be interpreted as considering that all co-opera-
tion contracts are "complex contracts" for the effect of complying with article
164h and 12 and with the Directive 2004h8. Alternatively it can be interpreted as
allowing the use of competitive dialogue for awarding procedures that are not
particularly complex. The first interpretation would be obvious had the law mak-
ers opted to include it as a further element of definition in number 2 of article
164,where the concept of "particularly complex" contract is defined, and not on
its own number of the same article. Bearing in mind the fact it has its own nurn-
ber in article 164 and it does not refer to the need to abide by the "particularly
complex contract" test, one can argue that the second interpretation is more logi-
cal in face of the drafting adopted. In addition to the fact that no reference is
made to article 16412,article 164/3of the Law on Public Sector Contracts makes a
reference to the need to heed article 154/a,mso one can also argue that the law
makers wanted cooperation contracts to be exclusively awarded by either com-
petitive dialogue or the negotiated procedure. Furthermore, the drafting of arti-
cle 164/3is clear in its command: cooperation contracts have to be awarded by ei-
ther competitive dialogue (preferably) or negotiated procedure. It appears the
Spanish law makers have arguably not acted entirely consistently with the Com-
mission's stance and considered that all public-private cooperation contracts are
579. Article 154(a) allows the negotiated procedure to be used after a previous open, restricted or competitive
dialogue procedure has been tried but the results were not forthcoming and the original conditions are not
substantively changed in the new procedure. The novelty, ~ain, is not the negotiated procedure use after a
competitive dialogue as failed, per se, but the motives behind the failure that can lead to the use ~f the
negotiated procedure. For instance, according to that article, if the tenders were presented by candidates
deemed as unsuitable the contracting authority may resort to the negotiated procedure.
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necessarily particularly complex.t'" The caveat with the second proposed interpre-
tation is that it is not compatible with the Directive 20041I8, since that in this in-
terpretation not all of the situations where competitive dialogue may be used are
particularly complex contracts.
I t may be thus argued that competitive dialogue is the default procedure for all
cooperation contracts mentioned in article II of the Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts, even if they fail the particular complexity test set forth by article I641I12.
This could raise the question of compatibility of the law if any of the contracts
mentioned in its article II are not public-private partnerships or concessions ac-
cording to EU law/81 and covered by Directive 2004118.
4. Phases oftbe procedure
(r) Introduction
The competitive dialogue in the Law on Public Sector Contracts is divided into
three phases: i) start of the procedure, presentation of candidates and assessment
of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates; ii) dialogue with
suitable candidates; iii) presentation of tenders and award. In the following sec-
tions we will discuss in detail the characteristics of each phase of competitive
dialogue.
580. Commission, Explanatory note - competitive dialof,IU - classic directive (2005) P.3, on public-private
partnership contracts. . . .. . .
581. Bearing in mind the previously discussed difficulties of defining precisely both terms according to EU
law.
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(2) Start of the procedure, presentation of candidates and
assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability
of candidates
(a) Introduction
The start of the competitive dialogue procedure in Spain, does not stray much
from what is established in the Law on Public Sector Contracts for the open and
restricted procedures, except for some particular points. 58.It also follows closely
the Directive 2004118.583There are, however, specific rules regarding the composi-
tion of the jury for the procedure.
(b)Jury for the procedure
Article 296 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts states how the jury of the dia-
logue is to be composed. This jury, contrary to the jury for other procurement
procedures must have expert members that may be external to the contracting
authority to assist in the development of the dialogue. The jury for other proce-
dures may include only internal members of the contracting authority. This rule
has a basic nature. In consequence, any autonomous region may approve its own
rules to regulate the composition of the jury in procedures held there. The central
Government approved Royal-Decree 817/2009 developed the Law on Public Sec-
tor Contracts and has included an article on the jury for the procedure. Article 23
of Royal-Decree 817/2009 states that the jury shall have at least three expert
members and that they need to make up at least a third of the jury. This article
further details the functions of the jury that include, for instance, if the contract
582. For example, the inexistence of proper specification but only the notice or a descriptive document at
the most.
58J. With the exception of the notices in regional and local papers.
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being tendered is a public-private cooperation contract the comparison between
the costs of doing the project that way or under a normal public contract.
During the procedure itself the jury will have to assess the economic, technical or
professional ability of candidates, identify the solutions to carry to successive
stages (if any) and identify the solurionts) most attuned to solve the contracting
authorities' need. Furthermore, it will also evaluate the final tenders and request
clarifications or confirmations of commitments from the bidders if appropriate.
The final decision on whom to award the contract to remains with the contract-
ing authority and not the jury.
Regional Governments may change this rule if they enact their own procurement
regime. So far, only the Region of Navarra has enacted a regional procurement
law, the Foral Law 612006. In that law, there are no specific rules for the jury for
the procedure on a competitive dialogue procedure. However, article 6012 of the
same law allows the jury to include especially qualified external members in ex-
ceptional circumstances.
(c) Notice and descriptive document
The competitive dialogue procedure in Spain starts with the contracting authori-
ty publishing a notice describing its needs either in the contract notice or in an
accompanying descriptive document.
In articles 163 through 167 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts not much is
said on what should be included in the notice or the descriptive document.r" Re-
garding notice publication, since there are no specific rules applicable to competi-
tive dialogue, one can assume that the publication will be done in accordance
584. The exceptions are article 16512(on t~e mini~um number of candidates to invite for the dialogue), 166/3(on the possibility of successive stages dunng the dialogue) and 16712 (on award criteria).
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with the general rules of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. Article I2611 of the
same law, the contracts subject to harmonised regulation'" have to be published
in the OfficialJournal. Additionally, they have also to be published in national, re-
gional and/or local official journals.t"
The tender notice will include the criteria for the selection of candidates which
will be invited to take part in the dialogue.l" The definition of such criteria is
specified in articles 64 through 68 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. These
are related to the financial and technical ability of the candidates. Whereas the
financial criteria or requirements are relevant to all types of contracts (public
works, goods and services), the technical criteria are divided by type, as in article
48 of the Directive 2004118.588 In relation to competitive dialogue, the technical
criteria to consider a candidate as suitable will depend on the type of contract to
be awarded. The criteria present in the above mentioned articles will allow the
contracting authority to determine which candidates are suitable for the dialogue
in question.
The notice will also have to include the minimum number of candidates the con-
tracting authority intends to invite, with such number being at least three.f"
In the event that the contracting authority wishes to have successive stages on
the dialogue phase, such possibility must be expressly mentioned in the notice.'?"
585. Te~ders cove~ed by:the Directive 2004118 (articles 13 through 17 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts).
586. With the notice being sent for the Official Journal, before it is distributed to national, regional and local
official journals (article 126/1/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts). Due to the administrative division of
the country into different provinces, which we have seen in Chapter 8, the official journal relevant for each
case will depend on the contracting authority awarding the contract. If the contract is being tendered by an
Autonomous Province, local authority or public body which depends on them, then the publication in the
national official journal can be replaced by publication in the official regional or local journal, respectively.
587. Article 1471I of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
588. Content wise, the Law on Public Sector Contracts does not differ at all from the Directive, although
from an organisation point of view, the law makers has opted to give the criteria for each type of contract Its
own article, facilitating the interpretation.
589. As per articles 14712and 16512of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, and following article 4413 of the
Directive 2004/18. In the notice, the maximum number of candidates to invite can also be specified., as
allowed for in Recital 40 of the Directive 2oo4!I8.
590. Article 166/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts., as per article 29/4 and recital 41 of the Directive
2004/18.
(d) Presentation of candidates
Any prospective candidate can submit its request for participation on a competi-
tive dialogue, as long as he does so before the deadline established in the notice
or descriptive document.'?' To be considered by the contracting authority, the re-
quest must abide by a number of conditions set forth in article 130II of the Law
on Public Sectors Contracts. This article mandates that requests will have to be
accompanied with documents supporting the petition of being a suitable candi-
date for the dialogue. These documents and statements are similar to the ones
demanded from companies wanting to tender in open or restricted procedures.?"
although the Law on Public Sector Contracts admits that the contracting authori-
ty may demand extra documents or statements.'?'
It should be mentioned that foreign companies wanting to participate in a com-
petitive dialogue procedure in Spain will have to state that all and every claim re-
lated to the tender, interpretation or performance of the contract must be
brought to the Spanish jurisdiction if the contract being tendered is to be per-
formed in Spain. Foreign companies must thus accept that Spanish courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. It should be noted though, that the Law on Public Sector
Contracts does not impose the need to accept Spanish law to rule the contract's
performance.594 One may argue, however, that contracting authorities may have
the tendency in the contract's notice or descriptive document to define Spanish
law as the ruling law for the contract's execution, since it is the law of the
country.
591. Article 148 of the Law on Public. Sector Contracts.
592• Article 1301Iof the Law on Pub~c Sector Contracts.
593. Article 130/2 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
594. Regarding the procurement procedure, there are no doubts that it is ruled by the Law on Public Sector
Contracts.
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(e) Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of
candidates
Having received the requests for participation, the contracting authority will then
assess the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates to participate
in the dialogue. The criteria for selecting candidates, as mentioned above in (c),
have to be objective and non-discriminatory and defined in the notice or descrip-
tive document.r" as per article 147/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. the
minimum number of candidates to invite for the dialogue phase is three.t" How-
ever, it appears that the contracting authority can proceed with the procedure
with less than the supposed minimum of three, if not enough suitable candidates
are available.r" In addition, the Spanish Law on Public Sector Contracts makes it
clear that neither unsuitable candidates nor companies that did not submit an ap-
plication can be invited to the dialogue stage.r" The invitation will have to com-
ply with a number of formalities that are similar to the ones found on article 40
of Directive 2004118,'99 with the caveat that any other language apart from Span-
ish admitted has to be identified.
The contracting authority has also to inform all the invitees of any clarifications
or further explanations asked by any of the candidates. It has to be done in writ-
ing until six days before the start of the dialogue.?"
595· From the list of admitted criteria specified in articles 64 through 68 of the Law on Public Sector
Contracts.
596. Article 16512of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
597. According to article 14912of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, the contracting authority can proceed
with the procedure if less candidates than the minimum established are considered suitable, but again, this
article is drafted with the restricted procedure in mind where the five minimum rule applies.
598. Article 14912of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
599. According to article 165/3of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
ooo.Articles 15012through paragraph 5 and 165/3of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
After the contracting authority has decided which suitable candidates to invite,
invitations are to be sent to all at the same time.'?' The invitation will have to
comply with a number of formalities."? which merely repeat what is already
present in article 40 of Directive 2004118.603
(3) Dialogue with suitable candidates
(a) Introduction
The dialogue phase with the selected candidates ensues after the selected candi-
dates have been invited. The objective of such a phase is to discuss with the can-
didates the adequate means to meet the contracting authority's needs, meaning
that all the aspects of the contract to be tendered can be discussed.?" The Span-
ish law does not provide for much more detail regarding this stage than what is al-
ready available in the Directive. Therefore, a lot of scope is left for contracting
authorities to define as they may see fit. For instance, how they are to organise
the meetings or what information should be included in the minutes of meetings
are not addressed. This is a marked departure from the tradition in Spanish pro-
curement laws of extensively detailing how procedures are to be carried out and
limiting discretion.
(b) Equal treatment during the dialogue and confidentiality
As per article 29/3 of Directive 2004118, the Spanish lawmakers states that the di-
alogue cannot be used to benefit any of the candidates. This article orders that
601. Article 149/1 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
602. Listed in sequence in the same paragraph in article 165/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
603. On the formalities in Directive ~004/18, please see Chapter 4 above, for a detailed breakdown.
604. Article 166/I of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
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equal and fair treatment between candidates must be assured."?' The Spanish law
does not provide further details regarding this issue, merely restating what is al-
ready present in Directive 2004h8.606 The Spanish law only specifies that infor-
mation transmitted as confidential has to treated as such. In addition, it provides
no extra protection regarding cherry picking. Furthermore, the Spanish law also
does not provide any solution to what can be objectively considered as confiden-
tial information worth protecting.
(c) Successive stages inthe dialogue
As allowed by Directive 2004h8 article 29/4,607 the dialogue phase of the compet-
itive dialogue procedure may be divided into successive stages.t'" so as to elim-
inate solutions and focus the discussions on the most promising ones."?'
It should be noted that the Law on Public Sector Contracts does not mention the
elimination of candidates but only of solutions, which leads to three possible in-
terpretations. Firstly, if candidates cannot be eliminated, the law may be read as
allowing each candidate to offer more than one solution (as nothing in the Law
expressly forbids it). If so, only those extra solutions can be elirninated.?" Second-
ly, in the event that candidates submit only one solution it may be read as allow-
ing the elimination of candidates, as the contracting authority is in effect elim-
inating a solution, with the elimination of the underlying candidate a simple
consequence. Thirdly, in a more literal interpretation, even if only one solution is
605. Article 16612of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
606. Please see Chapter 4, above for a more detailed discussion of this topic under the Directive 2004/18.
607. Please see Chapter 4, above for a more detailed discussion of this topic under the Directive 2004/18.
608. Article 16613 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
609.As above mentioned in (c), this possibility must be included in the notice or descriptive document at the
beginning of the procedure.
610. In addition, the Law on Public Sector Contracts, on article 166/4, regarding the end of the dialogue
makes the distinction between finding the best "solutions" and notify all the "candidates" of the end of the
dialogue. This renders clear that in the law both concepts are used with different meanings. Furthermore,
since article 166/4 contains both whereas in article 16673only "solutions" are mentioned, it could indicate
that the law makers wanted to eliminate only solutions and not candidates.
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presented by a candidate and it is eliminated, the candidate must still be invited
to submit a tender.
According to article 166/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, the criteria to
be used in this elimination phase are the ones included in either the notice or the
descriptive document. Such a specific remark raises some doubts in the event that
the contracting authority did not supply any award criteria in the notice - as arti-
de 165/3 of the law seems to allow - or in the case the weightings supplied with
the invitation for the dialogue - mandatory by the same article 165/3 - are to be
used. Two solutions are arguable. The first, more literal, is that the contracting
authority must refer to the award criteria in the notice, disregarding the weight-
ings supplied afterwards (these would only be applicable then in the award of the
contract). In the event that no award criteria are supplied from the onset, then
the contracting authority would refer to the award criteria included with the invi-
tation for the dialogue. The second solution, would be, perhaps, more logical.":
The same article 166/3 has some remarks about ensuring competition in what it
refers to as the final phase, presumably of the dialogue stage. Similarly to recital
41 of Directive 2004118,612 it would mean then that the contracting authority may
not use the successive phases in the dialogue stage to end up with a single candi-
date and no competition.
(d) Conclusion of the dialogue phase
The dialogue with candidates phase will continue until the solutions meeting the
needs of the contracting authority are found, even if that means comparing
611. As per recital ao ?f the Direct!ve 2004/18.. .
612. As we have mentioned before m Chapter 9 the Spanish law makers has included in the main body of the
law content from recitals that were intende only to facilitate the interpretation of its articles.
them.?" bearing in mind the limitations of article 16612 regarding equal treatment
between candidates. After the suitable solutions have been found.?" the contract-
ing authority will conclude the dialogue and inform all candidates still in it of
such a conclusion. At the same time, all candidates are invited to present their
tenders.?" This notification will have to include the deadline to submit tenders,
address for delivery and languages admitted, if any, apart from Spanish.
It is not specified in the law if at the end of the dialogue stage the contracting au-
thority may ask candidates to submit tenders based on a common set of specifica-
tions similar to what is the mandatory model in Portugal. Bearing into considera-
tion the lack of detail in the law it appears that it is possible to draft common
technical specifications at the end of the dialogue stage.
<.> Presentation of tenders and award
(a) Introduction
The competitive dialogue procedure under the Spanish law ends with the submis-
sion of tenders by the candidates, their evaluation and the award of the contract
to the one meeting the needs of the contracting authority best.
(b) Presentation of tenders
Similarly to article 29/6 of Directive 2004118, candidates have to submit the ten-
ders with all the elements required for the performance of the contract.!" The
Spanish law does not provide any guidance or explanation on what should be con-
sidered a sufficient level of detail for such requirement to be considered fulfilled.
61). This is similar to article 29/5 of Directive 2004/18, although mentioning only "solutions" in the plural,
whereas Directive 20041r8 mentions both "solution" and "solutions".
614. Article 166/4 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts. .
615. Once more, from an organisational point of view, it would make sense to include this reference not m
article 166 but article 167, as this last article is epigraphed "submission and examination of tenders".
616. Article 167/r of the Lawon Public Sector Contracts.
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Similarly to what is stated by article 29/6 of Directive 2oo4!I8, the contracting au-
thority may request from candidates clarifications, specifications, fine-tuning of
tenders or further information, as long as they do not lead to fundamental
changes or discrimination. Once more, the Spanish law makers decided to closely
follow the Directive, forfeiting the possibility of detailing these concepts.
(c) Evaluation of tenders
The evaluation of tenders in a competitive dialogue in Spain is to be made in ac-
cordance with the award criteria specified earlier in the notice or descriptive doc-
ument, or the invitation for the dialogue phase."?
After the most economically advantageous tender has been selected, as per Direc-
tive 2oo4!I8 article 29/7, the contracting authority can ask for the tenderer to
clarify aspects of the tender or confirm commitments contained in it, as long as
no substantial aspects of the tender are modified, competition is not distorted or
discrimination caused. Yet again, the Spanish law simply repeats the rules already
present in Directive 2004h8.
So Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter the most relevant characteristics of competitive dia-
logue as transposed into Spain by the Law on Public Sector Contracts. The
grounds of use of the procedure appear to be similar to the ones of Directive
2004118 with the exception of the public-private cooperation contracts. The reg-
ulation of the procedure in general has not been elaborated further.
617. Article 167/z of the ~w on Public Sector Contrac.ts. T.his article furt~er specifies that the price may not
the only criteria in awarding the contract, as per the Directive 2oo41I8 article 291I.
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The issues described in this chapter, although similar to the ones found in Chap-
ter 4, provided relevant questions to discuss with the interviewees at the empiri-
cal research stage. The next chapter is focused on the findings of theses
interviews.
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Chapter IO - Empirical findings on Spain
I. Introduction
In Spain, as we have seen in Chapters 8 and 9, competitive dialogue was trans-
posed by the Law on Public Sector Contracts of 2007. In this country, contrary
to Portugal, law makers has decided to transpose Directive 20041I8 without par-
ticular differences.
Arranging interviews in the country has been reasonably easy. In six cases gate-
keepers known to the author facilitated a contact with the person who might be
relevant for the purposes of this research. In all other situations, the author sim-
ply cold called the relevant entity directly.
Interviews were carried between March and August 2010. They were held prefer-
ably face to face (4) in a closed room, with the exception of one of the lawyers
who had to be interviewed during his lunch break. Due to the geographical dis-
persion of respondents and the time and costs involved it was only possible to in-
terview the remaining participants by telephone. All the telephone interviews bar
one were conducted over Skype. Only seven interviewees, all from face to face in-
terviews, allowed the interview to be recorded. The remaining seven face to face
interviewees declined to talk with the recorder on. Of the telephone interviews,
the one carried over traditional telephone lines was impossible for the author to
record. The others could have been recorded in theory. However, for the first
four the author did not have software that made it possible. All the others inter-
viewees declined to have the Skype conversation recorded.
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As we have seen in Chapter 2 above, the author has conducted a total of 27 inter-
views in Spain: 20 on entities that have used the competitive dialogue procedure,
four lawyers, two public procurement advisory bodies and one consultant.
The contracting authorities with experience in competitive dialogue that were in-
terviewed had used it 33 times, out of a total of 57 situations where the procedure
was used. Of the total of 57, at the end of July 2010, seven had either been recent-
ly launched or were still in their early stages. It was considered that they would
not be developed enough in time to be analyzed for this research. Therefore, the
sample covered is 33out of 50 procedures or roughly 2/3.
In the following sections of this chapter we will present the findings of the empir-
ical research carried out in Spain. Each class of respondents {contracting authori-
ties, lawyers and public procurement advisory bodies} will be expressly identified
when the answers harvested are different from the other classes. Section 2 ex-
plains the situations where the competitive dialogue procedure was used. Sections
3-20 are each dedicated to a category of issues that were discussed during the in-
terviews. Section 21 covers general comments made by the interviewees.
2.Actual use of the procedure
As of September 2010 the procedure has been used 59 times in Spain by 32 differ-
ent contracting authorities.?" Contracting authorities in most of the regions of
the country 64 out of 18) have already used it at least once. It has been used 19
times in the region of Madrid, 12 in the Balearic Islands and 12 also in Andaluzia.
Three contracts identified in the Tenders Electronic Daily as competitive dia-
618. This number includes three that were started very recently. Data from the Tenders Electronic Daily
website and the Spanish National Official Journal.
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logue procedures ended up being tendered by means of either an open or negoti-
ated procedure.
The procedure was used 26 times for the award of public-private cooperation
contracts, although nine of them are related to different medical equipment need-
ed by a single hospital in Majorca.
In the medical sector in general, the procedure was used 13 times, by four differ-
ent contracting authorities.?" All of them appear to be public-private cooperation
contracts, both for the construction and management of hospitals and for specific
types of medical equipment needed.
For construction and refurbishment projects the procedure was used 21 times,
with II being public-private cooperation contracts. Out of this total, five are IT
projects related with the deployment of new networks in different areas of the
country. Apart from the IT projects, none of the other construction projects rep-
resent major works contracts. In fact, the most expensive construction project
that is neither an IT project or a public-private cooperation contract is the con-
struction of an oceanic research platform in Canaries valued at around 12 million
euros.
The procedure was used eight times for the award of contracts under I million eu-
ros, 10 for contracts between I and 10 million euros, 12 for contracts between II
and 100 million euros and 5 times over 101 million euros.?" The most expensive
contract was an IT contract (public-private cooperation contract) valued at 662
million euros.
619. The author was told by three different respondents that other contracting authorities in the medical
sector were conside~ing ad<;>ptin~the procedure in the fu.~re.
620. Itwas not possible to Identify the pnce of the remammg 24 contracts, as not all of the notices identified
a value.
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3. Groundsfor use
(x) Introduction
As we have seen in Chapters 4 and 9, the grounds for use of competitive dialogue
are uncertain, both at EU and national level. The author decided to ask this ques-
tion as in Portugal it had been found that respondents had a lot of doubts when
answering (in theory, in that case) on how to fulfill the grounds for use of the
procedure.
b)Data
The author asked some interviewees (eight) from contracting authorities that had
experience with competitive dialogue if they had any doubts when picking the
competitive dialogue procedure as the procedure to award their contractfs), The
reduced number of respondents is due to the fact that every answer pointed in
the same direction. In face of such a overwhelming response the author consid-
ered the category saturated and decided to dedicate the time available to other
questions.
All of the interviewees have stated that they did not have any doubts regarding
the grounds for use of the procedure. Two respondents have argued, however,
that they had doubts in the point of deciding to either go for a cooperation con-
tract?" or a public works concession but not the procedure itself.
621. Which, as we have seen in Chapter 8 above is an exceptional contract and has to be tendered by means
of a competitive dialogue.
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(3) Conclusions
Bearing in mind his previous experience with respondents in Porrugal.?" the au-
thor was not expecting at all this outcome to this question. The immediate an-
swer of "no" to the question also puzzled him. Three different reasons may be in-
volved in explaining this situation.
Firstly, competitive dialogue is the default procedure for cooperation contracts in
Spain. It means that for this type of contracts the doubts on the grounds for use
revolve around the type of contract selected and not the award procedure itself
since it, according to the national law, this has to be competitive dialogue. This
idea is further confirmed by the two respondents who said they had doubts re-
garding the type of contract but not the procedure itself.
Secondly, it may be evidence of the respondents subjectively fulfilling automati-
cally the grounds for used. This theory was (partially) argued by a lawyer inter-
viewed in Portugal.?" This lawyer argued that contracting authorities using the
procedure would always consider the grounds of use to be fulfilled. He suggested
that the test on the contracting authority's lack of means would be virtual since
the adoption of the procedure would mean automatically that contracting author-
ities did not have the necessary capabilities available otherwise. In other words, if
the contracting authorities are using competitive dialogue is because they consid-
er that they do not have the resources needed to tender the contract through an
open or restricted procedure.
621. Although the bulk of res.pondents there had no ac~al experience of matching the grounds for use to an
actual situation they were facing and, thus belong to a different set of respondents.
623. Please see Chapter 7·
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Thirdly, it may point to the contracting authorities not being attuned with poten-
tial issues surrounding grounds for use raise, perhaps due to a perceived lack of
importance of the issue.
4. Jury for theprocedure
(r) Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 9, according to article 296 of the Law on Public Sec-
tor Contracts and article 23 of Royal-Decree 817/2009, the jury for the procedure
on a competitive dialogue procedure has to include at least a third of members es-
pecially qualified in the topic in hand.
Interviewees were probed for information about how they had composed the jury
for the procedure. Their answers made it possible for the author to check if they
had composed the jury differently than in open or restricted procedures (by in-
cluding especially qualified members) and if they had hired external members. By
external members the author meant the hiring of expert assistance to participate
in the dialogue, irrespective of them being officially considered as actual members
of the jury or not. This would make it possible to know that, even if contracting
authorities are not complying with the legal obligation to include a certain num-
ber of especially qualified members, the actual work was being supported by
experts.
(2) Data: internal members
A trend was clear in data regarding internal members. Most of the contracting au-
thorities have not changed their habits on how to compose the jury for the proce-
dure. They stated that they have used the human resources normally attached to
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procurement in their institution. In other words, they were not making changes
due to the specific nature of competitive dialogue, as required by the Law on
Public Sector Contracts. The author had been told by one of the lawyers inter-
viewed at the start of the empirical research phase that this would probably oc-
cur. This lawyer classified the legal rule as "useless".
Six interviewees stated that they had created a multidisciplinary task force and
their jury had included especially qualified members. These were actual techni-
cians of the contracting authority that usually do not take part in the procure-
ment process and had been asked to take part in it. In two of the cases, the actual
heads of the project had had prior management experience in the private sector.
One of the lawyers interviewed had participated in multiple procedures and said
that the creation of multidisciplinary teams to tackle a project amounted to a "sea
change" in the culture of contracting authorities. According to his experience,
contracting authorities' departments tend to work separately and not together.
"Legal counsels usually produce their legal opinion and then leave the grunt work
of making it happen to someone else". He also said it was no coincidence that in
the procedures producing positive outcomes the creation of this multidisciplinary
teams had happened.
Three interviewees from local councils have remarked that the jury of their pro-
cedure included politicians. In two cases, this meant not only politicians from the
party in power but also from the opposition. They were asked about the reasons
of this inclusion and replied that it reduced the "political risk". In other words,
having politicians from the opposition on board and with access to all material
ensured the project would not be used as a political tool. Furthermore, it reduced
the risk of misrepresentation of the project on the media.
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Although the author did not ask most respondents why they had not hired exter-
nal consultants, most stated they had not done so due to the costs involved. Only
one of the contracting authorities said they did not have a need for external assis-
tance and were able to carry multiple procedures successfully.
(3) Data: external members
A clear trend could be identified regarding the use of external members in the
jury for the procedure. Only four contracting authorities have stated that they
have used external assistance in conducting competitive dialogue procedures. In
no cases were they members of the jury and have taken part only at a technical
level, that is, the decision making ability remained in the internal members of the
jury. In one of these circumstances the external participation was drafted in only
at the dialogue stage to help with the discussions. Out of this three respondents,
two said that hiring external help was key to the success of their project. They
were adamant that it would have been very difficult to achieve a similar outcome
without expert assistance.
Furthermore, three of the respondents stated that they have taken the opportuni-
ty of using competitive dialogue and composing the jury differently to embrace
change in their practice. These changes made the contracting authority create
multidisciplinary teams to tackle a project, something similar to what, according
to them, can be found in private companies.
(4) Conclusions
The reasons for not using more external help are not clear, although the author
would point to the dissonance between the upfront cost of hiring external help
and the deferred and not so clear benefits. Entities that hired external assistance
were happy with the results after the procedure had ended, when they could as-
sess the cost to the benefit effectively accrued by the help. Cash-strapped enti-
ties?" may simply look at the upfront cost and decide to go with the cheapest op-
tion possible.
So Work done in advance and detail in the descriptive document
(I) Introduction
Interviewees were asked about work carried out in preparation of the tender and
how much detail they had included in the descriptive document. This would al-
low the author to check if there was any correlation between anticipating the
problems beforehand, give detailed descriptive documents and success.
(2)Data
Two clear and opposing trends were identifiable. Nine of the respondents stated
they had done work in advance and included a lot of detail in the descriptive doc-
ument. Eight stated otherwise, that in reality not a lot of detail had been included
in the descriptive document, all but one due to lack of doing work in advance.
One gave a mixed response.
The first group of respondents has included much detail for two main sets of rea-
sons. Firstly, because they had done work in advance on the technical solution
and wanted to pass this information to the candidates.?" Secondly, they were fully
624. One should bear in mind ~he th~ lack of payment for the development of solutions in the country that
will be discussed further down ID section 6.
625. One of the resl?Ondent~ said .that after the first competitive d.ialogue ~~here they already had drafted a
fairly detailed technical specifications - they tuned down the technical detail ID subsequent ones.
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aware of the lack of practice in the country with this procedure and thus wanted
to convey as much information as possible. They have included a lot of "house-
keeping information", for instance, on how the meetings would be held and their
sequence, how contacts would be made, whom and how many people might at-
tend meetings, if the meetings were to discuss the entire project or simply parts
of it or how the minutes of meeting would be drafted. The respondents that in-
cluded a lot of detail at the start also indicated they did some work before the
procedure was launched. Two, for instance, posted prior information notices to
gauge the market's interest in the project. Another one said preparations for the
tender started a couple of years before.
Eight of the nine ended up with a positive opinion of the procedure. The same
eight respondents have completed successfully their competitive dialogues and
were satisfied with the outcome. The deviant case said the procedure ended suc-
cessfully but that he was not entirely happy with the outcome as only one compa-
ny was deemed suitable and the discussions were held only with it. Furthermore,
one of the lawyers said that although having more information was in general
good, one should not put information that could have a negative influence later
on. He pointed to detail of award criteria as particularly sensitive area where cau-
tion should be exerted.
The second group of interviewees did not include many details in the descriptive
documents, either technical or administrative clauses on how the dialogue would
be processed, with all but one not doing a lot of groundwork in advance. On the
technical part, two interviewees said they had only included either a basic project
or something even vaguer. One of these participants said they had not disclosed
technical information on purpose, as a way to entice candidates to be more cre-
ative and exert more control over the procedure. The same respondent said they
did not disclosed information for the duration of the procedure on purpose.?" In
three cases, regarding the lack of specific administrative clauses, respondents stat-
ed that they had only included what was already in the national law."? Of this
group, three managed to have successful procedures (achieving the aims set forth
by the contracting authority at the start). Two were concluded without the con-
tracting authorities being convinced it had been a success. The remaining two
were not concluded due to lack of financing from the candidates or needed docu-
ments, that is, factors that were external to the contracting authority or the way
the procedure had been organised. In this analysis, we should then focus on the
first five cases. Of these, three were clearly successful and two were less success-
ful, but the contracting authority still managed to take them to the end and
award the contract.
The mixed response was given by a contracting authority that has used the proce-
dure multiple times.t" This respondent stated that in the first few - started even
before the transposition of Directive 2004/18 to Spain - the detail had been
sparse, but as time went on they included more detail on the administrative claus-
es. This covered how the meetings would happen and the contacts between the
parties held. Even so, in total not a lot of detail had been included. Some of the
procedures were clearly successful - namely the last ones - but some were not, be-
ing interrupted during the dialogue stage when prototypes were being tested.
626. In the end, this was one of the reasonably unsuccessful examples of the use of the procedure in the
country and where the interviewee expressed most regret on how the procedure had been conducted.
627. In ~o situ~t~ons an underlying theme appeared t~ be present with resl_londents ap~arently puzzled by
the question as If It was obvIOUS.only w~at was already m the law should be included. This happened in two
interviews by telephone, so the Impression of the author may not be correct due to the lack of further hints
such as body language that could be observed on a face to face interview,
628. The author is not identi~ th~ exact number of times as it ~ould violate the confidentiality
agreement since it was the only entity usmg the procedure that number of times.
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(3) Conclusion
The author thinks that there are signs of a correlation between preparing the
procedure in advance, producing detailed documents and having a successful pro-
cedure where the contracting authority is happy with the end result. That is not
to say that they are the sole cause or even the major one since other factors were
not assessed. As possible other factors one could suggest, for instance, that these
contracting authorities are more careful during the dialogue stage (by giving dur-
ing the procedure a lot of information to candidates), have better project manage-
ment skills, hired external assistance or have had candidates who are more at-
tuned to procurement where discussions take part or have had previous
experience.
On the other hand, however, one may argue cautiously that it is possible to guide
competitive dialogue procedures to their end without supplying a lot of technical
and/or administrative information. The caution is due to the two problematic
cases and also the limited number (five) of relevant answers involved.
6. Payment of solutions
(I) Introduction
The Law on Public Sector Contracts allows in its article 16312, as does article 29/8
of Directive 2004h8, for contracting authorities to offer money to offset the cost
of developing solutions. Although contracting authorities are not bound to offer
these payments, if they decide to do so, it has to be established from the start.
Respondents were probed if they had paid candidates for the development of so-
lutions. If so, they would be asked about how they had calculated the payments.
(2)Data
A unanimous trend was found. None of the contracting authorities interviewed in
the course of this research paid candidates for developing solutions. Most of the
interviewees said they had dismissed the idea of payments straight away. Two rea-
sons were given. Firstly, they wanted to spend the minimum amount of money
possible in the procedure. Secondly, two of the contracting authorities stated that
they were sure the relevant companies (well known companies in their field)
would turn up. Although it was not asked, of the cases where only a limited num-
her of candidates (one or two) turned up, no respondent linked this fact to the
possibility it was due to the lack of payments.
Only one of the respondents said the possibility of paying for the development of
solutions but, in the end, decided not to do so. Another one acknowledged that
private companies would incur in higher costs in an competitive dialogue proce-
dure than in an open procedure and decided to waive the bond the candidates
have to deposit at the start of the procedure. In this case, it was a substantial val-
ue since it was a multimillion euro project.
One of the lawyers interviewed suggested payments should not be standard and
only considered for exceptional situations. He suggested, for instance, payments
should be made available when prototyping or field tests of new items occur as
these usually carry heftier costs than simply attaching a team to draft and develop
a solution.
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(3) Conclusion
From the data gathered it is clear contracting authorities are not interested in
offering candidates money to offset development costs. The apparent reason is to
save on procedural costs even if one could argue that payments could entice more
candidates to participate and, in the end, have a better solution or more competi-
tion. Either contracting authorities are not seeing any benefit at all in this possi-
bility or, in a cost-benefit analysis the need to calculate a cost that is certain (the
payment) against a possible benefit, the cost outweighs the benefit. As none of
the interviewees complained of not having enough candidates in the dialogue, it
appears companies are participating in competitive dialogue procedures in suffi-
cient numbers even without payments on the table. However, it may be argued
that considering payments would have effects on their commitment to the dia-
logue. For instance, it may be considered that offering payments under the condi-
tion that the candidate develops a solution and submits a tender"? would improve
competition at the tender stage.
7. Assessment of the economic, technical orprofossional ability
of candidates and number of candidates
(r) Introduction
According to articles 147 through 149 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, the
assessment of economic, technical or professional ability of candidates has to be
done in accordance with objective criteria. Article 165/2 of the same law states
that if a maximum number of candidates is established by the contracting author-
629. See section 20 for a discussion on the non-show of candidates at the tender stage.
ity, it cannot be less than three. Article 14912 states, however, that if the number
of candidates deemed suitable is less than the minimum the contracting authority
may?" carry on.
Interviewees were asked if they had capped the numbers of participants to a max-
imum and how many candidates had presented themselves.
(2)Data
A clear trend can be identified in the data collected. Only two of the contracting
authorities interviewed have limited the numbers of candidates that could partic-
ipate in the dialogue stage. One of the contracting authorities and two of the
lawyers offered the explanation that this could be due to a perception from the
contracting authorities that limiting the numbers might have a negative impact
on prospective candidates.
Out of the two entities that have actually limited the numbers, only one did ex-
clude candidates from taking part in the dialogue as in the other the number of
candidates was smaller than the limit. This contracting authority was then faced
with requests for explanations from the excluded companies, but without any fil-
ing for administrative or judicial review.
The widespread lack of a cap led to situations where up to 20 candidates have
been considered suitable and the contracting authority forced to discuss with
them. The contracting authority faced with this high number of candidates ad-
mitted it had been very difficult to manage the process. This interviewee said it
would have been preferable to limit the numbers beforehand or to have carried
out successive rounds during the dialogue. Although this was an extreme case,
630. It does not say it has to.
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there were four other contracting authorities that reported having to deal with
five or more candidates. The author does not know the exact number of proce-
dures where this has happened as two of these entities have used the procedure
multiple times. They have reported, though, that happening to them at least
once.
The opposite situation has also been observed in the data. In three cases, the dia-
logue proceeded with only one candidate. This was acknowledged by the respon-
dents as a suboptimal solution, but they were still able to take the procedure to
its end with, in their view, positive results (ie, contract awarded). It was argued by
one of them that ending the dialogue because only one candidate turned up
would be illegal in his interpretation of the Spanish law. In his view, it would have
been akin to a tenderer groundless exclusion. That contracting authority, there-
fore, decided to carry on but made it clear to the candidate during the dialogue
that if it did not produce an acceptable solution they would conclude the proce-
dure at the end of the dialogue stage, as they were legally entitled to, and then
open a negotiated procedure.
(3) Conclusion
It is clear from the data that the contracting authorities are not limiting the num-
ber of candidates at the start of the dialogue. The reasons are unclear and may be
related to fears of lack of competition, or simply lack of foresight from the con-
tracting authorities. However, in most of the procedures held so far not limiting
the number of candidates has not been a problem because the actual number of
companies is relatively small.
8. Outline solution
(I) Introduction
The author wanted to know how the contracting authorities had organised the
start of the procedure, in particular the way they had instructed the draft of the
solution. In other words, the author probed the interviewees if they had request-
ed an outline solution from the candidates
b)Data
A clear trend was observed in the data with 14 respondents saying they had re-
quested outline solutions from the candidates before starting the dialogue stage.
This allowed them to have the first meeting knowing already what was the candi-
date's solution and prepare in advance both questions and suggestions for
improvement.
Four respondents said no outline solution was requested. In these cases, contract-
ing authorities had to spend the first meeting of the dialogue stage explaining
what the candidates were supposed to present with their solutions. In addition,
one of the respondents stated this had been a waste of time since they waited the
appropriate time between the invitation to the dialogue and the first meeting for
an outline solution to be prepared. As no outline solution was handed at the first
meeting, the contracting authority had again to wait the same period before the
second meeting.
(3) Conclusion
It is apparent from the data that Spanish contracting authorities have a prefer-
ence for requesting outline solutions from the outset and to develop them during
the dialogue.
9. Exclusion of candidates or solutions during the dialogue stage
(I) Introduction
Both the Law on Public Sector Contracts and the Directive 2004118 allow for the
dialogue to have successive stages with the aim of progressively reducing the
number of solutions being discussed with the contracting authority. It is not clear
from the law if this exclusion pertains only to the solutions (with the candidates
being retained for the tender stage) or if the candidates themselves are actually
excluded.
Interviewees were probed if they had forecast this possibility - through its inclu-
sion in the procedure documents - and if they had used it.
b)Data
Three trends can be observed from the data collected. Firstly, of all the contract-
ing authorities interviewed, none has actually excluded any candidate or solution
during the dialogue stage. Secondly, eleven interviewees stated that they did not
forecast this possibility. Thirdly, eight interviewees did forecast the possibility of
excluding solutions or candidates but decided not to do so. Finally, one intervie-
wee argued that exclusions at this stage affected only the solution and not the
candidate itself.
(3) Data: lack of exclusions during the dialogue stage
The absolute lack of exclusions is one of the most clear trends identified by the
author in his research. The only reason given by respondents for this widespread
attitude was a fear of reducing competition. No other reasons were put forward
in the interviews to explain this decision.
Interestingly, however, three contracting authorities argued that losing candi-
dates had expressed a preference to be excluded during the dialogue, before the
final tenders were submitted. These candidates, they argued, said there was a
price to be paid on their reputation in the market if they submitted non-winning
bids, particularly when their bid fared badly in comparison with the winner. In
the candidates' view, if the contracting authority thinks their solution is not com-
petitive, they would rather know that before submitting the final tender. One of
the respondents added that, from a cost point of view, non-winning participants
would have also preferred to be excluded during the dialogue to avoid incurring in
the costs of preparing and submitting a complete tender.
Furthermore, some contracting authorities have also said that candidates during
the dialogue stage were quitting the procedure. This happened when the con-
tracting authority "raised the bar", as a respondent explained, and updated the re-
quirements for the solution during the dialogue?" or asked for a certain require-
ment to be accompanied by a specific price. Candidates were not excluded by the
contracting authority but their decision to leave the procedure was based on the
more stringent requirements. In one of the cases this was clearly carried through
631. Please. see sec.tion 14 under for a more detailed discussion on the different Spanish models of dialogue
stage seen in practice.
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applying successive stages in the dialogue where more and more detail was asked
from the candidates.
Regarding the exclusions referring only to solutions or also to candidates them-
selves the author registered both answers from one respondent each. One of the
contracting authorities suggested the exclusions during the dialogue stage per-
tained to candidates, while one of the lawyers said it was only for solutions and
that candidates would have to be retained for the tender stage.
(4) Data: possibility of excluding not exercised
Although eleven respondents considered and included the possibility of conduct-
ing successive eliminating stages in the documents of the procedure, none has
done so. Of these interviewees, one stated the excluding reasons were simply for-
mal (not showing up to meetings, not supplying information asked for) and had
nothing to do with the merit of the solution being proposed. Another one con-
ceded that, although the motives for exclusions included in the documents of the
procedure referred to the merits of the solution, they were "very discretionary".
No other reasons were put forward in the interviews to explain this decision and
the author did not press the point further.
(s) Data: not even considering the possibility of excluding
candidates
Out of the eight respondents who stated that they had not included the possibili-
ty of excluding candidates during the dialogue stage in the documents of the pro-
cedure, only one offered an explanation. For this interviewee, they were expecting
limited numbers and thus thought this possibility would not be needed. Two in-
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terviewees faced with a number of suitable candidates they deemed, in hindsight,
as too large to be managed properly, said they would have preferred to have
adopted the possibility of excluding candidates during the dialogue stage. No oth-
er reasons were put forward in the interviews to explain this decision.
(6) Conclusion
I t is clear from the data that contracting authorities have not been excluding can-
didates or solutions during the dialogue stage, even in situations where the num-
ber of participants is clearly above what the contracting authority would consider
optimal. One can argue this may be due - once more - to fears of stifling competi-
tion or lack of experience with the procedure.
It is worth noting at this stage the preference expressed by some losing candi-
dates for being excluded during the dialogue stage. One would argue that, in theo-
ry, all candidates that endure the dialogue and then submit a bid would accept
that not winning the contract is part of the game. What was not expected is that
they would actually prefer being excluded during the dialogue to avoid having
their tender officialy classified with a low score. One could argue the opposing
view that candidates are not bound to present tenders and only do so on their
own accord. In addition, they can quit the procedure at any point until the ten-
ders are submitted.
Finally, contracting authorities may be discreetly achieving the same objective of
reducing the number of participants by upping the requirements and the candi-
dates deciding to quit the procedure. One could say contracting authorities are
not excluding candidates or solutions officially, but that by elevating the demands
during the dialogue they are having candidates dropping by their own accord.
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This result is being achieved without the risks of an administrative appeal or judi-
cial review.
IO. Successive stages during the dialogue
(I) Introduction
The author wanted to know how the contracting authorities had organised the
dialogue stage, namely if they had undertaken successive stages. As we have seen
in the previous section, no candidates or solutions were ever excluded, so succes-
sive stages with the objective of leading to exclusions were not present, but the
author did not know this in advance.
b)Data
As we have seen above, no candidates or solutions were ever excluded at this
stage, thus meaning successive rounds were not conducted. However, eight situa-
tions were seen where the contracting authority asked for successive revisions of
solutions to be submitted, that is, more detailed solutions or changes to already
detailed designs. In particular two cases were observed of what contracting au-
thorities described as "cycles", where the requirements of the solution (either
technical or financial) and level of detail expected would be increased and some
candidates, by their own decision, would retire from the procedure completely.
This has had the effect of reducing the number of candidates without formal
exclusions.
Furthermore, as during the dialogue stage candidates are not bound by what they
offer with their solutions but only by tenders, successive stages are also not being
used to secure definitive compromises in any area where agreement has been
reached.
(3) Conclusion
From the data it is clear Spanish contracting authorities are not using successive
stages to eliminate candidates or solutions. They are using it, however, to get
more detail and to increase the demands made to candidates. In turn, some can-
didates are quitting the procedure when they feel they can no longer achieve what
is being asked.
II. Meetings
(I) Introduction
The Law on Public Sector Contracts does not contain any detail on how con-
tracting authorities are supposed to conduct the dialogue. The author asked the
interviewees how they had set up the meetings during the dialogue stage, focusing
the questions on the number of meetings held and the participants involved.
(2)Data
First and foremost, all contracting authorities conducted meetings with each can-
didate separately. No instances were observed of contracting authorities having a
first group meeting with all the candidates. Secondly, all meetings were held face
to face. No instances whatsoever have been found of meetings held by telephone
or videoconference means. One lawyer said it was puzzling contracting authori-
ties insisted on having all the meetings in person when at least the aims of some
could have been achieved through less burdensome means. Not even in the com-
munications between the parties, are contracting authorities adopting tools that
could facilitate their work. Only one contracting authority stated that they had
created a secure online platform with a common area (where common informa-
tion would be posted) and a private one for each candidate (where the communi-
cations specific to each candidate would take place). All the other contracting au-
thorities are conducting communications using ad hoc systems such as telephone
or email.
Contracting authorities were probed about how they had organised the order of
the meetings, for instance, by following the order of application or its opposite. It
was observed that most are not worried about how to set up the meetings, since
only three contracting authorities have taken that into account. The remaining
have set up the meetings according to the agendas of all involved.
Regarding the number of meetings held, three trends have been identified. First-
ly, four respondents have had only three meetings in total during this stage, either
by design (limit set in advance to make sure the dialogue would end in time) or
consequence (it was deemed sufficient to close the dialogue). Secondly, three in-
terviewees had only one or two meeting with the candidates. Thirdly, the remain-
ing contracting authorities had multiple meetings with candidates, without speci-
fying the exact number.
It was found that most contracting authorities held meetings with all the poten-
tial relevant persons from both sides present. Four contracting authorities have
created a task force for each relevant area that would meet their counterparts
only. The author was told that this made the dialogue more manageable (fewer
people to coordinate at each time) and possible to have meetings focused in the
problems at hand.
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(3) Conclusion
Itwas observed in the data that, on the lack of detail imposed by the Public Sec-
tor Contracts Law, there is a varied practice developed in Spain on how to con-
duct the meetings for a competitive dialogue procedure. A "one size fits all" ap-
proach to the meetings in the dialogue stage was not found.
I t is noteworthy to mention that some contracting authorities are having an ex-
tremely limited total number of meetings with candidates.
The author also believes that it is worth mentioning the fact contracting authori-
ties are not adopting a more streamlined approach to the meetings. By having all
the meetings in person and eschewing any technologies that could be used, con-
tracting authorities may be making it more difficult for companies to fully partic-
ipate and are increasing the costs (in money, man hours and even the duration of
the procedure) for everyone involved. It is one thing to schedule meetings in a
city such as Madrid or Barcelona that have good domestic and international tran-
sport links, it is another thing to arrange meetings in a small local council in the
middle of the country. What may be at play is that this is a new procedure and
the word "meeting" conjures in the contracting authorities the idea that it can
only mean "face-to-face meeting". Perhaps this could be an area warranting fur-
ther research as the procedure is used more in Spain, or even to compare with the
practice in other countries.
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:12.Minutes of meeting
(I) Introduction
As with the previous section, the lack of explicit detail in the Law of Public Sec-
tor Contracts means that contracting authorities have to decide on how they will
keep record of what is discussed in each meeting. The author asked how the con-
tracting authorities kept a record of discussions with candidates and what con-
tent was included, that is, especially information classified as confidential by the
candidate.
b)Data
All respondents bar one said minutes of each meeting were kept. They differed
widely, however, on the content included. Two clear trends could be identified.
Firstly, minutes of meeting were never shown to other candidates, not even after
the dialogue had ended. In one case, the losing tenderer asked to have access to
the winner's documents (including minutes of meeting). The request was declined
by the contracting authority directly and afterwards in an administrative appeal.
This tenderer has filed for judicial review and is awaiting decision.
Secondly, most of the contracting authorities have not produced very detailed
minutes of meeting, rather preferring to keep details to a minimum to reduce the
administrative overhead. Furthermore, one respondent stated they were unsure
on how to draft the minutes and have only produced summarised accounts of the
discussions.
Regarding information deemed as confidential by the candidate, two contracting
authorities have not included any information classified as confidential by the
candidate. Itwas explained to the author that if the information was confidential,
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it should not be recorded. On the other hand, five contracting authorities have
included confidential information. They considered it relevant for the decision
making process and, thus, should be included on the minutes of meeting.
(3) Conclusions
From the data gathered it appears contracting authorities are at least keeping a
summarised record of what is being discussed during the dialogue stage. In addi-
tion, the information collected is only shown to the appropriate candidate and
not to the other competitors. The scenario is less clear regarding confidential in-
formation, with some contracting authorities preferring to include it and others
not. However, bearing in mind they are not showing the minutes to other candi-
dates is reasonable to question if all the information - including confidential in-
formation - should not be included in the minutes of meeting.
IJ. Confidentiality
(r) Introduction
Confidentiality is regulated in the Law on Public Sector Contracts in article
16612, in very similar terms to article 2913 of Directive 2oo41I8. Therefore, the po-
tential issues we have already covered in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 can also be at play in
Spain.
Interviewees were asked how they had dealt with confidentiality, that is, with in-
formation that was deemed confidential by the participants.
Various themes could be observed in the data gathered. Firstly, a significant num-
ber of contracting authorities have considered all the information transmitted
during the dialogue to be confidential. Secondly, a significant number of contract-
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ing authorities have also said confidentiality was not a problem at all during their
procedure. Thirdly, a relevant number of contracting authorities have made all
participants (public and private) sign non-disclosure agreements.
(2) Data: treating all information as confidential
Nine contracting authorities have said that they decided to treat all information
received from participants during the dialogue stage as confidential. Even if the
candidates had not asked to treat such information as confidential, contracting
authorities have done so by their own accord. Two reasons were given to the au-
thor. On the one hand, they were worried companies would not take part in the
dialogue if confidentiality was not assured even beyond what is requested by law.
On the other hand, they feared it could increase litigation during the procedure.
The fact all information is considered as confidential by these contracting author-
ities has not impeded that such information is included in the common technical
specifications in the situations where these were used. One lawyer argued, howev-
er, that this blanket coverage of all information was happening only during the di-
alogue stage and that it was difficult when the moment came to draft the techni-
cal specifications to convince the companies to accept the use of information
they regarded as confidential in the technical specifications.
(3) Data: confidentiality as a non issue
II contracting authorities have said that confidentiality was not a problem during
their competitive dialogue procedures. No company raised any issues related to
confidentiality either during the dialogue stage or when the common technical
specifications were drafted.
(4) Data: non-disclosure agreements
Four different contracting authorities have dealt with confidentiality by going a
step further than simply considering all information confidential. These entities
have made both their personnel and companies involved in the dialogue sign non-
disclosure agreements. They said this option conveyed a message of seriousness
from the contracting authority that confidentiality was being taken as very impor-
tant and that companies could take part in the dialogue knowing that the infor-
mation they did not want their competitors to know was kept as confidential.
(s) Conclusion
From the data it appears that contracting authorities are considering confiden-
tiality as a major issue and that not ensuring it during the dialogue could have a
negative impact on competition. This would explain why many contracting au-
thorities are offering a blanket confidentiality protection from the onset. The au-
thor doubts, however, that this protection amounts to what contracting authori-
ties claim it does. If contracting authorities were adopting a model of organising
competitive dialogue where each candidate presented a tender based on its own
solution, then the blanket confidentiality protection would make sense. The trou-
ble is many of these contracting authorities, as will be explained in section 14, are
in fact developing a master or trunk solution during the dialogue using the inputs
from the candidates (that will end up as the common technical specifications).
While the candidates think. they are working on their solution, in reality, they are
composing a master or trunk solution with their best bits cherry picked by the
contracting authority. The author feels that for all,the declarations of protection
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of confidentiality, in reality protection is only apparent in these situations where
a master or trunk solution is being developed during the dialogue stage. Which
then leads to a pressing question: what is the point of having confidentiality dur-
ing the dialogue stage if the objective of the dialogue is the creation of a common
solution and technical specifications? It appears to make sense only when the
model of each candidate presenting a tender based on its own solution is being
used.
:14.Models of dialogue stage seen inpractice
b) Introduction
The author did not anticipate that during the interview stage the need to create
models to describe how the dialogue was being processed. From the interviews
conducted it became apparent that contracting authorities were using three
different models to organise the dialogue stage of the procedure. This is not to
say that these are the only possible models to run a dialogue stage in Spain but
they were the only ones identified by the author. These models are the own solu-
tion model, crowd-sourced or common trunk model and the common specifica-
tions model. In fig. 2 hereunder it is possible to see the three models side by side.
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Four interviewees stated that they followed the model of having candidates pre-
senting tenders based on the solution they developed during the dialogue stage.
In these cases, no common technical specifications were drafted at the end of the
dialogue stage and candidates simply presented updated versions of their solu-
tions, eventually including an overall price that had not been discussed before-
hand. One of the respondents stated that, according to his interpretation of the
Spanish law this is the only model possible and that the others are illegal.
Some cherry-picking of solutions was observed by the author in these instances,
as solutions were being developed in parallel with the contracting authority sug-
gesting changes to solutions influenced by discussions with other candidates. One
of the respondents affirmed that confidentiality had been assured by not identify-
ing the candidate that had come up with the information being transmitted to
other candidates. No candidates complained or filed for administrative or judicial
review.
- 261-
(3)Crowd-sourced or common trunk model
In total, five respondents have used this new model representing 15 different pro-
cedures. This represents a substantial number of cases where this model has been
deployed. In fact, in the sample analysed, it is the most common model.
This model is characterised by having a common development trunk with partici-
pants contributing during the dialogue stage changes to the solution that then
ends up in a common technical specifications document. Since the actual devel-
opment of the common solution is shared among the candidates, with each con-
tributing with some elements, the development process is similar to what can be
found in crowd-sourced projects such as Wikipedia.
One can describe the model as follows.?' The contracting authority has either a
pre-conceived idea about a solution for its need that needs confirmation or devel-
ops enough capabilities during the dialogue to know exactly what it needs. During
the dialogue stage it then proceeds to request changes to the solutions presented
by the candidates to fit its developing "master solution". These changes amount
to an extreme situation of cherry picking, as candidates are in reality contributing
to a common solution and not developing their own, although in appearance they
are still doing so. The common solution under development is thus a much better
match for needs of the contracting authority than the original solutions and con-
stitutes the "master solution". This progressive unifying development may take
some iterations where the candidates end up developing ever more similar solu-
632. It would have been preferable and more clear to present exact scenarios of where this model was used
or, at least, hypothetical ones drawn on the practice. However, the first would entail breaching the
confidentiality agreement signed with the respondents. The second, although apparently feasible. proved to
be more complex than the author anticipated and all the examples he came up with were too drawn on ~he
practice he has seen that it would be extremely easy for any reader to pinpoint exactly what contractmg
authorities had used it. This could be considered, once more, as breaching die confidentiality agreeme~t: It
was thus decided to simply describe the model in theory without providing specific examples. recogmzmg
though these would provide further clarification.
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tions. In reality, they are contributing to the development of the "master solu-
tion" without knowing.
When the development of the "master solution" reaches a satisfactory stage for
the contracting authority, it closes the dialogue and sends out a common techni-
cal specification document based on the "master solution" that candidates will
have to follow when presenting a tender. In consequence, their tenders will share
many characteristics and be very different from the original solutions put forward.
It must be said, however, that neither have candidates complained according to
the contracting authorities information, nor have any administrative or judicial
review been filed by candidates.
This model may also be a product of the difficulties of keeping information com-
ing from different sources separate to avoid a breach of confidentiality. Two re-
spondents stated it was very hard, even when making a conscious effort, to have
discussions with different companies while at the same time ensuring no confi-
dential information was being transferred.
(4) Common specifications model
The common technical specifications model, similar to the mandatory model im-
posed by the Portuguese law was also found in Spanish practice. In this model
contracting authorities draft a common set of technical specifications at the end
of the dialogue stage and candidates then submit tenders based on these specifi-
cations and not the solution they developed during the dialogue stage. In the
sample studied, this model has been used in two situations only.
The author has observed clear cherry picking of elements of different solutions to
compose the common specifications by contracting authorities. The difference
between this and the previous model is that no "master solution" was developed
during the dialogue stage and the solutions under development during the dia-
logue stage kept their individuality. In consequence, candidates had to make sig-
nificant changes to their solutions to make them compatible with the technical
specifications.
As with the two models above described, no candidates complained or filed for
administrative or judicial review.
(s) Conclusion
The author was not expecting to provide a new matrix system for classifying the
practice of conducting the dialogue stage. It must be said though that in many
cases the actual model being used in practice is hard to identify since the border-
lines between them are blurred. It is hard to come to a conclusion in many
circumstances when the organization of the dialogue and development of solu-
tions are not addressed in the tender documents. In those borderline cases, the
only way to determine which of the models had been used, would have been to
have more extensive interviews with participants in the meetings {not all of the
respondents from contracting authorities took part in those discussions} to check
how the solutionls) were being developed and eventually the respective minutes
of meeting. Furthermore, the development of this classification came only at the
end of the empirical research stage in late July 2010.
One should add though, that it may be the case that the most common seen in
practice, the crowd-sourced or common trunk model,'?' may be the most appeal-
633. This model was also mentioned, albeit with a different name, by Burnett, Competitive di4logue - A
practical guide (EIPA, 2010). In addition, a three-tiered classification was also suggested by Racca and
Casalini, {Paper) (2010) Implementation and application of competitive dialogue: experience in Italy. !h~se
authors called the models as Chinese walls model (similar to the own solution model), mixed solution (SImilar
to the crowd-sourced or common trunk model) and patchwork {similar to the common specifications modeO.
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ing for contracting authorities in many circumstances. If the objective is to have
only one solution, the temptation to create a master solution during the dialogue
and not keep developing artificially multiple solutions in closed compartments is
obvious. In consequence, most borderline cases will probably fit this model more
than the others with own solution and common specification models being more
marginal.
I t can be argued that the crowd-sourced or common trunk model may pose inter-
esting questions about the value of confidentiality during the dialogue stage when
all candidates are in reality working in the same solution (albeit not knowing) and
adding their inputs to a common trunk. As we have discussed in Chapter 5 in
more detail, what is the value of confidentiality during the dialogue stage when a
common specification is being drafted either during the dialogue or at its end?
The crowd-sourced or common trunk model may also raise questions about its le-
gality, bearing in mind the confidentiality requirements set forth in both the na-
tionallaw and the Directive 2oo4!I8. What could not be assessed by the current
research is to know if this model is having a negative impact on competition by
discouraging potential participants from submitting entries. So far, contracting
authorities are apparently being able to generate enough interest in their projects
to carry them to the end.
I t is also very apparent that the practice in Spain is showing extreme situations of
cherry picking, but that is not leading to candidates filing for judicial review.
I;. Stage tofine tune tenders
b) Introduction
Article 167h of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, similarly to article 29/6 of
Directive 2004h8 states the possibility of the contracting authority requesting
extra information from the tenderers before selecting the winner. Contracting au-
thorities were asked if they had conducted any sort of discussions at this point
and with what content.
b)Data
Three trends were observed in the data. Eight of the respondents have not used it
at all, six have discussed some topics with candidates and three were interviewed
before the end of this stage and could not thus provide an answer.
The first set of interviewees stated that they were conducting the post-dialogue
stages of the procedure as they would do if it were an open procedure and had
thus decided not to discuss any items with the tenderers. In addition, one of
these interviewees said any changes to tenders after they had been opened would
put in jeopardy the principle of tender stability. None of these respondents stated
that he had preferred to have discussions at this point.
The second set of interviewees has taken advantage of the stage to fine tune ten-
ders. One of them had two or three meetings for instance. However, most of the
respondents discussed minor points such as the brand (irrelevant for the actual
functionality) of equipment to be supplied or asked for clarifications to check if
the tender submitted was compatible with the technical specifications. The dis-
cussion of any sort of financial issues was mentioned only once.
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(3) Conclusion
From the data it appears contracting authorities are avoiding to fine tune tenders
or engaging in detailed discussions. Over half of the respondents have had no dis-
cussions whatsoever and most of the remaining have kept their discussions to a
minimum.
:16. Stage to request clarifications and confirmation of
commitments
(I) Introduction
Article 167/3 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, similarly to article 29/7 of
Directive 2oo4!I8 allows the contracting authority the possibility of having fur-
ther limited discussions with the tenderer offering the best tender. Contracting
authorities were asked if they had conducted any sort of discussions at this point
and with what content.
(z)Data
Three trends were observed. Ten respondents have not discussed anything with
the winning tenderer. Four discussed some topics as with the previous section
and three did not respond as they were interviewed before this stage.
The first set of respondents again argued that they were running the post-dia-
logue stages of the procedure as if it was an open procedure. Two of them said
that companies wanted changes to contractual terms and they simply told them
the time for suggesting those changes was the dialogue and not this stage. One
even replied that the private company appeared to be gearing up for protracted
discussions and was "taken completely by surprise" when the contracting authori-
ty said the level of detail achieved was enough for the contract to be signed. The
contracting authority elaborated by saying the company would lose the bond if it
refused to sign on the agreed terms.
The second set of respondents had meetings to discuss some topics. Two of the
respondents have discussed financial issues (one on the confirmation of bank
commitments), one had discussions to discuss small details not covered in the bid
and the last one legal issues such as the reception of the works.
(3) Conclusion
It is very clear from the data that contracting authorities in Spain are refraining
from undertaking discussions after the selection of the winning tenderer. Most
respondents did not have any sort of discussions with candidates. Furthermore,
the ones that had discussions limited them to smaller issues.
I7· Administrative andjudicial reviews
(I) Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 8 above, private parties may either file for administra-
tive appeal or judicial review if they feel aggrieved. Contracting authorities were
asked if any company decided to use any of these options.
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Of all contracting authorities interviewed only two reported administrative ap-
peals to have been filed. One of those said the aggrieved bidder had subsequently
filed for judicial review. A third contracting authority stated that all the candi-
dates excluded at the assessment of the economic, technical or professional abili-
ty of candidates stage have asked to know the reasons for the exclusion although
none filed for either administrative or judicial review.
In the first case, where both the administrative and judicial reviews filed, only two
candidates reached the tender stage and the aggrieved company considered that
the award criteria were illegal. Furthermore, they wanted to gain access to the in-
formation classified by the other company as confidential. Their administrative
review was unsuccessful and they have decided to file a judicial review, without a
decision as of yet.
In the second case, the company wanted simply to gain access to the confidential
information. This was declined by the contracting authority and by the adminis-
trative appeal body. The company did not file subsequently for judicial review
where this issue could be settled definitively, as it would be interesting to see if a
court would give precedence to either the confidentiality or the principle of
transparency that governs public procurement.
(3) Conclusion
Itwas not observed in the data collected that using competitive dialogue is lead-
ing to significant litigation. In the sample studied only two cases were reported of
aggrieved bidders filing for administrative appeal or judicial review.
It may be the case the companies are genuinely happy with the outcome of the
procedure and see no fault in its conduction. On the other hand, it may be a case
of them being afraid of being blacklisted.?" However, as the author did not con-
duct research with private companies it is not possible to draw substantive con-
elusions on this topic. This might be an area to consider for future research on
the topic.
IN. Duration
(I) Introduction
The author asked interviewees about the duration competitive dialogue proce-
dures had or were forecast to have in the case of the entities where the interviews
were held before the end of the procedure. This question allowed the author to
have an idea about the approximate timeframes involved in a competitive dia-
logue procedure in Spain. They were also asked whether the procedure had been
longer than if an open or restricted procedure had been used.?"
(2)Data
Six interviewees said their procedures had taken around a year, give or take a
month. Five have stated a shorter duration of four or five months. For two, the
procedure has taken six months. One has taken seven or eight months and, final-
ly, one lasted for two years.
631- On the topic of blacklisting of candidates please see, Pachnou, The effectiveness of bidder remedies for
enforcing the EC public procurement rules: a case study of the public works sector in the United Kingdom and Greece
(2002).
635. This point will also be discussed further in section 20.
Regarding the second question posed, three interviewees have perceived competi-
tive dialogue to be longer than an open or restricted procedure. However, one of
the lawyers interviewed stated that in his experience the competitive dialogue
procedure was not longer than an open procedure. He grounded his view on the
fact that although the perceived duration of an open procedure (from notice to
award) may be shorter, this view does not take into consideration the time it
takes to draft the technical specifications before the tender is launched. The re-
spondent argued that if one included that extra time in the duration of the open
or restricted procedure, then competitive dialogue does not look that much
longer.
(3) Conclusion
According to the National Audit Office, the target for the length of PFI proce-
dures in the UK should be between 18 and 24 months.?" with most of these
projects being tendered by competitive dialogue. As one year was the most com-
mon response, the answers gathered are actually better than what the author ex-
pected in advance. The author also found a significant number of short proce-
dures, with a six month or less duration (seven). This may be a sign of very
efficient governance in place or of not knowing exactly what to do in the dialogue
stage. This second possibility is further sustained by the finding that a relevant
number of entities had only one or two meetings with the candidates during the
dialogue stage, as was discussed above in section (II).
636. National Audit Office, Improving the PFI tendering process (National Audit Office, 2007)
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I9. Perceived benefits
(I) Introduction
Interviewees were asked about the benefits they thought adopting competitive
dialogue had brought to the projectts). It was anticipated this question would
make possible assessing what the contracting authorities considered the competi-
tive dialogue procedure was adding as beneficial in comparison with other
procedures.
Three clear trends were identified. Firstly, most respondents have stated at least
one benefit of having used the competitive dialogue. Secondly, the most recurrent
theme was that the respondents perceived they had ended with a better contract
than if an open or restricted procedure had been used. Thirdly, in many cases the
contract ended up being cheaper than if an open or restricted procedure had been
adopted.
(2) Data: at least one benefit of using competitive dialogue
Of the contracting authorities that had experience using competitive dialogue
only two did not find any added benefit of using the procedure, citing the bad ex-
perience. All the other ones found at least one positive point on the use of com-
petitive dialogue.
(3) Data: better contract inthe end
Nine respondents argued that competitive dialogue makes for a better contract in
the end, that is, a contract more attuned to the authority's needs. That does not
necessarily mean that they ended up with a cheaper contract, but one where the
actual needs were thoroughly discussed with private parties to find the best solu-
tion for whatever problem the authority was facing. For instance, more than one
interviewee said that during the discussions they had changed their pre-concep-
tions on the solution to adopt, clearly stating the dialogue phase had made possi-
ble this change of opinion and that the final solution was better than the original.
Two respondents in sectors where technology evolves rapidly, said the author
that having a competitive dialogue where the technical solution is thoroughly dis-
cussed and decided upon late in the procedure ensures that the tenders submitted
are based in the most recent developments available in the market. It was argued
that in these areas, using the open procedure leads to the adoption of technolo-
gies that are obsolete or at least outdated by the time the contract is awarded.
(4) Data: cheaper contract
Six interviewees said the contract they tendered through a competitive dialogue
had been cheaper than anticipated in their own internal calculations and what
they could reasonably expect to achieve in an open or restricted procedure. In
one case, the difference was so staggering that it allowed the contracting authori-
ty to subsequently tender an extra lot for which they thought they would not have
a budget.?" It should be said though that three respondents stated that the better
price appeared not during the negotiations - where the companies would say that
going any cheaper would be impossible - but only when the final bid was submit-
ted.638 One of the respondents suggested that this difference might be due to the
637. The same contracting authority asked for clarifications from the tenderer, to make sure it was not an
abnormally low offer.
638. This finding is discussed in further detail on the issues sub-section, as the respondents implied they
were misled during the discussions.
fact the negotiators on the private side had still to clear with their boards the ex-
act terms the company could offer.
(s) Data: change inthe contracting authority's practice
Two contracting authorities and one lawyer interviewed said one that of the
biggest benefits of using competitive dialogue has been its ability to change the
way contracting authorities work on public procurement award procedures. It has
fostered a more dynamic or project-focused attitude in the members of the con-
tracting authority taking part in the procedure. I t has forced different areas or de-
partments to work together as a team, something that according to the respon-
dents is not common in public procurement. Furthermore, in two contracting
authorities that have used competitive dialogue more than once, internal audit
controls were improved in the more recent procedures. Those have also been ap-
plied to open and restricted procedures where possible.
(6) Data: general
The respondents provided more insight regarding their perceived benefits that
may not classify as trends or themes. Four argued that, for instance, they valued
the fact they had discussions with private companies or that the technical specifi-
cations had ended up being more detailed than if they had followed an open or re-
stricted procedure. One even said it had allowed them to negotiate with the sup-
pliers and function more as a private company.
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(7) Conclusion
From the data it seems contracting authorities are able to find value in the de-
ployment of competitive dialogue as an alternative to the open and restricted
procedures.
ZOo Perceived issues with competitive dialogue
(I) Introduction
Interviewees were asked about what they considered to be the issues competitive
dialogue had, according to their own experience and perception.
b)Data
A number of trends were identified. Firstly, lack of detail in the Law on Public
Sector Contracts was singled out as the most common complaint by respondents.
Secondly, arguing the lack of rulings from public procurement advisory bodies
was an issue was also very common. Thirdly, the excessive duration of the proce-
dure was also singled out. Fourthly, contracting authorities pointed some negoti-
ating tactics by candidates as a negative issue. Various other issues have also been
voiced by respondents and are presented in this sub-section.
<3) Data: lack of detail in the law
Thirteen of the contracting authorities with experience using the procedure have
stated that the current draft of the Law on Public Sector Contracts does not have
the level of detail they consider adequate to guide them through a competitive di-
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alogue. Currently, has we have seen in Chapter 9, the Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts is little more than the copy of what is already in Directive 2004118. The law
itself is very detailed in many other areas and, traditionally, contracting authori-
ties are used to either following the law or, if available, secondary regulations that
can add further detail."?
As we have seen in the section 3 of this Chapter, the current draft of the law has
not lead to many questions regarding the grounds for use in the interviewees,
since most of them argued they had no doubts on the topic.t'" The area where re-
spondents felt more detail was needed is clearly the dialogue itself. To be more
precise, they feel there is a need for regulation setting out, for instance, how the
meetings are to be held or how the minutes of meeting are to be drafted (thor-
ough, summarised, with or without confidential information transmitted by the
candidates).
As one respondent put it, they want to have more legal certainty on how the pro-
cedure is supposed to be carried out. The Law on Public Sector contracts is very
detailed regarding the other procedures, whereas for competitive dialogue it is
very sparse. With a more detailed law however, flexibility is lost since contracting
authorities would have to follow a longer set of rules and would not be able to
carve the dialogue to its need.
Six respondents suggested that the lack of detail could be overcome with sec-
ondary regulation and not necessarily through changes to the Law on Public Sec-
tor Contracts itself.
639· The author was told by various respondents that there is a two year old draft of a secondary regulation
unofficially circulating. The process is allegedly suspended while a new version of the Law on Public Sector
Contracts is being readied. The author was unable to secure access to a copy of the aforementioned draft.
640. That is not to say that it is not raising issues in contracting authorities that have not used the
competitive dialogue - they may have considered it and not used due to the uncertainties regarding the
grounds for use - nor in companies since this study did not cover them.
<.> Data: lack of rulings from public procurement advisory bodies
As we have seen in Chapter 8, Spain has one national public procurement adviso-
ry body and 15 regional ones. These bodies can produce opinions if asked by con-
tracting authorities and also general advisory rulings. Although they are not
mandatory, contracting authorities are wary of disregarding the rulings voiced by
an advisory body. However, those rulings are only applicable to certain contract-
ing authorities. For example, the National Government can only request opinions
from the national public procurement advisory body. The departments of the Re-
gional Government of Madrid can only request rulings from the Madrid public
procurement advisory body. So far only one ruling has been produced by the na-
tional procurement advisory body. Although the scope of entities covered by each
advisory is limited, the author was told by the two public procurement advisory
bodies' respondents that they consult themselves regularly. Furthermore, accord-
ing to these respondents contracting authorities commonly look to rulings from
any advisory body when facing legal uncertainty. From the interviews carried, it
appears that there is a certain respect by lawyers and contracting authorities for
the work of the advisory bodies. This finding was not supported by specific ques-
tions posed but derives from comments received when the respondents were
probed about the lack of rulings from these entities. Even the contracting author-
ities that were not subject to the scope of these rulings (because they were either
local authorities or bodies governed by public law) remarked that having such
documents would make it easier to apply competitive dialogue.
Five respondents have stated that more rulings from public procurement advisory
authorities are needed since they might shed some light on the more ambiguous
areas of the Law on Public Sector Contracts or topics where the regulation is
lacking. This trend is not as compelling as the previous one on the lack of detail
in the law due to the more limited numbers of answers collected in this trend.
<s) Data: duration of the procedure
Five interviewees have argued that one of the biggest problems they faced was the
excessive duration of the procedure. For these respondents, competitive dialogue
is longer than an open and restricted procedure and this is perceived as being neg-
ative. One of the respondents voiced concerns that the perceived excessive dura-
tion of the procedure might even be contributing for the slow uptake of its use in
Spain. For this person, contracting authorities in Spain - especially the ones sub-
ject to a direct political influence - want to have a contract awarded as soon as
possible, even if it means ending up with a worse contract and the need to bend
rules regarding changes to awarded contracts afterwards. In addition, a lawyer
without experience using competitive dialogue interviewed at the start of this
empirical research voiced exactly the same concerns.
One should add, however, that as we have seen above in section 18 most of the
competitive dialogue procedures in Spain appear to last a maximum of one year
from start to finish, with exceptions. It is interesting to note though that respon-
dents have argued that in their perception the procedure is too long. Their per-
ception is not entirely corroborated by the data collected. As one lawyer argued,
it may be the case, respondents are perceiving competitive dialogue as a longer
procedure because they may be not taking into account the time needed to pre-
pare the technical specifications of an open procedure. Since the procedure is
supposed to be used for the award of particularly complex contracts, it may also
be the case the respondents were simply drawing on their accumulated experi-
ence of conducting "run of the mill" open procedures and comparing their dura-
tion with competitive dialogue. However, the perception of competitive dialogue
as a long procedure is apparent in the authorities that have used it and is a finding
worth considering if further research is carried out on a wider sample of contract-
ing authorities that have not used the procedure.
(6) Data: creation of consortia during the dialogue stage
Two of the interviewees with experience in applying competitive dialogue have
argued that the possibility of candidates creating consortia during the dialogue
stage had appeared in their practice. In one case, this was allowed as the contract-
ing authority had included a specific provision in the descriptive document and
considered that it improved competition. In the other situation, the contracting
authority did not allow the creation of the consortia because it would reduce the
number of candidates in the dialogue to a number it considered negative for com-
petition. Furthermore, one of the public procurement advisory bodies acknowl-
edged the existence of the issue during the interview and said it would be legal as
long as competition was not impaired in any way.
(7) Data: companies not clearing negotiations with their boards
According to three of the interviewees, private companies appear not to clear
with their boards the terms of a project as it develops. In some occasions, this
had the consequence of reducing competition at the tender stage. Candidates are
discussing with contracting authorities during the dialogue stage without being
completely sure they may commit their company to present a tender under the
terms being discussed. It appears the actual decision of committing the company
to the project is only taken by senior management at the end of the dialogue
- :179-
stage and that junior management is given some leeway until that point. This is to
say until the exact details of a solution are found and all the economic variables
can be established, senior management is not involved in the process. This means
the contracting authority may be discussing with people that are not cleared to
commit their company. This has been reported 10 cases involving
multinationals.?"
(8) Data: confirmation of commitments
Two of the interviewees with experience using competitive dialogue and one of
the public procurement advisory bodies have voiced concerns over the lack of se-
curity of commitments during the dialogue stage. Contracting authorities are try-
ing to get candidates to improve their solutions during the dialogue stage, either
by asking for more equipment or a better price for the solution being discussed.
They feel let down when candidates either do not present themselves or submit a
tender that does not reflect what has been discussed and appeared to have been
agreed on during the dialogue stage.
This is due to the fact that in Spain (and also Portugal), due to the principle of
tender stability, companies participating in a tender are only bound by their ten-
ders, that is, they cannot afterwards try to change the terms offered. This is not a
problem in other procedures such as the open or restricted procedures, since the
tender is submitted at the start and the tenderers are bound by it. In competitive
dialogue, candidates only submit the tenders at the end of the dialogue stage.
Even the classification of their status in the procedure is different: participants in
an open procedure are considered tenderers, participants in competitive dialogue
641. The author's experience in Portugal is similar to this. For projects in smaller countries, multinationals
are known not to commit higher management to them.
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before the tender stage, participants. Hence there is the possibility of them quit-
ting during the dialogue stage on their own accord, or not keeping any promises
made.
(9) Data: candidates not submitting tenders
Sometimes, candidates decide not to present a tender even after spending time
and money during the dialogue stage developing their solution. This has hap-
pened mainly in projects involving public-private cooperation contracts, that is,
projects where the candidate is supposed to invest its own money upfront. The
cases reported to the author involve both multinational and national companies,
big and small. Contracting authorities are finding out that the companies are only
searching for credit to participate in the project at the end of the dialogue stage.
In one case, all candidates (construction companies) did not submit a tender be-
cause none could secure funding and it lead to the end of procedure. In two other
cases, multinationals have withdrawn at the end of the dialogue stage citing simi-
lar issues, but at least another candidate submitted a bid and the contract was
awarded.
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, candidates are not bound by what is
discussed during the dialogue stage and are free to present whatever bid they con-
sider appropriate at the tender stage.
(ro) Data: companies presenting much improved tenders
Three respondents stated that companies who during the dialogue had made clear
they could not achieve a certain price or a technical solution and "dragged their
feet" during the discussions according to one of the interviewees, ended up sub-
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mitting tenders that were much improved. In one case, the difference was so stag-
gering that the contracting authority had to ask for clarifications just to make
sure it was not an abnormally low offer. One respondent stated he felt "lied to"
and that companies were not being completely honest during the dialogue stage.
He concluded that the contracting authority lacks effective knowledge of the
candidate's reserve price (or other condition), that is, the absolute minimum price
the candidate is willing to offer.?" This participant stated that they would have
conducted the dialogue differently (ie, including more services in the project since
the budget allocated would allow for this) had they known the price would go
down. It was argued candidates were playing their cards close to their chest,
maybe due to fears the prices would be leaked to the other candidates and they
would lose a competitive advantage. One of the lawyers interviewed reported that
not giving prices during the dialogue stage was indeed a business tactic since com-
panies, in his view, feared information would be passed to the competition during
the dialogue stage and entice them to submit a better tender.
Another interviewee - in one of the situations where the dialogue was not suc-
cessful - said participants simply declined to divulge any prices (or show designs)
during the dialogue stage. He argued that this might have been because they did
not do any work in the meantime, were afraid of having their prices transmitted
to the competition or just wanted to know the prices and designs of their
competitors.
642. On this topic, please see Raiffa et al., Negotiation analysis: the science and art of (ollaiJoratiw decision _mg
(Belknap Press, 2002).
(II) Data: lack of prior experience
Two interviewees who only used competitive dialogue once have argued that de-
cisions they took reflected their own lack of experience with the procedure. If
they ever used it in the future they would make changes and improvements in ac-
cordance with what they had learned. Furthermore, two others said they had
made changes in subsequent procedures to reflect their new found expertise.
These respondents have refined the descriptive documents and also improved in-
ternal audit controls to ensure the discussions were focused on the most impor-
tant issues and that its duration did not slide in time.
Two respondents added that the lack of experience was obvious also on the pri-
vate side with companies being admitted to the dialogue stage without having a
clear idea on how it was supposed to be carried out.
(12) Data: not ending with a closed technical specifications
document
Two interviewees have argued that the discussions they held with the candidates
had not produced a "tight" technical specifications document. They felt discus-
sions were too shallow, long and vague. In other words, they considered competi-
tive dialogue as fostering some sort of "discussion creep", where a lot of time is
spent discussing but nothing is actually achieved. These respondents were unable
to transform their output in a technical specifications document. In their view,
the resulting document was less detailed than the technical specifications of open
and restricted procedures are.
(3) Conclusion
From the data it is possible to conclude that contracting authorities are per-
ceiving the existence of a number of issues with competitive dialogue in Spain.
Although the trend of pointing to the lack of detail in national law and public
procurement advisory bodies guidance as issues is compelling due to the almost
unanimous response, the author would like mention that the answers were col-
lected when the interviewees were asked if they thought the law needed more de-
tail and, thus, may be considered a leading question. It should be added also that
the interviews were carried out with interviewees that had only a single experi-
ence using competitive dialogue and, so far, not a lot of information whether the
procedure has been made available through other sources such as academic pa-
pers. These could provide some support to contracting authorities trying to apply
competitive dialogue without the need to refine the law to include further detail
or guidance from the public procurement advisory bodies.
It is also worth mentioning that, as far as the author knows, the practice of pre-
senting a very low price at the tender stage after saying it would not be possible to
achieve during the dialogue stage is not widespread in Spain. It is, however, rele-
vant to bring this finding up due to the fact that it has relevant implications in
practice. As with the more commonly used open and restricted procedures con-
tracting authorities do not have discussions, its staff is not used to deal with busi-
ness practices such as this one. Contracting authorities should be advised that
this may happen in discussions. This is not to say the attitude by the candidates is
illegal in any way, after all, companies and contracting authorities have a common
interest in finding a solution for the need but their interests are not aligned on
the price as the contracting authority wants the project to be the cheapest it can
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be and the candidate the other way around. This is nature of having discussions
and negotiations.
2I. General comments from interviewees
(I) Introduction
In this section are compiled the more general comments from the respondents on
competitive dialogue. They do not reflect perceived issues or benefits from using
the procedure but the answers herewith presented are still relevant for the wider
perception of the use of competitive dialogue in Spain.
(a) Data: financial costs
Regarding financial costs, interviewees were asked if the competitive dialogue
procedures they had participated were financially more expensive in the proce-
dure phase than an alternative open or restricted procedure. Seven respondents
stated that in fact the procedure in itself was not more expensive in financial
terms than the alternatives. One potential reason for this lack of perceived extra
costs may be the fact only a limited number of contracting authorities are hiring
external assistance to help during the dialogue stage thus avoiding a direct in-
crease in procedure related costs.
Four respondents have stated that their competitive dialogue procedure was more
expensive. Of this group three pointed out that in reality the extra financial costs
were offset by a better and/or cheaper contract in the end. In the words of one of
these respondents "it was a small cost when compared with the benefits reaped".
(3) Data: human resources' costs
Interviewees were asked if this procedure led to increased stress on human re-
sources of the contracting authority in comparison with an open or restricted
procedure. Eight said it had increased the workload in relation to the available al-
ternatives. It is interesting to notice that of this number, four had already said it
had not been a financially more expensive procedure. This leads to the conclusion
that at least these interviewees may not be attributing a monetary value to the ex-
tra man hours needed to carry a competitive dialogue. The remaining respon-
dents have not stated that this procedure had been more demanding to their
human resources. With the same opinion, one of the lawyers interviewed has
stated that competitive dialogue is not more burdensome on the contracting au-
thorities' human resources.
(4) Data: general impression of the procedure
Respondents were asked whether their overall impression of the procedure was
positive or negative. Nine have clearly stated they liked the procedure and were
happy with the outcome. One even stated that although originally he had a very
negative view of the procedure, the experience had been very good and had com-
pletely changed his opinion. Out of this group of respondents six work for medi-
um or large sized contracting authorities, either departments of regional (three)
and provincial administrations (one) or public owned companies (two). The re-
maining three worked for small local councils.
Three of the interviewees with a positive view of the procedure have used it mul-
tiple times. It may be argued that they have already developed a practice in house
to deal with this procedure and are thus able to conduct it competently and to
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achieve their desired outcomes. Furthermore, all three belong to large contract-
ing authorities that although they did not hired external assistance had sufficient
in house capability to carry out the dialogue (multidisciplinary teams). Two also
had a strong management background, having been in the private sector before
moving on their current positions. All three entities that had external help have a
very positive view of the procedure and have expressly mentioned that these ex-
perts were key to the success of their procedures since they either did not have
enough man power to carry it out or lacked the necessary experience and
capabilities.
Three have expressed strongly negative views of the procedure. One, from a
provincial contracting authority, even said contracting authorities "should avoid it
at all costs" as his particular experience had been very difficult. One, from a small
local council, was very put off by the experience and suggested contracting au-
thorities should keep to what they have been doing for a long time when they are
not sure of the technical solution, which is asking another contracting authority
that has carried out a similar project for the tender documents. Another respon-
dent said he had a negative view of his own personal experience ("it was a living
hell") but remarked clearly this represented a view based on his particular experi-
ence. Furthermore, he pointed out it had been a learning experience and that in
the future he would be happy to carry out competitive dialogue procedures again
and addressing the challenges faced the first time around. Another respondent
stated he had a slightly negative view of the outcome of their procedure. That was
due to the fact only one company was deemed as suitable and invited to the
dialogue.
The remaining interviewees have either not expressed an opinion or voiced a neu-
tral opinion of the procedure. One stated that the procedure was useful and con-
venient, but only In certain circumstances and another that it was not a
"panacea".
(s) Data: companies' impression of the procedure
Contracting authorities were asked also if they had obtained any feedback from
participating companies on the dialogue. Most replied that they had not collected
any feedback worth reporting. Of the few entities that did so, four said the parti-
cipating companies liked the procedure. One added that in fact, the companies
experience with the dialogue led to internal reorganisations?" to make them more
competitive in this business environment where they are expected to have dia-
logues with the contracting authority and not simply to present a tender. Two re-
spondents have stated the companies involved in their competitive dialogue pro-
cedures have not liked the experience and complained it was too long and
complex.
The author would like to advise caution before extracting conclusions from the
findings of this sub-section as the companies were not asked directly for their
opinion and the answers came solely from the perceptions the interviewees - all
from contracting authorities - had themselves gathered .
.2.2. Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed in the detail the findings from the 27 interviews
carried out in Spain. We have gathered insight relevant for the issues put forward
in Chapter 8 and also found some new issues, such as the different models of
643. In this case, the companies were well known multinationals operating in the medical sector, that also
operate in the same business in other EU member States.
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organizing the dialogue stage or the creation of consortia during the same issue.
In addition, we have also discussed some perceived benefits from using the proce-
dure as the perception contracting authorities have that competitive dialogue is
allowing them to either have a better or cheaper contract in the end.
Finally, we have found an interesting practice in Spain surrounding the lack of
formal exclusions during the dialogue stage and a preference for conducting the
procedure after the submission of tenders as an open or restricted procedure, al-
beit the inclusion by the Spanish law of stages similar allowing for some scope for
discussions to occur.
Chapter II -Conclusions
I. Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter I, the objective of this research is to provide an
overview of the implementation of competitive dialogue in Portugal and Spain.
The purpose of this chapter is to recap the research undertaken, compare the
findings across the two countries, answer the research questions and highlight
certain points that warrant further study.
This chapter has seven sections apart from this introduction, with one dedicated
to each of the five research questions, a section on the models of dialogue stage
seen in practice and a final section on concluding remarks.
2. First question: bow 'WIlS competitive dialogue implemented?
As we have seen above in chapters 6 and 9, both Portugal and Spain have trans-
posed competitive dialogue directly into national legislation and have included
content from both the articles and recitals of Directive 2004118. Each country's
lawmakers has, however, implemented the procedure differently.
In Portugal, law makers decided to elaborate further on the framework set by the
Directive 2004118. The objective was to adapt this procedure to national practice
and culture.
Due to a subtle but purposeful change in the wording of article 30 of the Public
Contracts Code, the grounds for use are tighter than those found in the Direc-
tive. The actual drafting implies that the procedure is only to be used when it is
impossible to use an open or restricted procedure. In other words, it is to be used
only when the contracting authority is not able to draft technical specifications.
If it can draft some specifications then an open or restricted procedure must be
used. Furthermore, according to article 33of the Public Contracts Code, compet-
itive dialogue may not be used for the award of contracts in the utilities sector. It
should be stressed though actual scope of the utilities sector rules in Portugal is
more limited than the Directive 2004117. For instance, if the contract to build a
railroad is tendered by a public owned company then it is covered by utilities sec-
tor rules and cannot be tendered through a competitive dialogue. If the same
contract is tendered by the State, then it can adopt the competitive dialogue
procedure.
Transposition to the Portuguese law has brought other changes. For the author,
the most important one appears to be the mandatory model imposed on con-
tracting authorities to identify a winning solution and draft common technical
specifications. The purpose of this change was to allow the use of the award crite-
ria rules and to increase competition at the tender stage as all candidates would
be submitting tenders based on the same technical specifications, thus levelling
the playing field.
Among the remaining changes, one should highlight the exclusion of a phase to
fine-tune tenders before the preferred bidder is chosen (as expressly admitted by
Directive 2004hS) and the restriction of post-award discussions to the exact
same (limited) grounds as any other procedure. Also worth mentioning are the
lack of exclusions or candidates during the dialogue stage, the need for candidates
to submit only one solution and be assessed on it at the start of the dialogue
stage.
In Spain, law makers have decided to copy the text of Directive 2oo4!I8 regard-
ing competitive dialogue, including both the content of recitals and articles in the
body of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.
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Regarding the grounds for use, these were copied directly from the Directive. Ar-
ticle 164 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts appears to be a direct translation
from the English draft of the Directive and not the Spanish text. Contrary to
Portugal, it may be argued it is possible in Spain to adopt a competitive dialogue
procedure when the contracting authority is unsure of the best solution to its
needs.
There is, however, a significant change to the grounds for use of competitive dia-
logue in Spain, as this procedure is the default procedure for the award of public-
private cooperation contracts. The exact content of this type of contract (and the
boundaries with similar contracts such as public works concessions) in Spanish
law is debatable, but it broadly follows the lines of public-private partnerships. If
an exact match between the Spanish public-private cooperation contracts and
public-private partnerships as described by the Commission?" exists, one should
point to the Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on
Public Contracts and Concessions, where it argued that the procedure should be
made available for the award of these contracts but that did not meant it should
be used every single time. In Spain, it seems, all public-private cooperation con-
tracts are thus "particularly complex".
The specific rules on the jury for the procedure are worth noting also. According
to article 296 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, the jury for the procedure
must be composed of members of the contracting authority and also external
members, who are supposed to provide the expertise necessary to assist the con-
tracting authority in the conduct of the procedure. For other award procedures,
Spanish contracting authorities may only create the jury with persons from the
contracting authority itself.
644. Commission, Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community IIIW 0" public contracts and co"wsions
COM (200.p 327final (2oo4J·
The rest of Spanish legal implementation is quite similar to the Directive and
warrants no further details.
One final point should be mentioned. Due to Spain's administrative organisation
and particularly its division on different regions, each with its own Regional Gov-
ernment, it was possible to find a regional public procurement law applicable only
to the regional and local contracting authorities of Navarra. Regarding competi-
tive dialogue, its draft, however, also follows Directive 2oo41I8.
The author was told by one of his respondents that at least one other region in
the country is considering approving its own regional public procurement law and
the plans current at the time of drafting this chapter are to address some of the
perceived shortcomings of the current national legal implementation of competi-
tive dialogue.
3. Second question: why is it not being used more in Portugal?
Although the original plan was to focus the empirical stage on the practice of the
procedure in both countries, it became apparent with the passage of time that in
Portugal competitive dialogue would not be used widely enough for the author to
have sufficient data to analyse. In face of the reality the most pressing question
regarding Portugal became: why is competitive dialogue not being used more?
Taking into consideration the data provided by the interviews with leading
lawyers and contracting authorities in Portugal, the author's view on this question
is that the lack of use of competitive dialogue in Portugal is due to the accumula-
tion of three main reasons and a multitude of minor ones. The three main reasons
are: more limited grounds for use, general perception of lawyers and contracting
authorities that grounds for use have to be interpreted restrictively, and the per-
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ceived legal risk of using an unknown procedure with many legal uncertainties
when bidders are granted easy access to remedies in national courts and the con-
tract may be analysed expost by the National Audit Court.
As minor reasons the author would point to the myriad of smaller legal issues
found in national transposition, such as two different models of assessing the eco-
nomic, technical or professional ability of candidates, limitation to a single solu-
tion, analysis of preliminary solutions, treatment of confidentiality, lack of exclu-
sions in the dialogue stage, the need to identify a winning solution and
mandatorily draft common technical specifications, lack of a fine-tuning stage
and limited scope for discussions after the award of the procedure. Not found in
the transposition but still relevant as a legal issue is the apparent incompatibility
between the current public-private partnerships framework and competitive
dialogue.
It should be noted that for contracts such as public-private partnerships or con-
cessions not covered by the scope of Directive 20041r8 the existence of a locally
developed alternative procedure called open procedure with a negotiation phase
has taken at least part of the theoretical scope where competitive dialogue might
be of use (for instance, in the transport or energy sectors). Not only are there over
ten years of practice in Portugal in applying this procedure - that is getting more
and more standardised as time goes by - but also, the interviewees that have parti-
cipated in at least one were, in general, happy with the experience.
Cultural issues may be playing a part in the limited uptake of the procedure also.
The public administration is traditionally used to ordering and not discussing or
negotiating with private companies. The open procedure with a negotiation
phase has an exceptional nature and is, indeed, used only exceptionally. It may be
the case - as voiced by one of the interviewees - that there is a degree of shame in
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using competitive dialogue as it entails a confession to someone higher in the hi-
erarchy that the contracting authority no longer knows the subject matter well
enough to launch an open procedure. Furthermore, the open procedure is consid-
ered the gold standard of procedures in Portugal and people are, for better or
worse, used to awarding particularly complex contracts within its limitations.
That does not mean they end up awarding the best contract they could possibly
do in theory. It means they will award the contract they can by using a tried and
trusted method where the perceived risk is low. In addition, resistance to change
may be at play also. Finally, administrative laws in Portugal are traditionally very
detailed (the current Public Contracts Code with almost 500 articles is a prime
example) and contracting authorities are used to following step-by-step instruc-
tions on how to run the public procurement procedures. As competitive dialogue
does not include such detailed instructions for the dialogue stage it may be the
case of procurement officials playing safe and avoiding having to think in the best
way of actually carrying a dialogue stage.
In addition the lack of case studies {rolemodels} and qualified information about
the procedure may be at play. On the first, it is clear that none of the first five
uses of competitive dialogue has been deemed as successful enough to entice oth-
er contracting authorities in using the procedure. In Spain, on the contrary the
author has seen in the medical sector that contracting authorities have expressed
an interest in knowing the procedure after seeing it being successfully deployed in
similar areas in other regions. On the second, there are only two articles pub-
lished by academics about the procedure in Portugal (one by the author himself).
According to the interviewees it is apparently a common trend in workshops and
seminars to either not mention competitive dialogue or for it to be mentioned
only briefly with the caveat "that it is not to be used" as more than one respon-
dent has argued. The lack of information on the procedure is so clear that virtual-
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ly all the respondents have asked the author to forward to them his research with
a few (mostly lawyers) even asking if it would be possible to arrange a presenta-
tion of the findings.
4. Third question: legal issues
A number of legal issues surrounding the implementation of the competitive dia-
logue procedure in both Portugal and Spain have been discussed in chapters 6, 7,
9 and IQ above.
b)Portugal
The author considers the most important legal issues are the grounds for use, how
to draft the common technical specifications, lack of formal exclusions, confiden-
tiality and the reduced scope for discussions after the submission of tenders.
The grounds for use have been addressed in detail in the second question section
above, and need not be considered again here.
Regarding common technical specifications, Portugal has decided to impose a
mandatory model of having such document drafted at the end of dialogue stage.
This "one size fits all" approach has left some legal issues unresolved. The most
pressing is to know how they are supposed to be drafted. The Public Contracts
Code states the need for the contracting authority to identify the winning solu-
tion at the end of the dialogue stage. Does this mean that the technical specifica-
tions have to include only information from that solution? What if there is no
winning solution and all are similarly adequate to meet the needs of the contract-
ing authority? What if the best solution presented by a candidate is not the best
solution overall? Is this model better or worse for competition? So far, these ques-
tions remain unanswered and may warrant further research. In addition, a signifi-
cant number of respondents have said that the common specifications may in-
clude elements from different solutions, thus suggesting the cherry picking of
solutions at least after the end of the dialogue stage to be legal.
In Portugal, as we have seen above, it is impossible to exclude either candidates
or solutions. In consequence, it is not possible to have successive rounds during
the dialogue stage as allowed by Directive 2oo4!I8. On the one hand, the question
of the exclusion at the dialogue stage covering only the solution or also the candi-
date is sorted: neither is the answer. The exclusions of preliminary solutions be-
fore the start of the dialogue implies the exclusion of the candidate as it is not ad-
mitted to the dialogue stage. On the other hand, this may lead to dialogue stages
where the contracting authority is forced to discuss with a large number of candi-
dates even ones where there is no interest in doing so. If this happens, it will in-
crease the transaction costs for everyone involved, both companies and contract-
ing authorities. However, it should be noted that in Spain, where the possibility
of having successive rounds is available, no contracting authority has taken advan-
tage of it.
How to deal with confidentiality was a problem at EU level and is still, in theory,
a problem, as the Portuguese law does not solve this issue. This issue may be par-
ticularly acute due to the fact the contracting authority will have to draft the
common technical specifications at the end of the dialogue stage and has the in-
centive to cherry pick elements from different solutions either during the dia-
logue or when drafting that document. The lack of practice in the procedure does
not allow for a practice-based solution to be offered. The author would like to
mention though that from an incentive point of view the issue of confidentiality
is different in the mandatory Portuguese model of having common specifications
drawn at the end of the dialogue stage and one where each candidate tenders
based on its own solution. In the latter, the advantage given to a candidate during
the dialogue stage by supplying confidential information equals an identical disad-
vantage to the other candidate. Since the tender will be based in the solution of
each candidate, if he can improve it with information gathered from other candi-
dates, its chances of winning are increased. The situation is different in the Por-
tuguese model where the purpose of the dialogue stage is, in reality, to allow for
the common technical specifications to be drafted. I f the technical specifications
are to include elements from more than one solution, it can be argued that to
maximise the possibility of winning the tender it is in each candidate's best inter-
est to have as much input as possible in the drafting of the technical specifica-
tions. Itmust be said though that on the open procedure with a negotiated phase,
as far as the author could gather information on it, confidentiality has not been
pointed out as being an issue.
The final legal issue worth mentioning is the clear restriction on discussions after
the tenders are submitted. There is no similar provision to article 29/6 of Direc-
tive 2005h8 allowing for the fine-tuning of tenders before the preferred bidder
has been chosen. Furthermore, any discussions after the preferred bidder has
been picked are limited to the same grounds and conditions as any other award
procedure in the country. Bearing into consideration the lack of use of the proce-
dure, it remains to be seen if these restrictions are beneficial or an hindrance.
(2) Spain
In the previous chapters we have seen a number of issues related to the legal draft
of competitive dialogue in Spain. The author would like to highlight the lack of
detail in the law, confidentiality, the compatibility of the common trunk model
with cherry picking and confidentiality, how to deal with consortia, exclusions
during the dialogue and the scope for discussions after the tenders have been sub-
mitted. A final note on the grounds for use is also worth mentioning.
The lack of detail in the Spanish Law on Public Sector Contracts regarding com-
petitive dialogue was expressed by the interviewees as a major issue in the coun-
try. The law is indeed very detailed in other areas, as traditionally in the country,
but not on the competitive dialogue. Respondents have also said that this lack of
detail could be overcome through secondary legislation developing the Law on
Public Sector Contracts or guidance from public procurement advisory bodies.
Indeed, in 2009 some secondary legislation came into force with the aim of devel-
oping the Law on Public Sector Contracts. Sadly, it did not touch competitive di-
alogue (apart from the jury for the procedure). Public procurement advisory bod-
ies have also been silent regarding the use of the procedure. Truth be told, is up
for contracting authorities to ask them for guidance and none has done so so far.
As we have seen, the Spanish law does not provide any new solutions on how to
deal with confidentiality and cherry picking. Furthermore, depending on the ex-
act model of dialogue stage being applied by contracting authorities, as we have
mentioned above on Portugal it is not clear if confidentiality is particularly useful
when common technical specifications are to be developed either during the dia-
logue or at its end. The exception might be if variant tenders are to be accepted
and the candidate with the confidential information may want to use that infor-
mation to have a more competitive variant tender. The compatibility of the ex-
treme case of cherry picking involved in the common trunk model with both the
Directive 2004/18 and the Law on Public Sector Contracts is debatable.
The legality of creating consortia during the dialogue is another legal issue faced
in practice by contracting authorities in Spain. The author has seen both scenar-
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ios in practice. In one case the consortia was allowed (the possibility had been in-
cluded in the tender documents) whereas in another the contracting authority re-
fused the request fearing being accused of giving preferential treatment to those
candidates and a hypothetical negative effect on competition.
The Law on Public Sector Contracts also does not make it clear if exclusions at
the tender stage are applicable to the candidates themselves or only the solutions
they are offering. The practice has not dissipated the doubt since no contracting
authority has ever used this possibility even when faced with excessive numbers
of candidates during the dialogue stage. It is clear there is some fear in contract-
ing authorities about using this possibility.
Spanish law also does not provide any clues regarding what can be discussed after
the submission of the tenders either before or after the selection of the preferred
bidder. Local practice, however, has pointed out that only small discussions are to
be held at this point. In fact, it may be one of the best practices of the country as
we will discuss on the fifth question.
Although contracting authorities that have used the procedure have not had a
problem with competitive dialogue, it may be the case all other contracting au-
thorities that have not used it may have a different opinion. Secondly, the actual
grounds for use of the public-private cooperation contract are uncertain. Regard-
ing the first point, one should add that contracting authorities that use the proce-
dure feel secure about the reasons justifying its use and had no problems in assess-
ing the situation they faced against the legal rule. However, comparing this
situation with the overall negative response from interviewees in Portugal about
the clarity and certainty of the grounds for use (even discounting for the differ-
ences in the actual draft) and also some remarks made by two lawyers without ac-
tual experience in the procedure, it may be the case that many other contracting
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authorities may feel unsure about the grounds for use and refuse to use it. In oth-
er words, we should not extrapolate this finding into the general class of contract-
ing authorities in Spain but only to the contracting authorities that have used it.
This is a serious doubt that warrants further investigation by researchers.
Finally, it is quite apparent that the legal grounds for use of the public-private co-
operation contracts are unsure at best. Although not an issue of the procedure per
se, the uncertainty has an impact on the procedure because competitive dialogue
is the default procedure for these contracts and not for alternatives such as the
public works concessions. Practice has shown also that for these contracts, con-
tracting authorities are still using the open procedure and not competitive
dialogue.
s.Fourth question: other issuesfound inpractice
Further to the issues related with legislation, it became apparent from the inter-
views in the target countries with contracting authorities that have used competi-
tive dialogue that a number of issues existed in practice. These issues are not
specifically addressed either in the national law or in Directive 2004118 but are
still relevant for assessing the practice of the procedure.
Due to the difference in the number of interviews with lawyers and contracting
authorities that have used the procedure in Portugal and Spain, more practical is-
sues were identified in the latter. One can say these practical issues are, in gener-
al, issues related with project management, if one thinks about the procedure as a
project that needs to be managed. The issues arose from the questions surround-
ing how the dialogue stage had been organized in practice and the general section
of the interview guides.
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b) Spain
In Spain it was possible to detect the following practical issues: how to organise
the dialogue stage; perceived duration; stress on human resources; how to max-
imise the outcome of the dialogue stage; how to avoid the negotiation or discus-
sion creep and the number of candidates.
Regarding the organisation of the dialogue stage, as the Law on Public Sector
Contracts does not provide a lot of detail, it is up to contracting authorities to
decide how they should organise the dialogue stage. It implies contracting au-
thorities deciding on the use of outline solutions and successive stages, for in-
stance. It also implies decisions on how to organise meetings and transfer of in-
formation, what content to include in the minutes or if these are to be drafted at
all.
The perceived duration of a procedure is also a practical issue. It may well be true
the duration of the procedure from launching the contract notice until the award
may be perceived as a longer period than if an open procedure had been used. Af-
ter all, the open procedure is well standardised and contracting authorities have a
lot of experience in running it. If one, however, includes in the duration of both
procedures the time it takes to prepare the launch of competitive dialogue and
drafting the technical specifications of the open procedure, it may be the case the
difference is at least partially abated.
Some contracting authorities perceive competitive dialogue as a strain on their
human resources. The added work of preparing rounds of discussions and having
actual meetings with the candidates is being pointed out as a negative point re-
garding competitive dialogue. This was particularly seen in smaller contracting au-
thorities that did not try to adapt their approach to the needs of this procedure
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hut tried to run competitive dialogue as they would run an open procedure. Larg-
er contracting authorities or where changes were made to its own practice have
not reported the same issue.
How to maximise the outcome of the dialogue stage was an issue identified hy the
author when contracting authorities complained about candidates quitting at the
tender stage or when they presented much improved offers at that point, in
comparison with what they had offered during the dialogue. As an hypothesis
warranting further study, the author considers this may be the result of compa-
nies not taking the dialogue stage seriously enough. In consequence, companies
are not allocating senior management to the dialogue stage and making a high lev-
el final decision only when the point of truth comes. Clearly, the moment of truth
is the submission of the tenders (to which they are then bound) and it may ex-
plain why so many companies quit at that point or the decision to commit leads
to a marked improvement in the conditions offered. However, it may also he the
case that companies are simply using negotiating tactics, playing the cards close
to their chest and keeping their options open with the minimum cost possible for
them. This should be expected in any negotiation setting and as such contracting
authorities should be advised of this possibility. To conclude the present topic,
one may arguer" that financial incentives may play an important part in im-
proving the usefulness of the dialogue stage, as either to entice more companies
to take part or making the ones participating more interested in the outcome.
Perhaps, as has been used in Portugal for contracts tendered by an open proce-
dure with a negotiated phases, these payments could depend on the company ac-
tually submitting a tender and the tender coming within x% of the winning
tender.
645. As Racca and Casalini, (Paper) (2010) Implementation and application of competitive dialogue:
experience in Italy have made.
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Some of the contracting authorities mentioned that there were too many discus-
sions and they were very long and time consuming without providing the out-
come (better technical specifications) the contracting authority was hoping for.
In other words, they had faced firsthand the dreaded "discussion or negotiation
creep", where talks drag over time, months go by and nothing is actually achieved.
Contracting authorities have reported that discussing with more than three to
five candidates is particularly difficult. One could think then that contracting au-
thorities would employ successive stages to eliminate the solutions and or candi-
dates and bring the discussion down to what they would consider a manageable
level. However, that is not happening in practice. No contracting authority inter-
viewed by the author has ever used successive stages for this purpose. What was
seen in practice is that contracting authorities are upping the requirements in the
level of detail or the actual technical requirements and candidates opting to quit
the procedure. One may question if their decision should be construed as drop-
ping from the procedure or, in alternative, it should only affect their solution and
they should be kept in the procedure if at the tender stage the technical specifica-
tions are to be drafted as in two of the models described in Chapter 10. In addi-
tion, contracting authorities have mentioned that some candidates would have
actually preferred to be excluded during the dialogue stage than to have a bid fare
badly and seeing the winner use the marking of tenders as a marketing tool.
There has also been reported a significant number of candidates not submitting
bids after participating in the dialogue until the end. In the cases the contract to
be awarded was a public-private cooperation contract it became clear companies
were not able to raise the necessary finance to proceed. In other contracts the
reason may be the excessive number of candidates present or the fear of them be-
ing branded as losers if they perceive they arc not competitive. Developing incen-
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tives to keep candidates engaged in the dialogue and have them present competi-
tive offers is an area that warrants further research.
The author's suggestions is for improvements at project management level, either
through the anticipation of the possibility of these issues occurring at the plan-
ning stage or the hiring of external experts to provide assistance to avoid these
pitfalls. The author does not believe these issues should be addressed simply by
adding more regulation into the competitive dialogue procedure.
Finally, the author would like to point the fact that confidentiality during the dia-
logue stage has not been identified as an issue by the respondents. Two caveats
should, however, be mentioned. Firstly, the author has not interviewed the com-
panies that participated in the procedures and they might offer a different view,
since they are the ones with something to lose if its violated. Secondly, the inter-
play between confidentiality, the ban on cherry picking and the practice of devel-
oping a common trunk solution during the dialogue stage remains a puzzle to be
sorted out.
(2)Portugal
In Portugal, the limited number of contracting authorities that have used com-
petitive dialogue does not allow the author to draw many conclusions regarding
the practical issues of the procedure. Three are, however, worth discussing at this
point: organisation of the dialogue stage, procedure duration (particularly in local
authorities) and preliminary solutions.
In Portugal, contracting authorities face the same issues as their Spanish counter-
parts about how to organise the dialogue stage. The Portuguese law, apart from
imposing the need to evaluate outline solutions and a mandatory model for the
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dialogue stage docs not provide detailed answers on mundane issues such as the
ones above mentioned for Spain.
The second issue is faced by local authorities. In Portugal. all reports (preliminary
and definitive> on procurement procedures are voted for in a meeting of the local
council and arc not approved by the jury for the procedure. It means that the fol-
lowing votes have to be taken: tender documents. assessment of the economic,
technical or professional ability of candidates, admission of outline solutions, win-
ning solution, common technical specifications and the winner of the contract.
Apart from the first, all others have to be voted twice, once for the preliminary
version and another for the final report. In addition, the executive branch of local
councils in Portugal do not include only members of the winning party. Seats are
allocated on a proportional basis. Local councils are composed of members of be-
tween 2 and 5 political parties. The reality is that this increases the entropy of the
procedure. its duration and the political risk of the whole procedure being de-
railed in one of those various votes. Perhaps Portuguese local contracting authori-
ties might consider bringing on board the jury members of the opposition as it
has been successfully done in Spain.
As we have seen in Chapter 6, before the start of the dialogue stage companies
will have to submit preliminary solutions that will be assessed by the contracting
authorities. This may raise two specific issues. The first is the level of detail the
preliminary solution needs to have and how the contracting authority can make
sure that it is comparing solutions with a similar level of detail. The second. in the
words of one respondent. is "how can the contracting authority know what is ade-
quate or not even before the start of the dialogue?"
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6.Fifth question: bestpractices identified
A number of practices identified during the empirical research conducted in
Spain can be described as being best practices at this point. In Pnrru~a/, nnn'
more, the limited number of interviews with contracting authorities that have ac-
tually used the procedure docs not allow for significant conclusions,
In this section, the best practices identified will be divided by the moment they
arc relevant to: before the start, during the dialogue stage and after tenders arc
submitted.
As purely project management best practices the author highlights the need of
preparing the procedure correctly in advance and anticipating potential problems,
hire external assistance if needed, limiting the duration of the dialogue stage,
organising the meetings per sector, and having internal audit controls in place.
As mixed best practices the author thinks creating a multidisciplinary team
(based in the jury for the procedure), conducting a prior request for information,
providing just enough detail at the start, limiting the number of candidates, re-
stricting the discussions after tenders have been submitted.
(I) Before the launch of the procedure
Contracting authorities should take the opportunity of including actual experts in
the jury for the procedure as mandated by the Law on Public Senor Contracts
and create multi-disciplinary teams to manage the procedure as a project team. It
was clearly seen that when the opportunity was taken to change the practice of
allocating simply one person to run the procedure and actually arcept the change
needed that the contracting authority was happy with the end result. 'Ibis was
done by allocating a full team of internal experts (project rnanagerts), legal advi-
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sors, technicians for various areas), or if the contracting authority did not have
enough in-house man power by hiring external legal, financial, project manage-
ment or technical advice. As one of the respondents put it, "paying a small fee to
have external expert advice paid off handsomely in the running of the procedure
and the end result".
Some contracting authorities have posted requests for information notices on the
Tenders Electronic Daily website to gauge the interest the project may have in
the market. Furthermore, this has given companies more time to prepare them-
selves and even to create consortia.
As has already been mentioned in literature, it is paramount to prepare the proce-
dure correctly in advance and anticipate as many potential issues (and solutions)
as possible before launching the tender.?" This is particularly important in a pro-
cedure with so many uncertainties and where so much scope for discretion in the
actual running is given to the contracting authorities, especially in comparison
with the open or restricted procedures. Further to this point, it is beneficial to
put as much information as possible in the tender documents, particularly house-
keeping rules. The contracting authority should explain clearly how the dialogue
stage is actually going to be organised (particularly the meetings, the order where
they will be held, if sectorial meetings will be held, the maximum number of par-
ticipants and who should participate) and all associated information to assuage
any fears potential candidates might have in participating in a competitive dia-
logue. It should even limit itself, for instance, by declaring that all the informa-
tion will be treated as confidential if it is ready to actually do so and feels candi-
dates will take that as a sign of seriousness.
646. Burnett, 'Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - Towards an optimal approach' (1009) 4
EPPPL P.I93 and Rijksoverheid, The competitive dialogue (Rijksoverheid, 2009) P.W25.
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Defining the maximum number of candidates should be decided before launching
the dialogue. Many of the contracting authorities interviewed in Spain have not
done so and regret their decision. The general view of respondents is that, at this
point, the appropriate number of candidates to invite to the dialogue stage is be-
tween three and five.According to the respondents, over five transaction costs in-
volved are vastly increased and timescales to actually run the dialogue stage will
also have a tendency to slip.
It is worthy to mention the differences found on the topic of payments for devel-
oping solutions found across respondents. Respondents in Portugal that had not
used the competitive dialogue said that it was a good idea and could foster com-
petition. Indeed, payments have been made in the country for participants in
open procedures with a negotiation phase. However, in the two countries it was
not possible to find one competitive dialogue where these payments have taken
place. Contracting authorities are not paying any sort of compensation to candi-
dates. In consequence, the question remains: which is the best practice? To pay
or not to pay candidates for the development of solutions?
(2) During the dialogue
During the dialogue stage the contracting authority should make sure it has put
in place sound internal controls that will allow it to run the dialogue efficiently.
For instance, meetings should be divided into specific areas if the project is big
enough to warrant smaller teams allocated to each area (this was successfully seen
in action in the medical sector). Information about the content or detailed agen-
da of the meeting should be given in advance to the candidates. Interviewees have
argued that minutes of meetings provide a useful paper trail for both the purpose
of internal audit and external controls.
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Also internally, the contracting authority should set either at the start of the pro-
cedure or at the latest at the start of the dialogue stage set a deadline for the dia-
logue stage and partial milestones to make sure it avoids never ending discussions
and the slippage of timescales. This was implemented by a contracting authority
in the country after the review of their first procedure. It was considered - and
validated in subsequent procedures - that pre-determining a deadline and partial
milestones would improve the dialogue stage.
Non-text based communications should be avoided during the dialogue stage.
One of the interviewees made it clear to the candidates that no information
transmitted through telephone would be taken into account. Another one set up
a secure website with public and private areas to handle all the communications
between the parties.
(3) After the submission of tenders
Contrary to the responses from Portuguese interviewees criticising the Por-
tuguese law makers for limiting the scope of post-submission discussions, in Spain
the body of evidence gathered points to the limited utility of such discussions and
potential risks for the contracting authority in entertaining discussions particular-
ly after the preferred bidder has been chosen. I t has been argued that consid-
erable scope for discussions after tenders have been submitted would be benefi-
cial for competitive dialogue."? as it would reduce the transaction costs overall,
for instance.
However, it is apparent from the data collected that the lack of use of these dis-
cussions is not leading to failure in the procedure. On the contrary. candidates are
647. Kennedy-Loest, 'What can be done at the preferred bidder stage in competitive dialogue' (2006) 6
PPLR, P.316 and Arrowsmith, Tbe law ofpublic and utilities procuremtnt (znd, Sweet& Maxwell, 200i), p.631.
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submitting very complete and detailed tenders. Furthermore, particularly after
the choice of the preferred bidder, renderers are not able to use the lack of com-
petition to its benefit to extract concessions or changes to the contract, since at
this point the company is in a better bargaining position. Furthermore, the com-
pany has all the incentive in keeping discussing to improve its position so avoid-
ing these discussions at this point may also provide respite for "discussion creep".
It has not been observed in practice that companies are not able to provide a
sufficiently detailed bid at the end of the dialogue stage and subsequent discus-
sions are needed to refine it. Itwas observed however, that a significant number
of candidates reaching the end of the dialogue opt not to present bids. This may
be a sign of the added transaction costs of submitting a very detailed bid, or as it
was argued before in the previous question, the case that candidates are not
taking the dialogue seriously enough. Paradoxically, it may be the situation also of
having too much "competition", that is, too many companies taking part during
the dialogue stage and feeling there is no point in submitting bids. It is also too
soon to see if during the performance of the contract problems arise due to the
lack of discussions after the dialogue stage.
7.Dialogue stage models seen in practice
From the practice observed in the target countries, as we have discussed above in
Chapters 7 and 10, it was possible to find in Spain that contracting authorities
were adopting three different ways of conducting the dialogue stage and that this
classification covered virtually all of the procedures assessed. That is not say that
it is easy in many cases to actually find the differences between the crowd-sourced
or common trunk model and the other models and the boundaries appear to be
hazy. A thorough case-by-case analysis (not only of tender documents, but also of
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the minutes of meetings and eventually more participants in the discussions)
would be necessary to confirm this thesis and it was not possible to do so during
this research as it had not been planned for in advance.
The practice of developing a common trunk model had already been mentioned
in the literature as a common way of conducting competitive dialogue proce-
dures.r" Furthermore, the author has seen his thesis of a three-pronged classifica-
tion of the dialogue stage corroborated by a paper on the experience in I taly that
was presented in September 2010 at the Global Revolution V conference in
Copenhagen.v'"
This piece of information is worth bringing to the body of knowledge. The mod-
els provide a helpful guideline at this point, on a topic where interviewees have ar-
gued legal rules or at least qualified information is lacking. This classification pro-
vides some structure to the issue of how to organise the dialogue stage, moving
the analysis to an abstract level higher than the pure empirical analysis. The ob-
jective is, thus, to stimulate discussion about this topic and contribute for the ad-
vance of legal science. The author does not argue these are the only ways to con-
duct the dialogue stage but that these were the only ones he witnessed in
practice.
Further to providing some structure to the analysis of the dialogue stage, this
classifications raises two new questions. The first question is what is the actual
importance and logic of having confidentiality and a ban of cherry picking in a
crowd-sourced or common trunk model? The second, connected with the first,
but more of an assertion than really a question, is: how can the contracting au-
thority comply with the principle of transparency and not identify clearly at the
648. Burnett, 'Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - Towards an optimal approach' (1009) 4
EPPPL p. 193. .
649. Racca and Casalini, (Paper) (1010) Implementation and application of competitive dialogue: experience
in Italy
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start of the procedure what model it will follow? Further research is needed to
confirm if these three models represent the reality in Spain and other member
States. In any event, even if the classification does not cover the whole reality and
contracting authorities may organise the procedure in other ways, disclosing what
model of dialogue will be applied is an important piece of information that should
be made available at the start of the procedure to companies.
In Portugal, due to the limitations imposed by the national law, only the common
specifications model was seen in action. However, from the few interviews carried
contracting authorities appeared to have problems in maintaining the discussions
on different solutions during the dialogue stage without leading the candidates
into a common solution as in the crowd-sourced or common trunk model. It may
happen that as practice develops in the country we will end up with seeing the
crowd-sourced model being applied in practice under the guise of a common
specifications model. This might also explain why in one of the few situations
where the procedure was used why the contracting authority had problems in
identifying a winning solution when all were so similar.
In any event, the models herewith described are based in the practice witnessed
by the author and will probably evolve with time.
8. Conclusion
To conclude this research it is worth pointing out the similarities and differences
between the two countries and EU legal framework on the competitive dialogue.
Although both Portugal and Spain have transposed the competitive dialogue into
their national legislations the way they did so was different and with a direct im-
pact in the use of the procedure. Whereas in Spain the law makers decided to
copy the essential of Directive 2004118 (recitals included) into the Public Sector
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Contracts Law, the Portuguese law makers considered necessary to adapt the pro-
cedure to fit within the national framework. This has led to the identification of a
significant number of potential issues (legal and otherwise) with the procedure in
Portugal. For the author, the principal cause for the lack of use of competitive di-
alogue in Portugal is the more restricted approach taken to the grounds for use
connected to the overall restrictive interpretation that was observed in the empir-
ical research. In the author's view, the purposeful sampling employed ensures
these findings are extendable to the general population of those categories (public
procurement lawyers, contracting authorities).
Practice in each country is clearly different. In Portugal the use of the procedure
is incipient at best. In Spain, although the usage numbers are far from those seen
in France or the UK for instances, from the data it appears an interesting practice
is developing in the country. Contracting authorities are applying the procedure
and appear overall to be satisfied with it and the challenges to project manage-
ment brought by it. Contrary to respondents in Portugal, they do not seem to
have any issues with the grounds for use. The author considers these findings are
also extensible to the general population of contracting authorities that have used
the procedure, but not the overall population of Spanish contracting authorities.
It is clear that the practice developed in each country, particularly in the areas
where the procedure is being used, does not fit exactly the objectives set forth by
the Commission. On the one hand, it is not being used for major infrastructure
projects (except IT and R&D, where the use coincides with the expectations of
the Commission). It is telling that it has been used zero times for transport net-
works, although both countries are building new high speed rail lines, for in-
stance. Furthermore, although the Commission has argued that competitive dia-
logue should not be used for all public-private partnerships contracts but only in
the cases where the contract was "particularly complex". In Spain, however, com-
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peritive dialogue IS the default procedure for all public-private cooperation
contracts.
From the practice in Spain it was possible to identify three distinct models of
organizing the dialogue stage. The author does not argue these are the best or
even the sole models to do so, but those were the ones he saw and replicate what
was found in Italy by other researchers. What the author considers is that con-
tracting authorities should identify what kind of model they intend to use in the
dialogue stage or otherwise transparency may be compromised.
Although according to Directive 2004118 it is possible to exclude candidates (or
at least solutions, depending on the interpretation) during the dialogue stage, the
truth is that in Spain this was not seen in practice. Contracting authorities are
not formally excluding candidates or solutions, nor conducting successive stages.
However, the way they are organizing it by demanding more from the candidates
is making them quit the procedure on their own accord. They are thus, achieving
exclusions of candidates without facing judicial review risks.
Although the differences in both countries are clear and numerous, there appears
to be some coincidence in the way the Portuguese law makers regulated the com-
petitive dialogue after the submission of tenders and the way Spanish contracting
authorities are dealing with the same stage. Whereas in the Portuguese law the
tender stage is simply cross referenced to the open and restricted procedures, the
Spanish law allows for discussions to take place under the exact same conditions
as Directive 2004/18. Spanish contracting authorities, however, appear not to en-
tertain discussions with tenderers or the winner of the contract. In fact, it ap-
pears they are applying the Portuguese law and not the Spanish. On this topic,
the practice found in Spain is different from what could be expected from the Di-
rective 20041I8 and the Law on Public Sector Contracts. However, it may be said
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that this contributes to avoiding "negotiation or bid creep" and also for too many
adjustments to be made when competition is no longer present.
It should be noted though that many issues the author found during the course of
his research do not have a legal basis. Issues such as the perceived cost of the pro-
cedure, how to organize the meetings, how to keep the candidates interested in
the procedure, how to ensure they keep the promises during the dialogue stage or
how extract from them the best tender possible are more practical than legal. For
the author it seems they seem to be project management issues that, however, are
relevant to mention as they impact the practice of the procedure. Pointing them
out may be of use to contracting authorities in any member State.
Regarding best practices, the findings on Spain about the information to give at
the start of the procedure, the anticipation of problems, creation of multidiscipli-
nary team, restricting verbal discussions outside of meetings and (eventually) the
lack of discussions after tenders are submitted may again be of use to entities in
other member States.
Finally, due to the exploratory nature of this project, the author considers that
more (new) questions than answers have been found. They provide a starting
point for subsequent research by other researchers, perhaps using different meth-
ods such as quantitative analysis, in either country and also in other member
States. What is clear for the author is that a lot remains to be investigated about
competitive dialogue.
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Annex I - informed consent form
Informed consent form for interview
I , the interviewee, hereby consent to be interviewed by Pedro Telles,
(the interviewer) a Ph.D candidate at the University of Nottingham School of Law, su-
pervised by Professors Sue Arrowsmith and David Fraser and doing research on the im-
plementation of the competitive dialogue procedure in Portugal and Spain.
Consent is also hereby granted for the use of the interview responses as input data solely
for the purposes of the research identified in the previous paragraph.
Anonymity wiU be preserved by means of removal of identifiers and other technical
means to break the link between the data and the interviewee.
The interviewer will ensure that confidentiality of the interview content is kept, with the
exception of obligations imposed by law, such as the Freedom of Information Act, Data
Protection Act, as well as copyright and libel laws. Data will be kept on a heavily encrypt-
ed sparse image file stored remotely with transfer of files done through Secure Socket Layer
connections.
The parties have agreed that the interview shall be registered by means of (tape recorder/
notes).
Any and all records kept will be destroyed after two years.
The parties have also agreed in the following set of limitations:
- not to address the interviewee by name;
- not to identify the interviewee workplace;
- background information provided with guarantee of anonymity;
- (Others may be added on an ad-hoc basis, if requested)
(Place and date)
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Annex II - Informed consent form (Spanish)
Autorizacion de entrevista
Yo, ', eI entrevistado, concedo autorizacion de entrevista a Pedro Telles, un
estudiante de doctorado en Derecho de la Universidad de Nottingham supervisionado
por los Profesores Sue Arrowsmith y David Fraser, que estudia a la implernentacion del
procedimiento de dialogo competitivo en Espana y Portugal.
La autorizacion se concede solamente para que los datos recogidos en la entrevista sean
utilizados en la invesrigacion identificada en et parrafo anterior.
La identidad del entrevistado se quedara protegida bajo sigilo por medio de rernocion de
los elementos 0 conexiones que identifiquen al entrevistado en los datos.
El entrevistador garantizara la confidencialidad de los datos recogidos, con excepcion de
las obligaciones que Ie sean impuestas por ley, como las del Freedom of Information Act
o Data Protection Act, as! como las derivadas de copyright. Los datos seran mantenidos
en un fichero bajo encriptaci6n y archivados remotamente con la transferencia hecha en
un una conexion secura.
El entrevistado acepta que se (grabe/saquen apunres) de la entrevista.
Todos los datos seran destruidos al final de siete afios,
Se reserva el entrevistado el derecho de retirarse su autorizacion de participacion a
cualquier momento hasta la entrega de la tesis por el estudiante.
Se acordo aun que:
- al entrevistado no se identificara por su nombre;
- no se identificara a la entidad donde trabaja el entrevistado;
- informacion extra sera fornecida bajo garantfa de confidencialidad
(Local y fecha)
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Annex III - interview guide: Portuguese law makers
I. Situation of particularly complex contracts before the Public Contracts
2. Competitive dialogue in the Public Contracts Code
2.1 Reasons for transposition
2.2 Relationship with other procedures
2.3 Grounds for use
2.3.1 Article 30 of the Public Contracts Code
2.3.2 Article 33 of the Public Contracts Code
2.4 Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates
2.4.1 Which model is available
2.5. Single solution
2.5.1 Why?
2.5.2 Why evaluate at the start of the dialogue?
2.6 Exclusions during the dialogue
2.6.1 Reasons for them not being admitted
2.7 Confidentiality
2.7.1 Importance
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2.7.2 Lack of innovation
2.8 Electronic auctions and negotiation phase
2.8.1 Reasons for the express exclusion
2.9 Common specifications model
2.9.1 Reasons for it being mandatory
2.9.2 Comparison with own solution model
2.9.3 Relationship with confidentiality, cherry picking and intellectual property
2.10 Transition to the tender stage
2.10.1 Candidates to be notified
2.10.2 Candidates to be invited to submit tenders
2.11 Tender stage
2.11.1 Lack of a stage for fine-tuning
2.11.2 Lack for a specific stage for amendments and discussions
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Annex IV - interview guide: Portugal
I.Adoption decision
2. Grounds for use
3. Stan of the procedure
4. Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates
5. Dialogue stage
6. End of dialogue
7. Tender stage
8. General
I. Adoption decision
1.1 Choice of procedure (competitive dialogue or not)
2. Grounds for use
2.1 Particularly complex contract concept
2.2 Interpretation of the grounds for use
2.3 Impossibility of article 30/I of the Public Contracts Code
2.4 Technical ability and functional needs of article 30/2
3. Stan of the procedure
3.1 Work done in advance
3.2 Information put in the notice
3.3Number of candidates
3-4 Payment for the development of solutions
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3.5 Contract cost estimation
4. Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates
4.1 Complex or simple, which is more appropriate
4.2 Issues with either of the models
4.3 Alternatives to the current models
5. Dialogue stage
5-1 Organisation of the dialogue stage
5.1.1 How was the stage organised (meetings, communications with candidates)
5.1.2 Detail in the law
5.2 Number of solutions
5.2.1 Limitation to a single solution
5.2.2 Evaluation of preliminary solutions
P.3 Level of detail
5.2.4 Variants
5.3 Exclusions
5.3.1 Exclusions at the start of the dialogue
5.3.2 Lack of exclusions during the dialogue itself
5.4 Confidentiality
5.4.1 Interpretation of article 214/3 of the Public Contracts Code
5.4.2 Issues with confidentiality
5-4-3 Articulation with common specifications
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5-4-4 Rules on secrecy (article 66 of the Public Contracts Code) as an alternative
6. End of dialogue
6.1 What content ended up in the common technical specifications
6.2 Candidates dropping out?
7. Tender stage
7.1 Tenders
7.1.1 Tender completeness
7.1.2 Abnormally low tenders
7.2 Fine-tuning stage
7.2.1 Should exist?
7.2.2 What should be discussed
7.3. Discussion with preferred bidder
7.J.I What can be discussed
8. General
8.1 Reasons for lack of use
8.2 Market feedback
8.3 Duration
8.4 Monetary cost
8.5 Human resources cost
8.6 Rules of the procedure (clear or unclear, points to improve)
8.7 General impression
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S.SJudicial review
S.9 Anything to add
-324-
Annex V - interview guide: Spain
I. Adoption decision
2. Grounds for use
3. Start of the procedure
4. Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ahility of candidates
5. Dialogue stage
6. End of dialogue
7. Tender stage
8. General
I. Adoption decision
I.I Choice of procedure (competitive dialogue or not>
2. Grounds for use
2.1 Particularly complex contract concept
2.2 Interpretation of the grounds for use
2.3 Public-private cooperation contracts
3. Start of the procedure
3.1 Work done in advance
3.2 Information put in the notice
J.3 Number of candidates
3-4 Payment for the development of solutions
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3.5 Contract cost estimation
3.6 Composition of the jury for the procedure
4. Assessment of the economic, technical or professional ability of candidates
4.1 Choice of candidates to invite
4.2 Number of candidates invited
4.3]udicial review
5. Dialogue stage
5.1Organisation of the dialogue stage
501.1How was the stage organised (meetings, communications with candidates)
5.1.2Detail in the law
501.3Successive stages
5.2Solutions
5.2.1Number of solutions admitted
502.2Level of detail
5.2.3Variants
5.2.4 Outline solution at the start
5.3 Exclusions
5.3.1Were forecast
5.3.2Use {criteria>
5.3.3]udicial review
5.4 Confidentiality
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5.4.1 Interpretation of article 16612 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts
5.4.2 Issues with confidentiality
5-4-3Information classified as confidential
5.4.4 Articulation with common specifications
6. End of dialogue
6.1 Candidates dropping out?
7. Tender stage
7.1 Tenders
7.1.1Tender completeness
7.1.2 Abnormally low tenders
7.2 Fine-tuning stage
7.2•1 Interpretation of article 1671I of the Law on Public Sector Contracts
7.2.2 What can be discussed
7.2.3 Actual use
7.3. Discussion with preferred bidder
7.3.1 Interpretation of article 167/2 of the Law on Public Sector Contracts
7.3.2 What can be discussed
7.3.3 Actual use
8. General
8.1 Lack of detail in the law or public procurement advisory body ruling/guidance
8.2 Market feedback
8.3 Duration
8-4 Monetary cost
8.5 Human resources cost
8.6 Rules of the procedure (clear or unclear, points to improve)
8.7 General impression
8.8Judicial review
8.9 Anything to add
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